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Abstract

The thesis analyses mid-nineteenth century electoral violence in England and Wales
in order to contribute to our understanding of the character of Victorian electoral
politics, and to assess the pace of political modernization as it has recently been
defined.

Historians have long acknowledged the presence of physical violence,

rioting and intimidation during British elections from at least the Middle Ages to the
turn of the twentieth-century, and yet the precise nature, frequency and scale of this
phenomenon has remained somewhat obscured by a lack of statistical data on the
subject. Therefore, by compiling a numerical sample of violence, based on strict
definitional parameters, this research corrects the quantitative void in which
discussions of English and Welsh election violence have largely been conducted.
This study of election violence provides a means of assessing the pace of
political change because coercion, intimidation and partisan conflict represented a
visible expression of an older electoral culture; one that stands contrary to
interpretations of the changes in electoral politics after 1832. Almost fifty years after
the passage of the Great Reform Act, elections in some English and Welsh
constituencies continued to turn upon matters of local importance, electoral history,
tradition and ritual. Within such a framework the outbreak of violence represented a
continued recourse to traditional, pre-reform electoral practices. Historians discuss
the rapid development of partisan, principled politics after 1832, yet the picture of
mid-Victorian electoral politics that emerges from this study is one in which such
phenomena competed - particularly in larger boroughs - with older expressions of
political mobilization.
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Chapter I
I

Some of the Conservative workmen in Carmarthen felt sorely
aggrieved by the treatment they received at the hands of the Radical
mob on the previous Tuesday ... and accordingly expressed their firm
determination not to permit a repetition of such conduct. .. About two in
the afternoon there were signs of a general melee ... Several small
skirmishes occurred, but we are happy to say that nothing serious
transpired ... The scene, however, afforded a strong argument on the
question of democracy, proving that it is dangerous, that its weapon is
violence, and that intellect is scorned by a certain section of the people.

Carmarthen Borough Election, November 1868. 1

In many ways the above quote, from the. Carmarthen Journal, represents a typical

contemporary press report of mid-nineteenth century English election violence:
conflict is described, here between conservative and radical partisans; the incident
gave rise to that most Victorian of fears, the threat of demos; and violence is blamed
on less educated sections of the populace.

Such characteristics were recurring

elements in Victorian accounts of violent electioneering- to which most mid-century
English and Welsh citizens were well, if not equally, accustomed. Yet to what extent
does this isolated anecdote reflect the wider realities of Victorian election violence?
The Carmarthen example is in fact relatively atypical: it refers to a small Welsh
county town, whereas the majority of this type of violence occurred in large English
industrial towns; and although in this instance the scale of violence reached only that
of a 'small skirmish', most episodes of mid-Victorian election disorder were serious
outbursts of crowd violence.

The character of English electoral violence has been the focus of a number of
historical studies since the 1960s, yet few reach a consensus regarding the scale,
1

Carmarthen Journal, 27 November 1868, p.3.
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frequency and nature of the phenomenon, and fewer still are based on any degree of
quantitative research. The lack of a detailed statistical study of this subject has meant
that some of the characteristics attributed to electoral violence have been misplaced.
These include issues of origin (where did violence occur), scale (the severity of
violence) and relevance (what such episodes represented within the context of
electoral politics). It is therefore the goal of this thesis, through a quantitative analysis
of episodes of violence, to examine and critically

reas~ess

the ambiguities that

characterise contemporary historical understanding of English and Welsh electoral
disorder. Furthermore, by arguing that this phenomenon reflected the priorities of an
older electoral culture, this study will use violence as a method of assessing the pace
of political modernisation in England and Wales during the mid-Victorian period.

An important characteristic of this period was that while some elements of the
political system heralded a new age of modem, democratic mass politics, others
remained fixed to an older style of politics that was more traditional and exclusive. In
the introduction to her doctoral thesis on the 1857 and 1859 British general elections,
Caroline Jackson writes of the relationship between these 'old' and 'new' elements of
politics:

This study ... reflects the transitional character of the politics of the late
1850s; and it illuminates the paradoxes which flowed from the
presence, side by side in the political system, of practices and attitudes
some of which looked back to the past, others of which looked forward
to the politics of the future. 2

I

I

t

Thus in Britain during the mid-Victorian period there emerged a dichotomy between

~

two competing forms of politics. Alongside the development of constituency party

I

II

II

I
I

I

organisation, the growth of voter partisanship and the evolution of the modem two2

Caroline Jackson, "The British General Elections of 1857 and 1859", unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford
University, 1980, p.2.

-
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party system there existed a continued recourse to an older form of politics. That
dichotomy is reflected in the title of this thesis, 'Democracy and Disorder'; terms that
describe the relationship between nascent modem features of a democratic system,
and the lingering elements of traditional pre-reform politics. Within the context of
this study 'democracy' describes the modern features of the British political system:
an expanded and more inclusive franchise; the growth of efficient and centralised
party organisations; rational political debate; party discipline and the gradual
subversion of local, idiosyncratic issues by national party platforms increasingly
disseminated by a popular press. The term 'disorder' correspondingly describes the
pre-modem or pre-reform features of the system including the politics of deference
and influence, consensus politics, local forms of political identity and organisation,
the attachment by a portion of the electorate, to corrupt inducements to vote such as
money and beer, and the presence of electoral violence. The co-existence of old and
new forms of politics reflected a somewhat disjointed process of political
modernisation. It is this aspect of nineteenth-century British politics that this study
will also explore.

To begin with, however, it is necessary to outline precisely what is being discussed
here. The terms election violence and election disorder are used interchangeably
throughout the thesis to describe episodes of crowd violence that occurred during the
period set aside for the contesting of a parliamentary election. 3 More specifically,
election violence is defmed here as a wilful disruption to the procedures of an election
campaign, through the use of collective violence, whether physical or material,
implicit or explicit. The term 'violence' is defmed as physical damage to persons or
3

Violence also occurred at by-elections during the period and a number of these are included in the
sample.

""'

Chapter I

5

property, or the threat thereof. Instances of election violence are distinguished from
criminal activity and other forms of popular disturbance (such as food, military,
labour or political riots), not merely by their occurrence during an election campaign,
but also by a direct relationship to the events, personalities and issues that comprised
specific electoral contests. This distinction is an important one, as it relates each
instance of violence to the electoral/political process. Upon such a predication rests
the argument that an analysis of such events can be used to assess the pace of political
change.
Episodes of election disorder were often complicated events that owed as
much to long-term, localised, political grievances as to short-term provocations.
Violence could occur when an unpopular candidate defeated a local favourite, when .
liberal distributions of free alcohol exacerbated partisan enthusiasm, when organised
gangs were hired to intimidate voters, when bands of party supporters encountered
each other in the streets, or when campaign events - such as speeches, meetings and
processions- ran out of control in an age when public policing was still in its infancy.
Election violence was not normally the product of direct political protest, nor did it
represent a challenge to the established political system. Rather, it grew out of the
fabric of local electoral conflict, either as the product of corrupt practices, violent
partisan enthusiasm or as a loss of control by campaign managers of the ritualistic

II

processes that characterised Victorian electioneering. Furthermore, election violence
differed from other types of popular disturbance in that it was largely predictable - it

I

only occurred during an election campaign - and in a great many constituencies it

I

I

formed an expected (though not generally accepted) part of electoral proceedings.

I

I

Much of the evidence of disorder examined in this thesis is drawn from sustained
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episodes of violence, however some attention has also been given to the 'cooping', or
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kidnapping, of voters prior to the polling day. Though not strictly episodes of crowd
violence, such actions are of interest because they represented the use of physical
force to pervert the electoral process. Furthermore, in many cases the forcible capture
of electors was accompanied by, or initiated, more serious outbursts of disorder.

The quantification and analysis of election violence is based on an important
assumption: that within the generally tumultuous atmosphere that accompanied
Victorian campaigning, instances of violence can be identified as events that exceeded
contemporary expectations of acceptable behaviour. Victorian contested elections
were often exciting, colourful and rowdy occasions, celebrated more as carnival than
as a serious mechanism of electoral politics. Campaign proceedings were infused
with strong ritualised elements that emphasised widespread public participation.
Furthermore, the established rituals of electoral ceremony (candidates' entry to the
constituency, the canvass, the nomination, speeches and processions, the declaration
of the poll and, in some cases, the chairing of the member) were not merely about the
mechanics of electing an official representative of the constituency. Indeed John
Vincent describes how, "Elections were for the England of 1860 what drama, sport
and liturgy have been for earlier and later times; there was nothing else which brought
an entire population together and demanded they determine their relation to each
other". 4 Elections thus fulfilled more than just a political function. Frank O'Gorman
writes that election rituals delivered specific messages to both voters and non-voters,
relating to matters of community welfare and local hierarchies of leadership. 5 And
James Vemon argues that the symbolic practices of official politics were used by

4

John Vincent, The Formation of the Liberal Party, 1857-1868 (London, 1966), p.xv.
Frank O'Gorman, "Campaign Rituals and Ceremonies: The social meaning of elections in England,
1760 -1860" Past and Present, 135 (1992), p.81.

5

7

Chapter I

political elites, and the disenfranchised (those without the right to vote), to contest
"exclusive official definitions of the political arena". 6 Campaigns were thus highly
anticipated events in which an entire community became involved.
Amid the 'licenced saturnalia' of a Victorian election, customary expectations
of social behaviour were suspended in favour of the values of an electoral culture
which encouraged mass participation, enthusiasm and social inversion.

During a

campaign candidates were often obliged to court the attentions of both voters and
non-voters, so that as a result even those normally excluded from the official political
arena found themselves, "free of the normal social restraints ... [and] able to treat their
superiors with scant respect; to interrupt, ,heckle and insult them". 7 Within such an
atmosphere of excitement, ritual and spectacle the opportunities for, and likelihood of .
violence were high. In July 1865 the dissenting journal Nonconformist commented on
the excesses of the recent general election: "Much allowance is to be made at such a
time of popular excitement for the vagaries and licence of an English crowd". 8 By the
middle of the nineteenth-century British elections were well-established as popular,
noisy, demonstrative events, during which normal standards of social conduct did not
apply.
However, amidst the commotion that could attend an electoral contest there
were still boundaries that governed the limits of acceptable behaviour.

Besides

causing serious injury and destruction of property, violence could potentially
invalidate an election result and trigger a parliamentary inquiry into the constituency.
English election law provided for the setting aside of an election result if, "voters
were deterred from voting by a prevailing terror, even without violence or a threat

I

6

James Vemon, Politics and the People: A study in English political culture, c.l815 -1867
(Cambridge, 1993), p.49.
7
O'Gorman, "Campaign Rituals", p.85.
8
Nonconformist, 26 July 1865, p.603.

I

i1
I

:Al

I
I
I
'(£

......
l!

J

____________________________________________________________________________________ ________
,

·------

8

Chapter I

thereof being brought to bear upon them personally".9 Therefore while a certain
degree of license was afforded to election crowds, the outbreak of physical damage to
persons or property represented a breach of accepted electoral conduct.

Local

magistrates were quick to respond to such events, and many constituencies took active
preparations to minimise the risk of violence. Such actions - which included the
bolstering of local police forces, the swearing in of special constables or the
requisitioning of a military presence - reflected the willingness of contemporary
authorities to maintain acceptable standards of social behaviour during election
campaigns. The outbreak of actual and serious violence - defmed as physical damage
to persons or property - represented an obvious transgression of electoral licence. It
is events falling into this category that are the focus of this study.

IT

The mid-Victorian period has been chosen for the study of election violence because
those years witnessed considerable, and momentous, political change. During this
period the second great instalment of parliamentary reform was passed (Reform Act,
1867) and secret voting introduced (Ballot Act, 1872). The franchise was widened
and efforts were made to combat electoral corruption (Corrupt Practices Acts 1854,
1883 and Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868). The machinery and growing influence
of party organization accelerated and the outline of the modem two-party system was

I
~

established. In The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill Robert Blake describes

l

the years between 1866 and 1881 as being, "one of the most fascinating periods of

I

I

I

!I

I

II
I

IJ

modem British political history. The fifteen years in question cover a major extension
9

William Leader, The Franchise: A manual of registration and election law and practice (London,
1879), p.ll3.

\
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of the franchise, the creation of the institutional framework of the modern state, and
the great duel between Disraeli and Gladstone". 10

Yet despite the obvious

significance of the mid-Victorian years they have received comparatively little
historical attention. Blake himself bemoaned this fact in 1970: "This period [18461865] has been less closely studied than the years immediately before and
after ... There is no book on the period comparable to the studies of Professor Gash for
the 1830s and 1840s, or of Professor Hanham for the period 1867- 1885". 11 Indeed,
as recently as 1996 John Davis and Duncan Tanner wrote in Historical Research that,

The electoral system after 1884 has attracted considerable attention.
The system and the electorate before and immediately after 1832 are
also much-debated issues. The mid-Victorian period remains in the
shadow of the earlier and later periods, although it was in the eighteen
seventies and eighties that the legal framework of the Edwardian
franchise was established, the party caucus developed and the
implications of democracy became clear. 12

Mid nineteenth-century Britain has not, of course, remained totally devoid of
historical attention, and Davis and Tanner highlight the pioneering works of
J.R.Vincent, H.J.Hanham, I.G.Jones and K.T.Hoppen in this areaY Indeed since the
1970s a number of studies have been published that have shone light onto various
aspects of mid-Victorian politics, albeit to differing degrees and across disparate time
periods. 14 Some of the more recent contributions to the period include: Jonathan

10

Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 1970), p.97.
Ibid., p.284.
12
John Davis and Duncan Tanner, "The Borough Franchise After 1867" Historical Research, 69
(1996), p.306.
13
Davis and Tanner highlight the following: H.J.Hanham, Elections and Party Management (2nd edn,
Harvester, 1978); J.R.Vincent, The Formation of the Liberal Party, 1857- 1868 (Constable, 1966);
I.G.Jones, Explorations and Explanations: Essays in the Social History of Victorian Wales (Llandysul,
1981) and K.T.Hoppen, "The Franchise and Electoral Politics in England and Ireland, 1832 -1885",
History, lxx (1985) and idem, Elections, Politics and Society in Ireland, 1832 -1885 (Oxford, 1984).
14
A survey of these includes: Derek Fraser, Urban Politics in Victorian England (Leicester, 1976);
D.C.Moore, The Politics ofDeference: A study ofthe mid-nineteenth century English political system
(Hassocks, 1976); Angus Hawkins, "Parliamentary Government and Victorian Political Parties, 18301880" English Historical Review, 104 (July 1989); Richard Shannon, The Age ofDisraeli, 1868-1881
11
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Pan'Y, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (Yale, 1993);
Matthew Cragoe, An Anglican Aristocracy: The Moral Economy of the Landed Estate

in Carmarthenshire, 1832- 1895 (Clarendon, 1996); Angus Hawkins, British Party
Politics, 1852 - 1886 (Macmillan, 1998) and K.T.Hoppen's recent survey of midcentury politics and society, The Mid- Victorian Generation, 1846 - 1886 (Oxford,
1998).
Despite these works nineteenth-century electoral disturbances have not before
been the sole subject of sustained analysis, though numerous studies of British
political history have discussed them: Cornelius O'Leary and Charles Seymour
examine violence within the context of parliamentary and electoral reform/ 5 Norman
Gash and H.J.Hanham include violence within their discussions of electoral
corruption/ 6 Donald Richter and John Stevenson incorporate violent electioneering
within their studies of popular disturbance; 17 K.T.Hoppen employs violence to
compare the electoral cultures of England and Ireland/ 8 and James Vernon and Jon
Lawrence both discuss violence within their post-modern interpretations of Victorian
political culture.

19

However, the lack of a comprehensive study of this phenomenon

has resulted in a degree of uncertainty about the exact nature of nineteenth-century

(London, 1992); K.T.Hoppen, "Roads to Democracy: Electioneering and corruption in nineteenthcentury England and Ireland" History, vol.81, 2 (64) 1996; E.Jaggard, "Small Boroughs and Political
Modernisation, 1832 -1868" Albion, vol.29, 4 (Winter 1996); Vemon, Politics and the People and Jon
Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, language and popular politics in England, 1867-1914
(Cambridge, 1998).
15
Comelius O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections, 1868 -1911 (Oxford,
1962). Charles Seymour, Electoral Reform in England and Wales: The development and operation of
the parliamentary franchise, 1832 -1885 (Newton Abbot, 1970).
16
Norman Gash, Politics in the Age ofPeel: A study in the technique ofparliamentary representation,
1830-1850 (2nd edition, Hassocks, 1977). Hanham, Elections and Party Management (1978)
17
Donald Richter, "Public Order and Popular Disturbances in Great Britain, 1865 -1914", unpublished
PhD thesis, University of Maryland, 1965. John Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England, 17001870 (New York, 1979). See also John Stevenson and Roland Quinalt (eds), Popular Protest and
Public Order: Six studies in British history, 1790-1820 (London, 1974).
·
18
K.T.Hoppen, "Grammars of Electoral Violence in Nineteenth Century England and Ireland", English
Historical Review, 109 (June 1994), pp.597- 620 .
19
.
Vemon, Politics and the Peo,ple; Lawrence, Speaking for the People.

-
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electoral disorder: Donald Richter and H.J .Hanham suggest that English election
violence was a feature of small rural towns/0 yet my evidence points to the larger
urban boroughs; John Stevenson argues that electoral rioting on the polling day
declined after the introduction of secret voting- "an obvious comment on the open
hustings and centralized voting as a cause for disorder"21

-

however violence

continued after 1872 and remained a feature of the polling day; and Roland Quinalt,
in Popular Protest and Public Order, describes how parliamentary reform reduced the

incidence of violence and that the Second Reform Act "contributed directly to more
peaceful electoral conditions"22

-

yet the general election of 1868 was the most

violent of the period and disorder continued to characterize electioneering in 1874 and
1880.
A survey of several notable contributions to this subject reveals some of the
ambiguities involved in developing an understanding of the nature of mid-century
election violence.

Donald Richter presents such disorder as a combination of

electoral corruption and public enthusiasm.

In "Public Order and Popular

Disturbances in Great Britain, 1865- 1914" and "The Role of Mob Riot in Victorian
Elections, 1865- 1885", Richter stresses the continuity of election violence into the
mid and late Victorian period. He argues that "All forms of illegal and corrupt
practices seemed to increase in direct proportion to the larger number of contested
elections and a wider franchise". 23 Richter acknowledges Norman Gash's work as

20

Donald Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot in Victorian Elections, 1865- 1885", Victorian Studies 15, 1
(Sept 1971), p.23; Hanham, Elections and Party Management, p.264n.
21
Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.288.
22
R.Quinalt, "The Warwickshire County Magistracy and Public Order, c.1830 -1870", in Stevenson
and Quinalt (eds), Popular Protest, p.201- 202.
23
Richter, "Public Order", p.170.
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having "delineated the rowdy and violent character of politics in the age of Peel"/4
and sets out to examine the implications of election violence between 1865 and 1885.
He found that throughout the nineteenth-century election riots formed, "an
acknowledged though routinely deplored aspect of British life",25 despite the
enactment of reform legislation in 1867, 1872 and 1883. He argues that it was in the
small towns and rural areas that much of the violence occurred, as it was in such
places that effective policing had yet to be established.

He suggests that the

persistence of election violence, in the face of reform measures, was an indication that
"the phenomenon was far less related to the malfunctioning of electoral machinery
than were other forms of corruption".26 Richter thus concedes that "many of the most
serious disorders seem entirely extraneous to the campaign and the polling, and were
spontaneous outbursts of sheer ebullience" .Z7 He focuses on election disorder as an
expression of the violence of Victorian society: one that he regards as defying easy
categorisation because of the spontaneity of its occurrence and the manner of its
provocation. In a period starved of mass public amusements Richter suggests that
violence represented a form of entertainment, and that it would be wrong to discount
"the magnetic attraction of excitement for its own sak:e".28 He thus offers a "simple
love of disorder" as one reason for the frequency of election violence, and argues that
it was, "only one manifestation of that violent society that deserves further
attention". 29
In "Grammars of Electoral Violence in Nineteenth Century England and

Ireland" K.T.Hoppen stresses an almost umbilical relationship between corrupt

24

Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.19.
Ibid.
26
Ibid., p.25.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid., p.28.
25
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practices and violence, and argues for the decline of electoral rioting by the mid1870s. His emphasis on the scale of Irish disorder does much to marginalize the scale
and frequency of English election violence. Hoppen presents disorder (in England) as
sporadic and insignificant, and electoral rioters as either venal, reactive or bored, thus
election crowds became violent only when they failed to get what they wanted (bribes
or treats), when they were paid to do so, or when they were shrugging off the daily
boredom that pervaded their lives. Increased urbanization after 1832 distanced the
population from traditional forms of communal protest, consequently rioting "lost its
former edge" as it became isolated from its origins in "agrarian patterns of violence".
Thus, in the place of a "driving, self-ge~erated popular participation in rioting", 30
there was left only an artificial inducement to violence provided by bribery and
treating.

In addition Hoppen stresses the importance of mass public events in

generating scenes of disorder, typified by his introduction to English electoral
violence:

Whereas election rioting had once constituted a sub-department, so to
speak, of communal violence in general, with the decline of the latter it
became isolated and marooned, not perhaps at ftrst shorn of all its
ferocity, but in the end little more than an anachronistic and irrelevant
aspect of public life. Having lost their violent contextual anchorage,
English elections after 1832, when violent at all, tended to fall into
disorder chiefly when candidates failed to deliver promised
rewards ... or when campaign managers lost control of those mass
displays of popular participation which, for a time, continued to be part
of the public choreography of electoral life. 31

Hoppen stresses the declining intensity of election violence after 1832, a process he
argues was almost complete by 1874 when, "what remained in the way of disorder
became more sporadic than ever". 32 He goes on to present election violence as often

30

Hoppen, "Grammars", p.606.
Ibid., p.605.
32
Ibid., p.610.
31

I
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simply a matter of "general disorder", rarely degenerating into serious rioting, while
also pointing out that 'much' of the violence of the period was little more than overenthusiastic campaign excitement, sometimes sponsored by the illegal exertions of
wealthy candidates. Yet he concludes by echoing Richter's suggestion that "letting
off steam" might be, "the most accurate description of what went on at the majority of
English elections between the First and Second Reform Acts". 33

Hoppen thus

sustains a degree of ambiguity regarding the nature of electoral violence by presenting
it as variously: the product of corruption; the outcome of a failure to provide promised
rewards; the result of a loss of control during large public displays of popular
participation; and as a form of social release.
Jon Lawrence, in Speaking for the People, examines late-century election
violence within a discussion of the rise of party after 1867.

He stresses the

importance of understanding the mechanics of control behind the mobilisation of
popular enthusiasm, and the ways in which this control helped shape the form and
content of party politics in the constituencies. Lawrence argues a 'purposeful' use of
violence during elections, and he discounts Richter's "simple love of disorder" and
Hoppen' s "irrecoverable personal antagonisms" as explanations for electoral violence.
Instead he discusses "the politics of disruption" in which election disorder becomes a
"highly controlled and purposive use of physical force", 34 presenting the phenomenon
within the context of attempts, "to establish a party's claim to political legitimacy in a
constituency". 35 In his view open public meetings and the physical control of civic
space "remained central to the symbolism of political legitimacy for politicians, as
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much as for their supporters". 36 Lawrence rejects Hoppen's suggestion that violence
became "an anachronistic and irrelevant aspect of public life", arguing instead that it
was, "a stylised repertoire ... [that] could be used to legitimate genuinely radical and
subversive forms of popular politics". 37 In response to Hoppen' s article he writes,

Rather than dismiss British electoral violence as a 'collusive - even
conservative - activity', because of its strong partisanship, and its
failure to challenge an elite-dominated political system, we need to
understand how politicians were able to mobilise popular enthusiasm
at particular moments, and how the demands of popular mobilisation in
turn helped to shape both the form and the content of party politics in
the constituencies. 38

Lawrence's argument that electoral disturbances can be treated as "phenomena which
embody the ambiguities inherent in the relationship between 'leaders' and 'led' in the
Victorian polity",39 suggests a symbiotic connection between political elites and
electoral rioters, in which violence provided the former with a representation of
political legitimacy, and the latter with an opportunity to influence the form and
content of party politics.

These brief outlines indicate some of the uncertainties that characterise the
historiography of English election violence. Hoppen argues that the severity and
frequency of electoral disorder began to decline after the First Reform Act, yet John
Stevenson, in Popular Disturbances in England 1700 - 1870, writes that "elections
[remained] as one of the most common sources of popular disturbance in late
Victorian England".40 Richter locates the majority of election violence in small rural
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towns, and Hoppen suggests that a population shift away from such places contributed
to the decline of electoral rioting. Both Hoppen and Richter stress the importance of
corruption in the outbreak of violence, yet point to boredom as a possible motive for
participation in such events. By contrast Jon Lawrence presents electoral disturbances
as a pre-meditated use of physical force - more related to the symbolism of political
legitimacy than to outbursts of "sheer ebullience".

Though Hoppen and Lawrence have recently revisited the subject of Victorian
electoral violence, much of the work in this field was completed some thirty years
ago. And yet with the exception of Richter's 1965 doctoral thesis, and to a lesser
extent Roland Quinalt's chapter in Popular Protest and Public Order, none include
any serious attempt to quantify electoral disorder. Comparisons between these limited
statistical analyses and the present research are complicated by differences in focus
and terminology. For example, Richter records 71 separate incidents of "serious
violence" at British elections between 1865 and 1885, whereas Quinalt discusses
"serious" and "less serious" riots in the Black Country between 1835 and 1860. The
lack of statistical data, and a considerable reliance on anecdotal evidence within the
historiography of election violence, brings into question the validity of statements
regarding the frequency with which Victorian elections were disrupted by outbreaks
of disorder.

The quantification of crowd violence poses certain methodological

problems (these are examined in Chapter Two), yet it must be undertaken in order for
a more meaningful picture of this phenomenon to emerge.

'
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This study also questions the extent to which English and Welsh electoral politics
reflected the values and characteristics of a modem political system during the mid to
late nineteenth-century. It will be argued here that the study of election disorder can
provide a means of assessing the pace of political modernisation, because within the
context of Victorian electioneering violence represented the visible expression of an
older style of politics.

Whether disorder was the product of corruption, elite

manipulation or partisan enthusiasm the picture of mid-century electioneering that
emerges is the same; techniques of manipulation and influence still found expression
in a system increasingly turning to modem forms of politics. If violence occurred
because of corruption, it represented the politics of persuasion rather than principle.
And if violence was the outcome of a 'politics of disruption' it reflected a continued
willingness by candidates, agents and partisans to resort to symbolism and ritual in
place of organization.
Election violence could erupt due to public excitement or excessive partisan
enthusiasm. Yet even then such outbursts were informed by a traditional expectation
of what was permissible during an election. Mid-Victorian campaigns, like those of
the eighteenth-century, were infused with a degree of spectacle and ritual- elements
that promoted public involvement and which heightened the intensity of both partisan
activity and popular excitement.

Election violence that grew out of popular

enthusiasm can thus be viewed as a reflection of older electoral priorities, because the
continued importance of symbolism and ritual promoted a degree of disorder. It is
therefore argued that mid-Victorian election violence represented much that belonged

'
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to an older political milieu - and that as such its study can be used to draw
conclusions about the pace of change in mid to late century England and Wales.

In order to understand how election rioting can help us to assess the pace of political

change we must first defme the term 'political modernisation'.

The concept of

'modernisation' has been employed in a number of ways within the historiography of
British electoral politics, yet it is possible to identify certain features that are common
to interpretations of the evolution of the British political system. The concern here is
not to delineate the historical debate concerning the timing and nature of British
political development. Rather this section seeks to identify those features of electoral
politics that can be described as recognisably 'modem'.
In a 1995 article in the American Historical Review John Phillips and Charles

Wetherell broadly defme 'modem' political behaviour as featuring allegiance to
parties, grounded in national as well as local issues and characterized by rational
political debate. 41 Phillips and Wetherell argue that the First Reform Act of 1832
unleashed a wave of political modernisation that "quickly [my emphasis] destroyed
the political system that had prevailed during the long reign ofGeorge III". 42 In their
view this radical transformation of English politics created "an essentially modem
electoral system". Thus, they contend, in the post-reform era political parties raised
national issues, appealed to broad political principles and provoked rational debate.
They argue for the modernizing influence of the Great Reform Act because in its
wake, "political principle defmed in national terms by the parties at Westminster took
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the place of the local, factional and idiosyncratic concerns that had dominated
England's unreformed political system".43
Angus Hawkins, in British Party Politics, believes that the emergence of a
recognisably 'modem' political framework in Britain was a feature of the period
between 1867 and 1886. Prior to the Second Reform Act, he writes that "parliament's
relations with the constituencies, extra-parliamentary organisations, electors and the
nation beyond were loose, sporadic and informal. Parliamentary elections and the
rituals of constituency contests were more a function of local dynamics and provincial
allegiances than national imperatives" .44 However, he argues, in the years after 1867
political parties developed extensive constituency organisations,

centralised

bureaucracies and, "through professional agents, local party-sponsored clubs and
formal constituency associations, national parties enlisted a mass membership from
among a popular electorate".45
Both Hawkins and Phillips and Wetherell interpret 'modernisation' as a
process of change whereby traditional forms of politics, characterised by localism and
factionalism, were replaced by a new, modem style of politics organised nationally
and based on the emergence of party allegiance. The modernisation of British politics
- they suggest - was characterised by the growth of professional party associations
whose structure and national scope supplanted older methods of political
mobilisation. A corollary of this process was that the informal and parochial nature of
constituency politics gave way to the strictures of national politics as directed by
central party organs. Phillips and Wetherell argue that this process was a feature of
the period after the First Reform Act, and they stress the development of a "new view
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of principle and principled behaviour that the parties in Westminster imposed on local
politics after 1832".46 By contrast Hawkins locates the point of change much later in
the century. He argues that "by the 1880s there was emerging a recognisably modem

\
national political framework: the basis of what would be a much-vaunted British party
"47
syst em.

Use of the term 'modernisation' has not, however, gone unchallenged. In
"The Dynamics of Urban Politics, 1867 - 1914" Jon Lawrence questions its use to
describe long-term changes in political behaviour and political culture. He writes that
traditional narratives of the emergence of Labour politics after 1867 embrace, "an
essentially sociological model of urban popular politics [that] ... assumed a strong
causal relationship between structural changes in society and economy, and changes
in political partisanship (and in political culture more generally)".48

In those

accounts, he stresses, the terms 'modernisation', 'secularisation' or 'centralisation'
have been used to describe,

A series of overlapping societal changes ... said to have transformed
political culture, replacing 'traditional', and essentially local, patterns
of political allegiance (forged by shared religious affiliations, a sense
of shared economic interests, and perhaps by social deference), with
new or 'modem', patterns of allegiance shaped by class interest, and
hence loyalty to class-based, national political parties. 49

Lawrence challenges such an approach: "Historians are increasingly rejecting grand
explanatory

frameworks

based

on

problematic

concepts

such

as

the

'modernisation' ... ofpolitics". 50 He questions the assumption that local political elites
played a critical role in the development of political allegiance amongst the new
46
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electors, that the 'triumph of party' eroded older, more independent traditions of
popular participation, and that the rise of class was a central factor in shaping urban
popular politics after 1867. 51
However, the concept of 'political modernisation' is not used here to interpret
long-term shifts in social or political behaviour. This study is concerned with gauging
the extent to which mid-Victorian politics reflected the characteristics of a modern
electoral system. Between the end of the eighteenth-century and the beginning of the
twentieth-century, the British political system moved inexorably towards its present
form: the modem two-party system and with voting rights freed from property
qualifications. That process was broadly characterised - as noted above - by the
decline of local, factional and idiosyncratic politics dominated by the strength of
traditional influences and interests, and the emergence of a more national-oriented,
partisan-based politics, characterised by relatively static party allegiances, grounded
in an appreciation of national as well as local issues, and the development of centrally
organised and nationally-focused party organisations.
The concept of 'political modernisation' is thus used within a broad
sociological context to describe, "the development of key institutions - political
parties, parliaments, franchise and secret ballots - which support participatory
decision making". 52 Within such a context the outbreak of violence will be presented
as evidence of a slowed pace of modernisation. The continued presence of violence
in the system - and what it represented by way of corruption, ritual or partisan
enthusiasm - reflected a set of assumptions about the operation of electoral politics
that appear distinctly parochial, factional and pre-modem. It will be argued that the
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persistence of violence into the post-reform era demonstrated an awareness, amongst
candidates, party agents, campaign managers and even election crowds that notions of
partisanship, principle and organisation, however far developed, could still be
supplemented by a reliance on the bully and the bribe.

This study, then, aims to contribute to a discussion about the pace of political change
in nineteenth-century England and Wales.

Since the 1950s there has been

considerable historical debate concerning the nature and timing of British political
development. The emergence and influence of party organisation, the extent and
basis of political allegiance, the continuity and relevance of pre-reform electoral
behaviour: these have been much-debated issues.

As noted earlier, Phillips and

Wetherell contend that the intense debate and two-year agitation over reform in 1832,
as well as the structural changes of the Act, created a new electoral environment in
which voters became consistent partisans. This new political consistency was also the
product of a new sense of political principle directed from Westminster and adopted
at the local level by party organisations that "suddenly existed in almost every
constituency virtually all year round". 53 Phillips and Wetherell focus on the political
realities that emerged after 1832 and they discount negative interpretations of reform
that emphasise the continuity of electoral behaviour. They write that,

Admittedly, it is easy enough to discover in some places older forms of
electioneering that had little to do with political parties, much less
political principles. It is also possible to uncover outright corruption
after 1832. Yet persistent flaws should not obscure the new political
realities that emerged in that year (my emphasis). Not mistaking form
for substance, this analysis uses new data and techniques to create an
improved perspective that reveals the reform's fundamental
reorientation of English politics.54
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In broad terms of England's gradual evolution towards a modem democratic electoral
system Phillips and Wetherell's argument is undoubtedly accurate. Debate over the
popular and participatory nature of Hanoverian politics notwithstanding, the Great
Reform Act undoubtedly altered the electoral landscape. However, their view that the
post-1832 political system, recently imbued with a sense of political principle and
aided by the sudden flowering of constituency party organisation, rapidly developed
recognisably modem political

characteristics,

fmds . challengers within the

historiography of British electoral politics.

In "Roads to Democracy" Hoppen suggests that the weakening of proprietorial
control in the boroughs after 1832 created a political vacuum that was filled, not by a
new politics of principle, but by "another traditional feature of English and Irish
electioneering, namely, corruption". 55 Hoppen stresses that while the First Reform
Act undoubtedly created a changed electoral world, it was one that continued to
reflect "many traditional priorities". In a challenge to Phillips and Wetherell's model
of political modernisation he argues that in England's small to medium sized
boroughs, which dominated the political system between 1832 and 1867, elections did
not, "suddenly begin to turn upon general principles and high moral argument".
Rather, he suggests, by weakening the importance of proprietorial control through
changes to the franchise, reform in 1832 created a situation whereby smaller
constituencies were at once more amenable and open to the influence of electoral
corruption. He writes that in a system still weighted against large, urban centres where a form of independent politics had a chance to flourish - elections in the
smaller constituencies became an obvious target for those candidates willing to

ss The following paragraph quotes from K. T.Hoppen, "Roads to Democracy", p.558.
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purchase a seat in parliament. The result, Hoppen argues, "was a spreading intensity
of corruption in post-reform electioneering".
Phillips and Wetherell contend that political parties became 'permanent
fixtures' in the constituencies after 1832, yet other historians have questioned the
development of party organisation so early in the century.

Indeed traditional

narratives of the rise of party in modem British history have focussed on the period
between the First and Second Reform Acts. In Elections and Party Management
H.J.Hanham highlights the lack of organised and disciplined party representation in
the counties as late as 1868. He writes that in 1874 there were, "Conservative
associations in only forty-four of the eighty-two English county divisions". 56
Likewise John Vincent's study of the Liberal Party between 1857 and 1868 found
little evidence of widespread political organisation much before the middle of the
nineteenth-century.

Vincent writes that "in the 1860s there was political life

everywhere, adequate political organisation in very few places". 57 He stresses that the
development of party loyalties preceded the emergence of party organisation by .
almost a generation and that it was in the 1860s that "a rapid and massive
development of party loyalties"58 emerged. Vincent contends that several factors
conspired to impede the spread of constituency party organisation: despite advances
in organisational techniques, the growth of the electorate and changes in election
procedure meant that "the electorate in general never became any more organised";
local and voluntary associations could not maintain the level of 'constant
administrative activity' of the central party offices; and a widespread antipathy
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towards the concept of party politics obstructed the creation of a national
organisational framework.

59

According to Frank O'Gorman the emergence of a· culture of political parties
was a feature of the mid-nineteenth century. It was then, he contends, that the British
political system, "began to fashion itself on the ideals of democracy, liberty and
reform". 60 An outcome of this process, he argues, was the weakening of traditional
electoral cultures in the face of improvements in literacy, the growth of party
organisation and the "increasing respectability of the 1832 electorate". 61 O'Gorman
stresses the decline of a vibrant, popular and inclusive electoral culture after 1860 as
party organisations rapidly developed new means of generating mass support in the
constituencies.

Whereas traditional election rituals had been at the heart of

constituency politics before the mid-nineteenth century, the emergent forms of
national party politics thereafter began to replace the use of local symbols to defme
and express political loyalties. The new political and religious organs of Liberalism
and Conservatism thus subverted the functions of traditional electoral culture.
O'Gorman concludes that after 1860, "the loyalty of voters and non-voters alike could
be won and maintained by more purely political methods, not least by election
manifestos and by promises of executive action at local as well as parliamentary
level". 62
In a recent post-structuralist interpretation of English political culture James
Vemon challenges the significance of party in the popular experience of electoral
politics between 1832 and 1867. He concludes that despite the presence of party
organisation in the five constituencies he studies, "national party politics were often
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undercut or mediated by local political allegiances and identities". 63 Vemon argues
the disabling effect of modernisation and contends that English politics between the
First and Second Reform Acts became "progressively less democratic ... as political
subjectivities and the public political sphere were defmed in increasingly restrictive
and exclusive fashions".

64

He contests the orthodox assumption that the period

between the first two reform acts witnessed the birth of the modem party system, and
points instead to the weakness of Westminster's national party identities in the
experience of popular politics. In contrast to Phillips and Wetherell' s contention that
after 1832, "local affairs, even those of long standing, gave way to national issues and
a politics of principle", 65 Vemon argues a popular antipathy towards party expressed
through the continued importance of local colours, symbols and identities to "define
local political cleavages".

He stresses that reform in 1832 led to an increasing

restriction of the popular experience of politics, and he echoes Frank O'Gorman in
arguing that a culture of national party politics was a feature of the 1860s. 66

In Speaking for the People Jon Lawrence challenges conventional accounts of
the 'triumph of party' in British politics by questioning the completeness of party
control in the years after 1867. Whereas Frank O'Gorman argues the decline of a
traditional English electoral culture in the 1860s, Lawrence suggests that the
weakness of party reflected the continued strength of a popular political culture. He
writes that "throughout this period party elites were obliged to engage with, and adapt
to, aspects of popular culture but dimly understood, and in some measure feared". 67
Lawrence argues that the political parties were unable to manage popular politics to
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the extent attributed to them because of the ambiguities inherent in their relations with
the electorate and the wider community. As a result, he argues "the relationship
between 'party' and 'public' remained highly ambiguous down to 1914, and that
partly in consequence democracy remained widely mistrusted and even feared". 68
Miles Taylor similarly questions the centrality of 'party' in the experience of
constituency politics before the Second Reform Act. In "Interests, Parties and the
State"69 he argues that the work of pollbook analysis needs to be balanced by an
account of electoral behaviour more sensitive to contemporary perceptions of 'party'.
He challenges the conclusions of O'Gorman and Phillips, who use pollbook evidence
to argue a growing tendency towards partisan voting in the decades after 1832,70
pointing out that their conclusions stand at odds with several studies of political
parties during that period. 71 He argues that in the years following the First Reform
Act local party associations were largely dormant between elections, and that it was
not until after 1867 that "the main parties [could] offer a nationally coordinated
message". 72 Taylor writes that O'Gorman and Phillips' reinterpretation of electoral
behaviour followed the work of historians like T.J.Nossiter and John Vincent. They
argue that Victorian elections were dominated by parochial issues, and that before the
turn of the century, "there was little evidence that Westminster based parties or
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national, regional or class based political issues had penetrated into 'small-town
•t•

pol IlCS

,, 73
·

In a synthesis of recent research Angus Hawkins locates the profound change

in British politics much later in the century than Phillips and Wetherell. He argues
instead that it was between 1852 and 1886 that the framework of the modern party
system superseded the structure of mid-Victorian parliamentary government.
Hawkins writes that it was between the Second and Third Reform Acts that political
parties developed the "extensive constituency organisation and centralised party
bureaucracies"74 that enabled them to cultivate a mass membership from within a
popular electorate. He locates the emergence of a recognisably modern national
political framework in the 1880s. The development of a modem system, he writes,
was characterised by an increasingly inclusive franchise, the development of party
organisations promising "strong and stable government defmed by principle or
programme", and the transferral of political legitimacy from parliament to the parties,
and ultimately to the constituencies.75
In a 1996 study of Cornish small borough politics Ed Jaggard challenges

Phillips and Wetherell's conclusions about the modernisation of English politics after
1832. Jaggard attempts to reconcile Phillips and Wetherell's statements regarding the
emergence of a new politics of principle after 1832, with the historiography of
electoral politics and the realities of electioneering in Cornwall's small boroughs. He
cautions against their over-reliance on evidence drawn from England's large industrial
centres as these constituted the least numerous category of boroughs between the First
and Second Reform Acts. Thus between 1832 and 1868 only 72 boroughs in England

73

Ibid., p.51.
Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.3.
75
Ibid., pp.l - 8
74

\

{;hapter I

29

and Wales could boast more than 1,000 voters, compared with 131 boroughs with less
than that number. 76 Furthermore, evidence from Cornwall's small boroughs suggests
the importance of factors other than party-induced principle in the formation of voter
preferences. Jaggard concludes that the continuing influence of "electoral history, the
power of patrons and local circumstances"77 exercised a retarding influence upon the
pace of political change in England after 1832.

The goal of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the nature of midVictorian electioneering. In "Campaign Rituals and Ceremonies" Frank O'Gorman
writes, "The substance of election rituals and, if sensitively interpreted, their symbolic
meanings and social implications, can extend our conception of electoral politics". 78
In his study of English electoral culture he questions the extent, spontaneity and

subversive nature of popular participation in electoral events and contends that "Such
questions take us down to the very street corner of the political and electoral processes
of the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries". 79 Likewise a close study of the causes
and processes of election violence allows a grass roots view of Victorian electoral
culture, and provides a window into the operation of politics at the constituency level.

It will be argued here that electoral violence provides evidence of a slow pace of
English political change after 1832: that the frequency of disorder between 1857 and
1880 reflected the persistence ofpre-reform electoral traditions that properly belonged
to an older electoral culture.

76

Ed Jaggard, "Small Boroughs and Political Modernisation, 1832-1868: A Cornwall case study"
Albion, 29, 4 (Winter 1997), p.625.
77
Ibid., p.642.
78
O'Gorman, "Campaign Rituals", p.81
79
Ibid., p.82

30

Q_hapter I
IV

The methodology to be employed involves the following: the quantification of crowd
violence at English and Welsh elections between 1857 and 1880; an analysis of the
nature and frequency of violence and of any changes in the pattern of its occurrence;
and an assessment of the operation of electoral politics during the period as an
outcome of the evidence uncovered. The chapters that follow provide an explanation
of the terms and concepts used in studying election violence, necessary for a
discussion of mid-century electioneering, a detailed and statistically-based analysis of
the phenomenon of electoral disorder, four case studies of elections and electoral
violence; and a concluding analysis of both the nature and instance of violence, and
modernisation, during the period.
Chapter II (Elements ofDisorder) introduces the terms and concepts employed
in the thesis.

This will include an explanation of the terminology employed in

referring to instances of electoral disorder, as well as an outline of the historiography
of popular disturbance (to contextualise the analysis of crowd violence). Chapter Ill
(The Structure of Politics, 1857- 1880) establishes the contextual framework of

election violence through an examination of the structures and processes of Victorian
electioneering. The chapter will outline the changing fabric of electoral politics, with
a particular focus on the constituencies, the electorate, elections and electoral
procedure, party politics and electoral contests. Chapter IV (Mid- Victorian Electoral
Disorder) incorporates a statistical analysis of the subject, including a study of

violence during each general election of the period.

This chapter includes

explanations of the pattern of violence including its timing, distribution, participants
and origins. Chapter V (Constituency Case Studies) provides four detailed analyses
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of electoral violence from a local perspective. The constituency case-studies include
Kidderminster (1857), Lincoln (1862, 1865 and 1868), Bradford (1867 and 1868) and
Carmarthenshire (1868).

Finally, Chapter VI (Electoral Violence and Political

Modernisation) will draw on the evidence presented in Chapter V to make judgements

about the nature of mid-century electoral violence, and the pace of political
modernisation in the post-reform era.
The 23 years between 1857 and 1880 have been chosen because, not only do
they cover the passage of two major pieces of electoral legislation (Second Reform
Act, Secret Ballot), but the six general elections that occurred during that period are
separated equally by the passage of the Second Reform Act of 1867. This division
allows comparisons to be drawn between the character of elections and electoral
politics in the post-1832 and post-1867 periods.

The period thus overlaps the

extensive franchise and constituency redistribution changes wrought by the Second
Reform Act of 1867, and the significant alteration to electoral procedure that was
introduced with secret voting in 1872. The general election of 1857 provides an
appropriate starting point for the study - the elections of the late 1850s, Caroline
Jackson argues, reflected the character of a system that accommodated both modem
political features and the continued practices ofpre-reform politics. 80 The study ends
with a focus on the general election of 1880, the last general election before the
reforms of 1883 - 1885 restructured the appearance and operation of the political
system.
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In the frrst place, English election mobs tended more and more to
consist in whole or part of toughs hired for the day at so much an hour
- a kind of induced violence.

K.T.Hoppen, 1994 1

It is clear that the use of physical force remained a central, and widely
tolerated, element of popular politics down to the First World
War ... The physical control of civic space - of public squares, meeting
halls, factory gates or polling day crowds - remained central to the
symbolism of political legitimacy for politicians, as much as for their
supporters.

Jon Lawrence, 19982

It is an aim of this thesis to analyse mid-Victorian English and Welsh electoral
violence within the context of a discussion of the pace of political change. As noted
in Chapter I conclusions about the scale and frequency of violence can be
qualitatively linked to the progress of political modernization: when interpreted as the
physical manifestation of efforts to influence the electoral process (or as the end result
of attempts to manipulate popular politics), the nature and frequency of violence can
be employed as a barometer of the strength of traditional or pre-modem electoral
practices. This study therefore relies upon the assumption that moments of election
violence can be quantified. This chapter will explore the theoretical basis for studying
instances of crowd violence, and will defme the terminology employed in the
classification of disorder.
The study of election disorder falls within the field of popular disturbance and
draws on a long tradition of enquiry into episodes of crowd violence. As a major
1
2
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strand of social history the study of disturbances has provided a means for
understanding the nature of popular movements and for unlocking the voice of
'inarticulate' sections of society. E.P.Thompson viewed crowd violence as revealing
the underlying assumptions of what he described as 'plebeian culture' .3 And in his
introduction to Rioting in America Paul A.Gilje suggests, "Riots are moments when
people in the street -le menu people ('the little people')- make themselves heard and
reveal how they interact with others in society".4 Indeed moments of collective
violence have been shown to embody popular social and political aspirations and were
"far from being the negative, instinctive and anarchic reactions of the 'rude multitude'
or 'many headed monster"'. 5 Thus John Stevenson writes in Popular Disturbances in

England, 1700-1832, "historians have increasingly been making sense of what have
often been regarded as aimless incidents". 6

In particular the study of popular

disturbances has formed part of a "fundamental revision of the assumptions that
underlie traditional accounts of the development of modem Britain" .7 This approach
has stressed the variety of public order disturbances in Britain since the industrial
revolution, and by interpreting such events as more than mere mindless outburst, has
brought violent protest out from the shadows of historical condescension.
In the 1950s and 1960s a number of studies traced the role of violent protest in
the evolution of British social and political institutions.
G.Rude, E.J.Hobsbawm and E.P.Thompson. 8

These include works by

Their work, and that of others,

contributed to a reassessment of British political history in which violent protest
/
3
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formed a constituent element in the process of change. In addition they established a
basis for interpreting instances of crowd violence as more than formless social
outbursts devoid of any meaning. Rather they presented popular disturbances within
a framework of communal protest and as the organised, disciplined and often highly
ritualised expression of social and political grievances. Thus by analysing riots and
assigning them significance within a model of political change I am drawing on a
historical tradition that stretches from Lefebvre and Le Bon to Thompson, Stevenson
and beyond.
The first attempts to understand the nature of crowd psychology were
pioneered by sociologists at the beginning of the twentieth-century. These included
Gustave Le Bon (Psychologie des Joules, 1895), G. Tarde (L 'opinion et la Joule, 1901)
and R.E.Park (Masse and Publikim, 1904).9 However it was in the period between
1930 and 1960 that a number of studies focusing on 'mob' violence, particularly
during the French Revolution, advanced the study of crowd violence and of the role of
riots within a social and political context.

These included G.Lefebvre's Foules

Revolutionnaires (1934), E.J.Hobsbawm's Primitive Rebels (1959) and G.Rude's The
Crowd in the French Revolution (1959). These studies suggested a greater degree of
purpose than had previously been attributed to episodes of popular riot. Hobsbawm
placed protest movements in pre-industrial Italy within the context of "traditional
concepts about the 'just King"', and the violence of the English Luddites as part of a
process of"collective bargaining by riot". 10 Rude's work established the 'mob' as an

9

In the introduction to Popular Disturbances John Stevenson provides a comprehensive historiography
of the study of crowd violence, popular protest and public order, pp.l-4.
10
Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.3 See E.J.Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels and "The Machine
Breakers" in Labouring Men: Studies in the history of labour (London, 1968), pp.5- 22.
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agent of political agitation and showed the French crowds to be "something more than
spasmodic and irrational phenomena" .

11

During the 1960s and 1970s a number of influential studies of popular
movements were completed.

Among others C.S.L.Davies and M.E.James, who

examine popular risings in Tudor England, raised important questions about the origin
and purpose of such movements. 12 In his seminal article "The Moral Economy of the
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" E.P. Thompson showed how popular
protest revealed patterns of popular belief and custom. 13 His work on food riots, and
that of Natalie Zemon Davis on French religious riots, focused "attention first to
popular ideology and to the profound sense of legitimacy which motivated protesters,
and secondly to the structures, customs and rituals which shaped the actions of a
crowd". 14 In the 1970s the study of popular disturbance broadened to include an
analysis of 'order' and 'disorder' and the processes by which these are negotiated,
this predominantly sociological approach including works by Victor Bailey (The

Dangerous Classes in Late Victorian England, 1975), D.Hay (Property, Authority
and the Criminal Law, 1975) and R.S.Storch (The Policeman as Domestic
Missionary, 1976)_15
Thus the historiography of popular protest establishes a basis for analysing
episodes of collective violence within the context of social and political change. The
danger in such studies, however, lies in assigning moments of violent crowd action
greater importance than perhaps they warrant.
11

John Stevenson cautions against

Ibid., p.2.
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"investing incidents with too much significance" 16 and highlights the inadequacies of
many source documents in shedding light on the causes of popular disturbances.
Episodes of popu1ar violence often had myriad causes and those who participated in
them a corresponding variety of motivations. In addition such events frequently
provided an opportunity for entertainment as much as they offered a chance to agitate
for social or political change. Paul Slack writes that riots and disturbances permitted
"the ventilation of high spirits, often in malicious, sometimes in comic form" .17 Care
is therefore required in assessing the causes and relevant significance of crowd
violence, hence the first step in such a direction is an adequate defmition of this
important phenomenon.

Few historians of nineteenth-century British disturbances provide an explicit
defmition of 'election violence', a fact that reflects the subject's position as a subset
of the broader topic of popular protest. In his chapter on election violence in Politics

in the Age of Peel Norman Gash describes only "forcible means to help ensure
success". 18 D.Philips discusses election riots in his study of public order in the Black
Country between 1835 and 1860.

R.Quinault in "The Warwickshire County

Magistracy and Public Order, 1830 - 1870" describes "riots during parliamentary
elections".19 And in his 1994 article, "Grammars of Electoral Violence", K. T.Hoppen
provides no defmition of his subject matter beyond the use of broad terms such as
'violence' and 'rioting'. 20 To a large extent this has been because the subject has
normally formed a sub-section of broader studies of popular disturbance.

16
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Furthermore, where quantification of violence has not been attempted less importance
is likely to have been placed on the precise defmition of terms.

However this

ambiguity is also related to the confusion surrounding the nature of election violence.
Modem studies of English popular disturbance have largely struggled to
reconcile two views of election disorder: as a product of electoral malpractice, or as
part of a wider Victorian tendency to indulge in violent behaviour. Norman Gash
establishes violent electioneering as a form of coercion or intimidation and details the
various forms of each. However, he goes on to stress that violence was "endemic
among the lower classes and election time provided merely the provocation and the
opportunity".21 Likewise Comelius O'Leary describes election violence as a common
law offence and refers to it as a fonn of undue influence. Yet he also writes that
physical violence and intimidation "tended to be accepted as part of the normal
behaviour of a rude and inhuman age" .22 Donald Richter writes that physical violence
during an election was a legal offence and yet was "expected and commonly accepted
as an inalienable heritage of British electorallife".23 He goes on to stress that "many
of the most serious disorders seem entirely extraneous to the campaign and the
polling, and were spontaneous outbursts of sheer ebullience". 24

More recently

Hoppen has presented English election violence as both a product of "direct bribery"
and as "participation in enjoyable circuses" .zs These views suggest a blurring of the
line between election disorder as a culturally tolerated phenomenon - and therefore of
limited political significance - and as the product of illegal attempts to influence an

21
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election result. Yet if we are to employ violence as a measure of political change this
line needs to be brought into focus.
To begin with it is clear that in discussing 'election· disorder' we are focussing
on events that represented a degree of disruption to the peace during an election
campaign. After all the term 'disorder' can refer variously to confusion, an absence
of 'order' or a disturbance.

However given that mid-century English elections

routinely displayed any or all of these symptoms some further explanation is
necessary. What, for example, distinguishes the kind of events described in this thesis
from the types of popular protest examined by Hobsbawm, Thompson and Rude?
Electoral riots were qualitatively different from other forms of popular disturbance in
that they were, in a sense, both predictable and artificial. Violence during an election
was predictable because it occurred within an established time frame and at a specific
location.

Furthermore the potential for disorder during an election was a well-

established fact and the authorities often took precautions against its occurrence. This
is not to argue that there was no element of spontaneity involved in the outbreak of
election violence. But as the product of tensions and aspirations generated within a
proscribed period of time, election riots were more readily anticipated than, for
example, food or labour riots.
In Riots and Community Politics John Bohstedt recognises a difference
between political violence - under which he classifies 'Church and King' riots,
illuminations and election riots - and food, labour and military disturbances. He
writes of the former that "rather than mobilizing a community against an external
threat, they typically split a community internally along vertical fissures". 26 Bohstedt
thus suggests that political riots were different from food, labour or military riots

26
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because they generally did not involve community opposition to an external threat.
However he concedes that election violence could involve "defence of local interests
against outsiders".

27

Rude, in The Crowd in History, also distinguishes between

election violence and other forms of popular protest. In describing the 'raising of a
mob' during a Middlesex contest in 1768 he writes, "it has nothing to do with the sort
of popular movement we are here discussing". 28
Election violence has been described as more contrived than other forms of
public disorder.

Philips presents election riots as "'artificial' and less directly

connected with social and industrial conditions".29

Likewise Hoppen writes that

violent electioneering was "quite artificial, paid for by cash on the nail and, as such,
part of the great business of electoral corruption". 30 Election disorder that grew out of
corrupt practices could be regarded as artificial in the sense that it did not reflect
popular dissent. Yet not all election violence was generated through the payment of
bribes. Party enthusiasm alone was a potent source of disorder, as was the militant
parochialism that many boroughs displayed throughout the period: in many cases
strangers were targeted by election crowds, particularly if the former had been vocal
in their support of an unpopular party or candidate. Electoral riots were certainly less
related to social, economic or industrial conditions than either food or labour
disturbances, although such factors could contribute to a general atmosphere of
disorder during a campaign. Election violence did not usually represent a challenge to
the official structure of the political system: these were not events designed to
achieve, for example, greater political participation for the unenfranchised. Electoral
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riots did not generally embody attempts to voice communal grievances, they were
more 'popular outburst' than 'popular protest'.

Given that election riots were structurally different from other forms of popular
disturbance it follows that general defmitions of the latter will be inadequate in
describing the former. However there are obviously features common to both. In

Popular Disturbances in England John Stevenson discards the general defmition of
'disturbance' as "any interruption of tranquillity by tumult or uproar'' 31 in favour of a
more specific approach that stresses the importance of numbers and violence. He
borrows elements from the law of riotous offences which defmed the basic offence of
unlawful assembly as,

Any gathering of three or more persons, on public or private
property, with common intent to commit either a lawful or unlawful
act in such a way as to give any person of reasonable courage and
firmness fear of a breach of the peace.32

Thus the law recognised three elements in the definition of public order offences:
alarm, mutual intent, and numbers. The first involved at least one person of normal
courage fearing a breach of the peace. The second established that the crowd was
united in its pursuit of some common goal or purpose. Finally, by common law the
involvement of three or more people constituted a disturbance whereas by statute the
Riot Act required the involvement of 12 or more persons. Stevenson writes that the
social sciences have largely discredited the notion that rioters share a common goal,

31

32
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or that they even intend participating in such events before they begin. 33 As such he
discards the concept of 'mutual intent'. Stevenson thus defines 'disturbance' as an
event involving three or more persons and violence, which he classifies as "physical
damage to persons or property". 34 In addition he allows for those incidents that
"bordered upon explicit violence". 35

In his 1965 thesis "Public Order and Popular Disturbances in Great Britain,
1865 - 1914" Donald Richter provides a rare defmition .of election violence. He
describes "public disorder at elections" as "mob action of a terrorist nature aimed at
the voters and supporters of an opposite political faction". 36 His defmition fmds
parallels in Stevenson's approach and establishes several key concepts: that election
violence involved mob action; that it was of a terrorist nature; that it was aimed,
suggesting a degree of purpose; and that it was directed towards an opposite political

faction. Richter thus presents election disorder as an event involving a large number
of people, creating a degree of public terror and organised for the purpose of
intimidating political opponents.

By law public disturbances were recognised as

offences that could invalidate an election result. Electoral law established that "when
stones are thrown and shots fired among the persons going to record their votes, they
are not bound again to imperil their lives, but may claim that the election be declared
void". 37 The requirements for such a case were that voters were prevented from
exercising their franchise by intimidation or a fear of violence, "even without violence
or a threat thereof being brought to bear upon them personally". 38

33
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The definition to be adopted in this thesis will be a synthesis of the above
approaches. As a form of popular disturbance the focus must be on episodes of
violence involving groups of people who commit acts, or threaten acts, of physical
damage to persons or property. And, as a study of electioneering, the focus must be
broadened to encompass events that interfered with the electoral process. As such the
term 'electoral disorder' will refer to the wilful disruption of the procedures of an
election campaign through the use of collective violence, whether physical or
material, implicit or explicit. This definition establishes several important points:
firstly that 'disorder' describes episodes of violence; secondly that such episodes
often represented wilful or purposeful attempts to interfere with the electoral process,
either as the product of corruption or as part of the symbolism of mass participation;
and thirdly that the study is limited to cases of violence that could be directly linked to
the events, personalities and issues of specific election campaigns. A discussion of
the terminology used in describing electoral disorder will follow later. Firstly we
must explore the distinction between 'normal' expectations of election excess and the
outbreak of 'disorder'.

This study recognises that while popular participation and exuberance were well
established features of English electioneering, the outbreak of violence represented an
extracurricular event that exceeded the accepted bounds of electoral behaviour. The
former constituted part of the ritualistic fabric of constituency politics, while the latter
represented a breach of electoral law and public order. Throughout the period English
elections, as a matter of course, generated a degree of popular 'disorder'. In part this
was because the formal and informal rituals of Victorian electioneering invited a
measure of social disruption. Peter Bailey writes that mid-Victorian elections were
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"celebrated as popular holidays cum licensed brawls". 39 Election rituals contributed
to an element of disorder because they put people on the streets in large numbers,
encouraged partisan enthusiasm and indulged a tradition ·of social inversion. Thus
traditional expectations of political courtship, bribery and treating meant that voters
and non-voters could look forward to elections as a period of unregulated revelry and
social inversion. Indeed Frank O'Gorman describes a contemporary fascination with
election rituals in which participation, "must primarily have been experienced by
those involved as a form of entertainment".40 Within such an atmosphere loud,
effusive and ebullient behaviour was not only accepted, it was even encouraged.
There is no doubt that within the 'licensed saturnalia' of a contested election a
certain degree of disorder was expected.

Setjeant Cox, a contemporary election

observer, urged campaign managers to prepare their candidates for what awaited them
during a contest.

The motley crowd at the hustings is either funny or furious. It must
at all events be noisy. If you are popular it will cheer you as much
as you please; if unpopular it will hoot you .. .If your candidate is a
novice in elections, prepare him for this sort of reception. Tell him
not to be angry or frightened, but to fall in, as it were, with the fun of
the moment. 41

Displays of popular participation were, however, tolerated only in so far as they
served a particular purpose. O'Gorman argues that election rituals were designed to
encourage mass participation and to deliver certain messages to the community.
These messages were aimed at voters and non-voters and related to issues such as
local welfare and leadership. James Vemon writes that the symbolic practices of
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'official politics' represented an attempt by authorities to, "convey and reaffrrm the
legitimacy of governing in thousands of unspoken ways". 42 Thus election ritual was
designed to promote participation in a controlled and regulated manner. Within such
a context violence represented a loss of control and a challenge to authority. Ritual
did not promote riot, instead violence was an unwelcome by-product of attempts to
direct mass participation. Electoral rituals reinforced notions of community, power
and legitimacy not subversion, disorder and mayhem. As a result O'Gorman writes
that the challenge for electoral managers was to "promote lavish displays of popular
participation in the election campaign, while containing and controlling the
sentiments thus excited". 43
Contemporary educated opinion recognised election disorder as an undesirable
and unacceptable feature of the political system. Indeed Richter writes that election
rioting was an acknowledged and "routinely deplored aspect of British life". 44 The
turbulence of English electioneering was criticised in newspapers and journals and
lampooned in fiction by writers such as Dickens, Disraeli, Trollope and Eliot. In
Dickens' Pickwick Papers the title character, Samuel Pickwick, fmds himself caught
up in a campaign disturbance during a 'spirited contest' for the borough ofEatanswill.

Mr Pickwick's hat was knocked over his eyes, nose and mouth, by
one poke of a Buff flag-staff, very early in the proceedings. He
describes himself as being surrounded on every side, when he could
catch a glimpse of the scene, by angry and ferocious countenances,
by a vast cloud of dust, and by a dense crowd of combatants. He
represents himself as being forced from the carriage by some unseen
power, and being personally engaged in a pugilistic encounter. 45
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Dickens' fictional account differs little from many newspaper reports of election riots.
The contemporary press treated such scenes as sensational, though deplorable, events.
Editorial comments, however, were surprisingly rare during the period. In most cases
journalists confined themselves to reporting the fact of violence and little else. So in
November 1868 the Manchester Guardian reported of the borough election in York,
"After the declaration of the poll ... several disgraceful disturbances took place in
various parts of the city". 46 And in Stafford during the same general election, "A
great number of Liberals disgraced themselves by acts of personal violence". 47 A
journal like the Nonconformist, with its evangelistic creed, was more likely to adopt a
high moral tone in describing electoral disturbances, particularly when a political
point could be made. In July 1865 it commented, "The great triumph of Liberal
opinion at the General Election as been greatly tarnished by the senseless and
disgraceful scenes which have been witnessed in various parts of the United
Kingdom ... the appeal to the people ought not' to be turned into a saturnalia of
rowdyism". 48 Indeed the tone of editorial comments often revealed the none-toosubtle sympathies of the newspaper involved. For example the Liberal Bristol Daily
Post reported in November 1868,

If any evidence could have been required to show the evil of
introducing that always dangerous element, mob violence, into our
election contests, it has been afforded, we should say, by the
proceedings at our police court during the week. When in April last
the Tories supplemented the ruffianism of Bristol by the hiring of a
regular army ... to spread terror amongst the peaceably disposed
citizens, we ventured to prophesy that the seed they had sown would,
if nurtured, bring forth bitter fruits, and so it has proved. 49
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Within parliament electoral disorder was condemned as a product of corruption and as
a stumbling block to the 'tranquillity, purity and freedom' of elections. Electoral
reforms during the period were routinely directed towards achieving more peaceful
and orderly elections.

In his motion for a parliamentary inquiry into electoral

procedure in March 1869 H.A.Bruce, the Home Secretary, referred the Commons to,
"those scenes of rioting and violence which so frequently characterise a contested
election". 50 The inquiry that was established sat for 12 months, collected 500 pages
of evidence on parliamentary and municipal elections and led to the tabling of the
Parliamentary Elections Bill in May 1870.
During the first reading of that abortive legislation the inquiry's chairman,
Lord Hartington, described the disorder that attended public nominations as tending
to, "disgust the most peaceable and intelligent portion of the constituency with
everything connected with elections". 51 Arguments in favour of the Ballot often
referred to the peace it would bring to electioneering . Thus when W.E.Forster, the
Liberal minister for education, tabled a revised Elections (Parliamentary and
Municipal) Bill in February 1871 he informed the House that "the advantages of
order and quietness in voting are much in favour of the Ballot, and this is an
argument that applies with greater force as we increase the number of electors."52
Ultimately secret voting was not introduced until 1872, five years after the Second
Reform Act had expanded the size of the electorate. The massive increase in the
number of voters after 1867 led to the realization that open voting was no longer

:o Hansard 3, Vol.194, 4 March 1869, p.653 (Motion for a select committee inquiry).
1
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Ibid., Vol.204, 20 February 1871, p.530 (First Reading of Elections [Parliamentary and Municipal]
Bill).
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practical, and that many of the new voters were proving, "highly vulnerable to the
temptations ofbribery and [the] victimization of coercion".

53

The willingness of local authorities to take steps to prevent or limit violence
reveals it to have been a little tolerated aspect of electioneering. Throughout the
period election preparations routinely included the bolstering of constituency police
forces with county reinforcements, the swearing-in of 'special' constables and, if
necessary, requests for a military presence. In February 1862 the 29 officers of the
Lincoln City police were joined by 100 men from the county force in anticipation of a
contested by-election in the borough. Given Lincoln's history of violent contests it is
little wonder that the Mayor petitioned the Home Office for, "the attendance of a
detachment of the Military or of an efficient body of Police Constables ... to preserve
order on the day appointed for the Election". 54 The popular attraction of campaign
events ensured that election crowds frequently outnumbered local police forces. The
swearing-in of 'specials' was therefore common. Their effectiveness, though, was
questionable.

Quinault writes that "in most cases of serious disorder special

constables - however numerous - were insufficiently trained and equipped to quell a
riot although they might retard its growth". 55 In Nottingham during the 1865 election
several hundred 'specials' and the borough force were unable to maintain order and
the military were required to attend. 5 6
The use of soldiers to restore order was in most cases a last resort. More
commonly troops were quartered nearby to be called on by the magistrates if they
were needed. In November 1857 the Chief Constable of Staffordshire informed the
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Home Office that "the excitement in the locality is such as to require precautionary
measures ... The Officers commanding the Pensioners and Y oemanry and the Chief
Constables of Wolverhampton are on the alert". 57 And iii Dorset as late as 1880 the
military were requested to be present during an election.

The Salisbury and

Winchester Journal reported that during the Dorchester election, "So serious was the
aspect of affairs that the Mayor summoned a detachment of the 39th Regiment, under
Colonel Henning, CB, and also the aid of the Royal Horse Artillery, both of which
bodies were stationed on Cornhill with drawn bayonets". 58

Such precautionary

measures highlight the seriousness with which local authorities viewed election
violence. There were, therefore, recognised limits to what was acceptable during the
chaos and excitement of a constituency election. This is an important distinction:
election disorder as described here constituted an event beyond the normally tolerated
excesses of campaigning.

Beyond the boundaries of what constituted 'accepted' electoral excess, disorder often
represented the outworking of corrupt attempts to influence the polling. Election
violence was recognised by law as a form of intimidation.

The 1854 Corrupt

Practices Act made 'undue influence' a statutory offence and thus punishable as a
misdemeanour. The Act regarded, "Personal violence [as] ... clearly an infraction of
the law, and if done by or with the consent or authority of a candidate, or his agent,
with a view of influencing the vote for or against, would render the election void". 59

In addition the Act provided penalties for those found guilty of such acts. Offenders
could face a £50 fme, be struck from the voting register and rendered incapable of
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holding public office for seven years. Three kinds of undue influence were defmed in
the Act and they included,

(1) Any force, violence, restraint or threat thereof, (2) Any injury,
damage, harm or loss inflicted, or threat thereof, or other
intimidation, (3) Any abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device or
contrivance which might impede the proper enjoyment of the
franchise. 60

The use of such means to influence an election result had become, by the middle of
the nineteenth century, an established feature of electoral malpractice. Indeed this
aspect of English electioneering had increased since the eighteenth-century, driven by
@.greater frequency of contests and a growing electorate. Thomson writes that after
the First Reform Act, "elections consequently became often more disorderly than
before, for larger numbers of voters were involved". 61 In addition, as party conflict
intensified so too did corrupt efforts to manipulate election results. Indeed John
Stevenson suggests that "it was the increasing bitterness of party strife after 1689
which underlay the frequency of election riots". 62 The intimidation of voters could
take non-violent forms such as threats to employment, tenancy or patronage. Yet as
Norman Gash writes, "with so much, financially as well as politically, at stake in
elections, parties and politicians in many constituencies were apt to use more forcible
means to help ensure success". 63 These 'forcible means' included personal assault,
crowd violence and even kidnapping. A survey of contemporary sources provides
numerous examples of corruptly engineered electoral violence.
The kidnapping or 'cooping' of electors continued well into the late Victorian
period. Voters could be kidnapped to prevent them from voting, or to keep them in a
60
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state of pacific inebriation prior to casting a controlled vote. Dickens satirised this
element of electioneering in Pickwick Papers. On the eve of the poll in Eatanswill.
Mr.Pickwick was informed by Samuel Slumkey's agent that 33 voters had been
locked up in the White Hart.

'They keep 'em locked up there till they want 'em,' resumed the
little man. 'The effect of that is, you see, to prevent our getting at
them; and even if we could, it would be of no use, for they keep
them very drunk on purpose. Smart fellow Fizkin's agent- very
.smart fellow indeed'. 6

Elections in Carlisle in Cumberland frequently witnessed such scenes: in 1865 a
number of Blue (Liberal) and Yellow (Conservatives) partisans fought in the street
when the former caught the latter attempting to kidnap several voters65 ; and during the
1868 borough election, "a lengthened siege was laid to public houses [by a
Conservative crowd] in which 'bottled' electors were supposed to have been stored
away". 66 In 1880 a petition against the return of Richard Dyott (Conservative) for
Lichfield concluded that "his election and return were and are wholly null and void,
on the grounds of abduction by the Respondent's agents of voters, whereby they were
prevented from voting at such election". 67 The hiring of crowds to intimidate voters
or to disrupt an opponent's political meetings was also commonplace. Comelius
O'Leary writes that in the decades after 1832, "in most of the large urban
constituencies the more genteel electors were sometimes terrorized on polling day by
gangs of hired bullies and deterred from voting". 68
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Election petitions frequently cited undue influence as a grievance. An investigation
into a Dudley election petition of May 1874 declared the contest void, "in
consequence of large tumultuous assemblages of persons armed, of serious riots, and
grave assaults upon individuals, a large number of voters were intimidated, and
deterred from exercising the franchise". 69 The Nottingham borough election of 1865
was similarly set aside after, "men armed with sticks, and others on behalf of Sir
Robert Jukes Clifton (Liberal-Conservative), by committing serious outrages on the
property and persons of the inhabitants, created an alarm which was not without its
influence on the result of the election".70 The Bristol election of 1868 witnessed the
organisation of a virtual army of Liberal working men to protect themselves against
the threats of a Tory 'mob'. At a Liberal election meeting days before the polling a
body of"true-blues and drunken roughs" -said to number almost 1,000- attempted
to disrupt the proceedings. The meeting continued despite fighting at the doors and
ftreworks being thrown at the windows. 71
A further cause of disorder was provided by clashes between rival groups of
partisans. During the excitement and tension of a contest the practice of parading
party colours, accompanied by bands of music, was a ready provocation to crowds of
enthusiastic supporters.

At Dukinfield in 1868, during the Stalybridge borough

election, a serious riot followed an encounter between Liberal and Conservative
'roughs'. The Manchester Guardian reported that "A large body of Liberals, wearing
red ribbons, came into collision in Oxford Road with a large body of Conservatives.
A free fight, in which sticks and clogs were used with the utmost freedom ensued". 72

In the Forest of Dean during the Gloucestershire county election of 1868 the
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Conservatives were accused of promoting such violence. The Gloucester Journal
commented that they had "injudiciously introduced a number of fighting men from
Monmouth ... who obtruded their political colours often iti a very offensive manner
upon the Yellow Foresters ... [and] blows were freely exchanged by the contending
mobs". 73 In some cases crowd violence was paid for in cash, and in others alcohol
provided both the incentive and the impetus to riot. In Monmouth during the 1868
election rioting was blamed on 'tory hirelings' who were alleged to have been paid 7s
6d a day fortheir services.74 And in Shanklin on the Isle ofWight a Liberal election

meeting in 1880 was disrupted after, "a gang of about forty navvies ... most of them
the worse for drink ... smashed the furniture and fittings, and a fight between them and
the townspeople took place". 75
The liberal distribution of free alcohol was often the cause of election riots,
though it is often difficult to discern where traditional expectations of largesse gave
way to corrupt payments. The customary practice of opening public houses on the
polling day merely contributed to the potential for disorder.

Candidates were

expected to be generous towards their constituents during a campaign and violence
might reflect the voters' sense of grievance at being ignored. Thus Hoppen writes
that election riots could occur, "when candidates failed to deliver promised rewards
(bribes, free drinks, and the like)". 76 More often candidates went out of their way to
ensure that their supporters were adequately 'refreshed'. At Bradford in 1868 Henry
Ripley spent more than £7,000 at 115 public houses for "any who enrolled themselves
as 'committee men'".77
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electoral strategy in Eatanswill, "We have opened all the public-houses in the place,
and left our adversary nothing but the beer-shops- masterly stroke of policy that".78

A clear distinction can therefore be drawn between 'disorder', defmed here as a
violent interruption to the electoral process, and the normally tolerated excesses of
Victorian electioneering. There was an established limit to what authorities would
allow during a campaign, and the occasion of violence - defmed as physical damage
to persons or property - normally formed the point at which tolerance gave way to
suppression. Philips quotes an article from the Staffordshire Advertiser in July 1835
in which counsel prosecuting a number of election rioters described their actions as
going beyond, "the normally tolerated excesses of a contested election, and [they] so
far forgot themselves as to injure people and destroy property" ?9 Likewise during the
Lewes nomination in 1865 the borough police did not act against a disturbance, ''until
a few ruffians so far forgot themselves [my emphasis] as to throw rotten eggs at the
ladies seated on the balcony of the hotel opposite the hustings". 80 While the second
incident perhaps better illustrates an intolerance for attacks on gentlewomen, the
wording of both reports suggests a known limit to electoral excess.
I have argued here that disorder was frequently motivated by a corrupt desire
to influence an election result. However we must be careful not to lose sight of the
fact that violence could occur in the absence of corruption. Politics constituted a
popular pastime for Victorians and disorder could reflect the over-enthusiastic
outburst of an excited populace. According to John Vincent, "there was a popular
political culture as there was a popular musical culture ... very high polls, very strict
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voting ... and broken windows bear witness to the consciously political intent of the
electorate". 81 The generations-old political struggle between Whig and Tory could
generate partisan enthusiasm that was independent of pecuniary considerations and
the highly charged ritualistic atmosphere of a contested election. Norman Gash writes
that England was often able to provide, "the dissolute, the lawless, the unemployed,
the professional bully to carry out the will of anyone with money and influence in the
licensed saturnalia of the parliamentary election". 82 It was also undoubtedly able to
provide the loyal Tory, the fervent Whig, the energetic Liberal and the zealous
Radical, who could be relied upon to take a hands-on approach to electioneering for
no other incentive than party enthusiasm and a sense of being part of a great political
struggle.

IT

Throughout the mid-Victorian period campaign violence remained a destructive and
highly visible reminder of an older era of electioneering. Certainly the scenes of
. . violence that accompanied elections in the 1860s differed little in substance from
those of a century earlier. William Hogarth's famous illustrations of the saturnalia
that attended the Oxfordshire election of 1754 could as equally apply to contests in
· the 1850s and 1870s. And when Joseph Grego introduced his book A History of
Parliamentary Elections and Electioneering in the Old Days - published in 1886 - he

wrote: "With the modifying influence of progress ... the time may come when the
narrative of the robustious (sic) scenes of canvassing, polling, chairing, and electionfeasting, with their attendant incidents of all-prevailing bribery, turbulence and
:~John Vincent, Pal/books: How Victorians Voted (London, 1967), p.12.
Gash, Politics in the Age ofPeel, p.142.
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intrigue, may be regarded with incredulity as fictions of an impossible age", 83 he was
obviously conscious of writing at a time when such scenes were still familiar to his
readers.
The continuation of violence and corruption into the post-reform era has long
been acknowledged. In The Making of Modem British Politics Martin Pugh writes
that "Victorian reformers who hoped that judicious expansion of the electorate would
foster a mature and informed debate on political issues in place of corruption and
influence invariably lived to be disillusioned". 84 The general elections of 1868 and
1885 were characterised by violence and intimidation, and both took place
immediately after the introduction of reform acts that greatly increased the size of the
electorate. Similarly the advent of secret voting in 1872 failed to remove the factor of
violence from elections- as evidenced by the scale of disorder that attended the 1880
General Election.
Indeed two of the seminal studies of British political history highlight the
presence of such practices beyond both the First and Second Reform Acts. In Politics
in the Age of Peel Norman Gash stresses the failure of reform in 1832 to eradicate

electoral intimidation and violence from English electioneering.

He argues the

continued influence of corrupt practices over the electoral process and writes that "it
is not easy to judge among the illicit influences brought to bear upon the electorate
whether bribery or coercion was the major factor in impelling it towards a decision". 85
Gash distinguishes between two forms of electoral coercion: "familiar and genteel
tactics" included threats of dismissal from employment, eviction, loss of patronage
and exclusive dealing; while "more direct and forcible methods" incorporated the
83
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'cooping' or kidnapping of voters, and the threat or employment of personal
violence. 86 In Elections and Party Management H.J.Hanham highlights a continuity
of electoral behaviour across the reform period. He argues that the elimination of
violence and electoral corruption was a process still incomplete by the end of the
nineteenth-century.

Hanham identifies at least 64 English boroughs at which

"undoubted cases of corruption occurred" between 1865 and 1884, and writes that,

Whatever figure one accepts as accurate it is certain that corrupt
practices occurred in between one-third and one-half of the English
boroughs on sufficient scale for them to be noticed ... Bribery could
take place in the market place without a finger being lifted to prevent
it, while riots often occurred simply because there was no one to stop
them[my emphasis]. 87

Historians from Gash and Hanham to Richter and Hoppen have written of the nature
of election violence during the mid-Victorian generation. Yet few of those studies
provide a sustained quantitative analysis of disorder. In addition, those who have
described the scale of the phenomenon have largely done so without reference to a
detailed statistical survey. The absence of such an analysis is particularly noticeable
in discussions of trends in the pattern of violence. For example Thomson argues that
elections became more disorderly after the First Reform Act88 , and Hoppen argues
that English election violence declined after 1832 and by 1874 was, "more sporadic
than ever". 89 However there is little attempt by either to quantify such conclusions.
Furthermore where some degree of analysis has been completed comparisons are
often hampered by statistics that utilise different terminology and cover disparate time
periods. Bohstedt records 617 riots between 1790 and 1810, of which 63 or 10%
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were classed as 'politica1'.90 Richter's sample of English disturbances between 1865
,,
and 1885 includes 253 riots, of which 71 or 30% occurred during elections. 91 Yet
drawing comparisons between these figures is difficult even considering the
differences in time periods.

As previously noted Bohstedt's sample of political

violence incorporates more than just election violence, and though Richter's sample
focuses exclusively on electoral disorder he fails to defme 'riot' and how he classifies
disturbances as 'serious'. The student of electoral disturbance is thus left with little
understanding of the actual scope of disorder during the mid to late Victorian era.
Given the considerable statistical vacuum in which previous discussions of
election violence have been conducted, a quantitative analysis of rioting must precede
any assessment of the operation of electoral politics.

Bohstedt highlights the

importance of such an approach. He challenges the prevailing myth of the feminine
food riot, "on the basis of a more complete analysis of some statistical profiles of
protest" .92 His argument that female leadership of food riots has been exaggerated
due to the rarity of their appearance in other forms of protest, is based on a large
sample of English riots. He writes that "the traditional method of analysing riots by
compiling anecdotes may simply confirm preconceived assumptions. Since even a
dozen incidents are fewer than 2 per cent of riots in this period, impressionistic
selection is no substitute for counting [my emphasis]". 93 Conclusions about the pace

of political modernisation will therefore be made within the context of a careful study
of the nature and frequency of disorder. In his study of Black Country disturbances
between 1835 and 1860 D.Philips establishes the general methodological problems
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associated with studying riots, namely definition and quantification. 94 The first refers
to the problem of labelling episodes of disorder, while the second concerns the
classification of violence according to size, seriousness and relative importance. The
following discussion will outline the methodology used to defme incidents of crowd
violence, and the terminology employed to describe incidents of varying size and
severity.

Stevenson and Quinault argue that "the words 'protest', 'riot' and 'disturbance' are
not always very easy to defme precisely, but they must be defined if quantification is
to be undertaken" .95

The basic model for defming and quantifying moments of

collective violence is provided by the law of public order offences. We have already
noted in section I that the law distinguished between popular protest and individual
assault on the basis of numbers (at least 3 persons), mutual intent (united in pursuit of
some common goal), violence (physical damage to persons or property) and public
alarm (at least one person of reasonable courage feared a breach of the peace). Thus
the basic offence of unlawful assembly described an event in which 3 persons or more

a degree of public alarm. The more serious offence of riot was defmed as,

A tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three persons or more,
who assemble together of their own authority, with an intent
mutually to assist one another against anyone who shall oppose them
in the execution of an enterprise of a private nature, and afterwards
actually to execute the enterprise, in a violent and turbulent manner,
to the terror of the people, whether the act intended were lawful or
unlawful. 96
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['he criteria established by the law for determining the severity of a disturbance

w~s

thus an increase in the number of participants. At common law a riot was regarded as
cooperative action involving 3 or more persons, was a misdemeanour and could be
<u•.u.u·~.... ~·~

by a fme or imprisonment. In such a case the authorities were allowed to

'reasonable means' to effect the restoration of order. However by statute a state
of riot existed if 12 or more persons remained riotously assembled one hour after the
reading of the Riot Act proclamation. Those who ignored the warning were guilty of

a felony and the authorities were legally justified in the use of deadly force to restore
The legal definition of riot therefore established both the severity of the
inc:ideJlt and proscribed the degree of response permitted to the authorities.
However the use of this legal model of definition presents difficulties to the
historian. Acceptance of contemporary labels of violence is dangerous given the
subjective nature of the classification process. The degree of seriousness attributed to
a disturbance, and therefore the label employed to describe it, depended on the
attitudes and perceptions of the authorities who were present at the time. An essential
element in the legal definition of disorder was therefore the subjective test of how the
authorities, present at the time, perceived the threat in front of them. Philips writes
that the crucial factor in defming a riot was, "the attitude and reaction of the
authorities to the assembled crowd; and the test the law applied was the essentially
subjective one of what the peace officer on the spot at the time, felt the situation to
be".

97

Therefore the potential exists for variations across the country and over time as

to what constituted a recognisable threat to public order.

And if, as Stevenson

suggests, Victorians were becoming less sensitive to the threat of disorder during the
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decades of the nineteenth-century, then inconsistencies in the classification of

violence would undoubtedly have occurred.
The historian is also faced with an evidential problem. Primary and secondary
"'"'""'''""'"' materials largely fail to provide the necessary details with which to classify

' rather than to estimates of the number of participants. Indeed, crowd sizes
often only provided when an incident achieved some considerable notoriety or
Uiltl~....., ..'"

in a specific number of indictments. Therefore, any attempt to categorise

while John Stevenson provides a comprehensive analysis of the issues relating to
definition, he ultimately relies on a catholic approach which allows him to, "embrace
a broader field than that covered by the legal term 'riot'".98
Neither Hoppen nor Richter provide a framework for establishing the severity
of electoral violence. Bohstedt does, however, provide some direction. He cites
physical attack, damage or coercion as distinguishing riot from mere protest.
Bohstedt defmes 'riot' as, "an incident in which a crowd of fifty or more people
damaged or seized property, assaulted someone or forced a victim to perform some
action". 99 He discards the legal use of the term 'riot' in favour of an interpretation
based on, "the way contemporaries routinely used the word". In contrast Philips
relies on the official legal definition of riot, and restricts his focus to those incidents in
98
99
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which the authorities clashed with rioters and prosecutions resulted. He argues that
the official reaction to disorder played a critical role in the development of riotous
situations. Therefore his categorisation of violence is bas.ed on how the authorities
labelled each incident, and the level of response it generated. In categorising the scale
of violence Philips resorts to what he describes as a crude and simple distinction: he
recognises both serious, and less serious, episodes of disturbance.

is clear that considerable variation in terminology (and focus) exists within the
of popular protest. What then is an appropriate starting point for
(i(~finmg

the types of violence examined here? Within the context of this study

precise distinctions between gradations of violence are less important than the fact of
disorder itself. The sample of election disturbances has been compiled to inform our
J.lnderstanding of the operation of constituency politics.

As such a restrictive

defmitional approach may obscure more than it reveals of mid-century electioneering.
Quinault writes that "exclusive attention on major disturbances gives us an
exaggerated view of the involvement of the national government in the maintenance
of public order" .100

Likewise too rigid an approach to defming disorder may

eliminate from view a considerable amount of disorderly activity. Furthermore the
categorisation of violence according to precise limits of size and severity is
problematic given the limitations of the source material available. The number of
participants involved in disturbances was rarely given and legal terms such as riot
were often employed by contemporary observers to describe incidents of varying
scale and seriousness. For these reasons I have discounted a narrow and exclusive
approach to the classification of violence in favour of an approach that will develop a
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cumulative picture of disorder across the period. This is not to argue for a catch-all
approach to classification in which every incident involving a harsh word or thrown
stone is included in the sample. Rather it is a recognition of the dangers of limiting
the sample to episodes of violence that meet exacting standards of qualification.
Given the limits of the available evidence a sample proscribed by precise limits of
" narttCI1JaltUII

and destruction could produce a pattern of sporadic outbursts of serious

mob violence, separated by periods of relative calm, order and civility.
The classifications of disturbance employed in this study are therefore based
on an appreciation of the complexities involved in studying moments of collective
I have avoided any categorisation based on the number of people involved,
as a more workable distinction lies in the character of an event and the scale of the
official response to its outbreak. The inconsistencies of contemporary reporting have
been taken into consideration, and where a lack of detail prevents easy categorisation
of an episode of violence it has been discarded or downgraded in terms of severity.
The sample relies on a three-tier approach to the quantification of violence. The
terms 'riot' and 'disturbance' are used to describe the more serious types of disorder:
.. with the former more severe than the latter. The term 'incident' has been chosen to
describe those disturbances that, while not serious enough to warrant a substantial
magisterial response, represented an interruption to normal expectations of electoral

A 'riot' is thus defined as a serious and sustained outbreak of collective
violence, involving the implicit or explicit use of force, intimidation or coercion, and
which resulted in physical damage to persons or property - or the immediate fear that
such would occur. Riots commonly evoked a magisterial response such as the reading
of the Riot Act proclamation and/or the forcible restoration of the peace by police

officers or the military. A report of the Bristol borough election of 1868 provides an
example of a mid-century electoral riot:

The destruction of property was very great. The windows of chapels,
schools, and private residences were smashed without respect to party.
Public houses were. forced open, and the mob helped themselves to
wine, spirits and beer, cigars, biscuits ... Mr.Morley [Liberal] was ... an
object of attack, but his assailants did not succeed in their attempts. A
boy was dangerously injured, and nine persons were taken to the
Hospital to have their wounds dressed. 101

'disturbance' is classified as a less serious breach of the peace than a riot, and
involved episodic outbursts of crowd violence rather than the type of sustained

..elicited some measure of official response. In July 1865 the Hull and Lincolnshire

Times reported various cases of disturbance in connection with elections in
I-eicestershire:

Disturbances broke out on Monday ... so serious in their character that
the polling had to be completed on Tuesday. At Ashby-de-la-Zouch a
scene of wild uproar ensued which resulted seriously, and threatened
more disaster than actually occurred. About nine or ten of the
constables were severely wounded, generally in the head by stones. 102

An 'incident' is defmed as a noisy or demonstrative action by a crowd of people that
interferes with, or disrupts, the proceedings of an election campaign. An incident was
a relatively short lived event that involved little overt violence, and invoked a limited
official response.

Though less serious than a riot or a disturbance, an incident

nevertheless represented an interruption to electoral procedure.

The distinction

between the above classifications is thus made on the basis of duration and scale of
response, and by the fact that all three disrupted campaign proceedings.
101
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study conclusions about mid-Victorian electioneering are based on a
sample of election violence. Evidence of disorder has been gathered from a variety of
sources and quantified according to the above definitions.

Episodes of electoral

violence were collated from a survey of newspaper and journal reports, election
petition fmdings, official government correspondence and parliamentary reports.
Contemporary newspapers and journals provided the richest source of material. A
total of 35 provincial newspapers, one national journal .(Nonconformist) and one
national newspaper (The Times) were surveyed across the general election years of
1857, 1859, 1865, 1868, 1874 and 1880. There are obvious dangers in an overreliance on one source type. However, the lack of material found in other sources
necessitated a dependence on newspaper articles.
Election petitions provided some evidence of disorder but were more useful in
providing additional details to accounts already furnished in newspaper reports.
Official correspondence between local authorities and central government offices
proved to be of limited use.

During the period the Home Office encouraged

provincial authorities to deal with matters of public order themselves; in Quinault's
words, "in most cases local disorders were controlled by the local justices ... the
maintenance of public order was largely a local responsibility". 103 As such, requests
to the Home Office for military assistance during elections are relatively sparse.
Parliamentary reports, particularly those dealing with corrupt practices or reform of
electoral procedure, contained some evidence of disorder. In addition, examples of
violence were drawn from a number of secondary sources including works by Richter,
Gash, Hanham, O'Leary, Quinault, and J.F.Hi11. 104
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Reports of electoral violence have been included in the sample (Appendix I)
where the following could be ascertained: county of origin; town or borough in
the event occurred; date of incident; type of election it related to (county or
"'"'"n'''ah parliamentary or municipal); scale of the event; timing (during the canvass,

seven criteria ensured that only those incidents that could be properly

criteria.

In cases where the location of an episode of violence was

the event was discarded. Examples of by-election violence are included on

included in the sample they reflect the occurrence of violence at different stages
a particular campaign - for example if violence broke out during an election
meeting and then again several days later during the polling day. Duplicate entries
are included because they reveal the extent to which disorder was part of the general
temper of Victorian electioneering. 105 The sample of violence provides the statistical
~basis

for conclusions about the character of mid-Victorian politics. However, an

analysis of the mid-Victorian political system will precede a discussion of the sample
of violence.
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I

I shall say exactly what I think .. .If you want venality; if you want
drunkenness, and facility for being intimidated; or if, on the other
hand, you want impulsive, unreflecting, and violent people, where do
you look for them? ... Do you go to the top or to the bottom? ... The
effect [of the bill] will manifestly be to add a large number of persons
to our constituencies of the class from which if there is to be anything
wrong going on we may naturally expect to find it.

Robert Lowe, March 1866 1

When Robert Lowe delivered these often-quoted words to the Commons in relation to
Gladstone's Reform Bill of 1866 he was Iio doubt voicing the concerns of many on
both sides of the House.

However he was also speaking directly from his own

personal experience. He held the unhappy honour of having been at the centre of two
serious election riots at consecutive general elections.2 In 1857 his re-election for the
borough of Kidderminster precipitated a riot that almost claimed his life. He was
forced to spend a week convalescing in the town after stones thrown during a violent
post-election riot fractured his skull. Two years later Lowe abandoned Kidderminster
after a canvass there revealed he had lost crucial Conservative support. In 1859, with
the support of his patron the Marquess ofLandsdowne, he stood for the small borough
of Calne in Wiltshire. However his victory there over a popular local candidate so
infuriated the local mob that they smashed his agent's windows, attacked the police
and "kept the town in terror until a very late hour at night". 3 Lowe 's comments in
1866 reflected his fear that an extension of the franchise 'downwards' would
inevitably lead to a rise in both venality and violence. Yet to what extent were his
1
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concerns based on the realities of contemporary electioneering, and to what extent
were they exaggerated by his own, painful, experiences? Did electoral reform, either
in 1832 or 1867, increase the frequency of election violence?

It is crucial to an understanding of the nature of election violence that the context

within which it occurred is first explored. Accordingly, this chapter will outline the
electoral framework of British politics between the years 1857 and 1880. This is not,
however, merely an attempt to contextualise the discussion of disorderly
electioneering. Rather, the changing pattern of electoral violence is explicable only in
the light of those changes to the electoral system that took place at various times
before and during the Victorian period. The English and Welsh electoral landscape
not remain static during these years. Instead it was continually altered by reform
acts and various anti-corruption measures. As such the structures and procedures that
invited or prevented election disorder underwent both profound and subtle changes. It
is the task of this chapter to delineate those changes and to assess their impact on the
nature and frequency of electoral violence.

During the mid-Victorian period the basic outline of the British electoral system
remained essentially unaltered.

In the House of Commons at Westminster 658

members represented a little over 400 constituencies across England, Ireland,
Scotland and Wales. Political representation was divided between county, borough
and university constituencies.

In addition the franchise - or the right to vote -

continued to be restricted to a fraction of the adult male population. However this
structural continuity masks a significant period of transition. It was during the middle
decades of the nineteenth-century, against a wider background of social and economic
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change, that the fabric of British politics was profoundly altered. During this period
the apparatus of a modem political system was established.

The growth of the

electorate, in 1832 and 1867, heralded the approach of a new style of politics in which
party organization assumed increasing significance.

The growth of local party

associations and pressure groups, and of their links to central party organs, signalled
the development of a national political framework.

Constituency elections

increasingly began to bear the imprint of national rather than local issues, and the
formation of governments became less a product of parliamentary influence and more
the outcome of electoral mandate. It was also during this period that politics became
increasingly delineated along class lines rather than those of interest and religion.
There were changes, too, in electoral procedure: the duration of the poll was reduced,
public nominations were eventually abolished, and whereas at the beginning of the
period electors stood in the open to exercise their franchise, at its close they cast their
votes in camera - shielded by the Ballot Act of 1872.
However, this process of modernization was neither uniform nor monolithic:
not only did various elements of modem and pre-modem politics continue to coexist
throughout the period, but the pace of change also varied across the system due to the
myriad constituency types - and thus electoral cultures - that existed in England and
Wales. New political realities were undoubtedly emerging between 1857 and 1880,
yet they did so in the shadow of older political traditions. As noted in Chapter I it is
possible to characterise the British political system during this period as being
positioned on a fault line between two competing forms of politics. James Vemon
describes this dichotomy in his study of English political culture between 1815 and
1867,
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As we shall see, it is difficult to talk of one, singular, exclusive official
definition of a male propertied political arena. The official political
structure was a curious mixture of the old and the new, the local and
the national, combining the remnants of a medieval political system
with that created by nineteenth-century reforms. 4

The coexistence of old and new features of politics owed much to the atomisation of
the system into individual electoral units - each with their own distinct cultures and
political heritage. According to Hoppen, Victorian constituencies, "ranged along a
lengthy continuum from comparatively straightforward deference communities to
provincial capitals sustaining something close to the free exercise of political
judgment". 5 Comparatively similar traditions of influence and patronage existed in
the agricultural counties and the small boroughs. In the former loyalty to the Church
of England and to aristocratic influence sustained a tradition of predominantly
Conservative politics.

In the latter the strength of electoral tradition and patron

influence stifled the development of democratic politics. In the larger urban boroughs
a measure of political freedom was possible and the ftrst stirrings of a modem style of
politics were to be found.

There a tradition of nonconformity and opposition to

privilege in church and state gave Liberalism and Radicalism the ascendancy. The
pace of political change across these constituencies varied according to the strength of
local electoral traditions and the extent of social and economic changes brought about
by industrial and urban growth.
The mid-Victorian political system was characterized by the simultaneous
operation of both progressive features of modem politics and the retardant elements of
a more traditional, pre-reform outlook.. Thus the development of centrally directed
Party organization was hampered by a leadership lack of faith, and a continuing
recourse to private correspondence rather than the emerging channels of official party
; Vemon, Politics and the People, p.15.
Hoppen, The Mid- Victorian Generation, p.254.
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machinery. Elections continued to be influenced by local concerns and provincial
allegiances, and campaigning remained infused with a strong sense of carnival and
ritual. And despite the formalization ofpolitics after 1867, which further limited the
participation of the unenfranchised and attempted to make the process of constituency
politics more respectable, the machinery of electioneering continued to provide
opportunities for the exercise of corruption and the outbreak of violence.

Violent electioneering in Britain may date from the late Middle Ages6 but it was not
until the end ofthe seventeenth-century, during the 'rage of party', that the 'great age
of electoral rioting' began. 7 It was then that an expanded electorate and greater
frequency of contested elections - a product of the Triennial Act of 1694 - contributed
to the strength of political activity and to the potential for conflict. The 20 years
between 1695 and 1715 experienced no fewer than 10 general elections, 8 during
which between one-third and one-half of all elections were contested.9 Ian Gilmour
writes of elections during this period,

Polling was concentrated in space and extended in time. A
constituency usually had only one polling place, and polling went on
for days, sometimes weeks. Excitement inevitably grew, as did the
consumption of drink. In addition, to ensure the freedom of elections
soldiers were removed from the towns where they were held. Their
presence would probably have provoked violence; their absence did
nothing to prevent it. 10

English and Welsh elections continued to occasion sporadic violence throughout the
eighteenth century, yet fewer contests meant fewer opportunities for disorder. Frank

6

See Derek Hirst, Authority and Conflict: England 1603 -1658 (London, 1986).
Ian Gilmour, Riot, Risings and Revolution (London, 1992), p.207.
8
Ibid.
9
Frank O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties: The Unreformed Electoral System ofHanoverian
England, 1734-1832 (Oxford, 1989), p.l 07.
10
Gilmour, Riot, Risings, p.208- 209.
7
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O'Gorman's table of contests between 1701 and 1831 illustrates the decline in
electoral activity: between 1701 and 1734 the average percentage of English and
Welsh elections that were contested was 40.2%; whereas between 1741 and 1831 this
percentage dropped to 27%. 11 The frequency of electoral violence declined after 1715
as the Septennial Act reduced the opportunity for disorder by increasing the time
between elections. In addition, a corresponding decline in the number of electoral
contests sapped the source of violence. By 1747 just 7.5% of English counties went
to the polls compared to 65% in 1705. 12 William Hogarth's satiric print of the corrupt
Oxfordshire election of 1754, Chairing the Member (1758), presents a picture of
undoubted bacchanalian chaos and disorder. Yet by the middle of the eighteenthcentury the frequency of electoral rioting had largely begun to decline.

John

Stevenson writes that "with the growing security of the Hanoverian succession and
the increasingly oligarchic tendency of electoral control, the occasions of open
political violence became more limited" .13
Comparing the frequency of violence in the eighteenth-century with that of the
nineteenth-century is difficult given the absence of quantitative surveys for the latter.
Where figures of electoral riots are available, comparisons are hampered by disparate
emphases and contrasting terminology.

Bohstedt records a total of 617 riots in

England between 1790 and 1810 - of which he classes 63 as 'political' .14 By contrast
Richter records 452 riots in England, Wales and Scotland between 1865 and 1885, of
which 71 occurred at elections. 15 As a crude indication of the gradual 'transition to
order' of British society these figures are enlightening: Richter found less violence in

11

O'Gorman, Voters, p.l08.
Stevenson, Popular Disturbances (1 ' 1 edn, 1979), p.27.
13
Stevenson, Popular Disturbances (2nd edn, 1992), p.30.
14B
ohstedt, "Gender, Household", p.91.
15
Richter, "Public Order'', p.275 and 172.
12
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the later nineteenth-century despite a wider frame of reference than Bohstedt.
However it is difficult to use such figures to trace the pattern of electoral disorder
between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Bohstedt's sample of political

violence also includes 'Church and King' riots and illumination disorders: neither of
which are the focus of this study. In addition he provides no distribution figures to
indicate when the riots occurred. Likewise Richter includes no details as to the timing
of disorder. Bohstedt defmes a 'riot' as, "an incident in which a crowd of fifty or
more people damaged or seized property, assaulted someone or forced a victim to
perform some action". 16 For his part Richter describes only, "separate instances of
serious electoral rioting" _I? However, given that Bohstedt's figure of 63 'political'
riots included other categories of disturbance, and Richter's sample of 71 riots
included only election violence, it seems likely that the later period (1865 - 1885)
included slightly more cases of electoral disorder. Such a conclusion fits comfortably
with my own evidence, which suggests that Richter's figures underestimate the scale
of mid-century electoral violence.
Yet what of the period between 1810 and 1857? The lack of any statistical
evidence on electoral violence during that period ensures that conclusions about post1832 disorder are necessarily speculative. Elections undoubtedly continued to be
marred by violence in the early nineteenth-century, and John Stevenson suggests that
"there was little evidence either immediately before or after 1832 that the more
tumultuous traditions of the eighteenth century had been left behind". 18 Given the
strong correlation between election contests and the frequency of violence some
conclusions can, however, be drawn. It seems likely that the phenomenon of electoral

16

Bohstedt, "Gender, Household"., p.90.
Richter, "Public Order"., p.172.
18
Stevenson, Popular Disturbances (1'1 edn), p.286.
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violence peaked in the years immediately after the First Reform Act of 1832. During
that period the growth of the electorate, a greater number of contested elections and
increased partisanship - all products of reform - would have contributed to the
frequency of violence. Thereafter the scale of disorder declined as the rate of contests
diminished. The dislocation of party politics in the 1840s contributed to a decline in
electoral activity, further reducing the likelihood of contested elections and thus the
opportunities for disorder. Hoppen argues a post-1832 decrease in electoral violence
and suggests, "Bloody electioneering had been common in the period before the First
Reform Act of 1832. Thereafter it declined, at frrst slowly and then rapidly". 19 By
1874, he writes, ''the press was reporting that in England 'mobs, processions, favours,
free fights and punch drinking have become for the most part things of the past"'. 20
Hoppen's contention that the frequency of electoral rioting was decreasing after 1832
is undoubtedly accurate. Yet his argument about the pace at which that decline
occurred during the mid-nineteenth century is likely over-estimated. The sample of
evidence presented here suggests a steady increase in instances of violence from 1857
to 1868.
For the period between 1857 and 1880, including general and by-elections, I
have identified a total of 191 episodes of election violence. This figure includes 25
duplicate cases of disorder - where more than one separate instance of violence
occurred in a constituency during a single campaign. The sample of 194 instances of
violence compares with Bohstedt's figure of 63 riots and Richter's 71 riots. 21 A
detailed analysis of the sample of violence is provided in Chapter IV. However I have

t9H

oppen, "Grammars", p.605.
!bid
21
The figures quoted for Bohstedt and Richter include only those riots they identified as occurring
during elections. The sample of 191 includes three classifications of disorder including riots,
disturbances and incidents.
20
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included a brief survey of the figures here to provide some context to the present
discussion. Table I below reveals the distribution, timing and location of election
violence during the period. Undoubtedly more than 13 cases of these occurred during
the period. Yet an attempt to identify all such instances would require an exhaustive
search of newspaper archives.

Table 1.Figures of Election Violence in England andWales, 1857-1880

General
Elections
1857- 12
1859-11
1865-29
1868-71
1874-32
1880-26

Total Cases of Violence- 191
By
Total orough
Scale of
Elections
Violence
Violence
1860-2
1861 - 1
132
Riot- 63
1862-2
1867-2
Total County Disturbance - 77
1869- 1
Violence
1871- 1
Incident- 51
1877- 1
59

Timing of
Violence
Pre-poll- 43
Polling day - 96
Post-poll - 27
Unknown- 25

181

10

Table I demonstrates the steady increase in electoral violence between 1857 and
1868.22 Thereafter reported cases of disorder decreased, yet remained higher than the
pre-1867 period. This weakens any argument that after the introduction of secret
voting in 1872 the potential for violence largely disappeared.

The definitions

employed to describe the scale of electoral violence are outlined in Chapter 3. Given
that both 'riots' and 'disturbances' are classed as serious cases of violence, Table 1
illustrates the overwhelmingly serious nature of mid-century disorder.

Electoral

violence is shown to have occurred predominantly on the polling day; a feature that
continued even after the introduction of secret voting. A considerable amount of
disorder also took place prior to the polling day, with much of that occurring during
22

This table, which includes duplicate entries, collates data from several tables which may be found in
Chapter N.
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the nomination ceremony. 'Post-poll' violence records those episodes of disorder that
took place during the declaration of the result - itself a potent source of violence. The
pattern and distribution of electoral violence revealed in Table 1 can be understood
through an analysis of the structure and operation of the political system.

11

The structure of British politics between 1857 and 1880 may be divided by the
Second Reform Act of 1867. In that year the extension of the franchise and a
substantial redistribution of constituencies refashioned the electoral landscape created
35 years previously. And whereas in the decade after the Second Reform Act the
character of politics was determined by the alterations of Disraeli's 'leap in the dark',
the electoral system prior to 1867 operated under the provisions of the First Reform
Act of 1832. The latter Act addressed some of the most obvious imbalances of the
unreformed electoral system. As well as extending the franchise to a portion of the
middle class, the distribution of seats attempted to rectify the over-representation of
the south by increasing the representation of the new centres of economic and
population growth. Many smaller boroughs, those with few voters and characterized
as habitually corrupt, were either partially disfranchised or totally removed from the
system. By introducing a system of voter registration, and thereby stimulating - in
the long-term - the growth of party organisation and partisan conflict, the First
Reform Act contributed indirectly to the frequency of mid-Victorian electoral
disorder. This is not to argue that violence increased inexorably after 1832, yet the
evidence reveals a defmite rise in the incidence of electoral disorder during the midVictorian period. In the years between 1857 and 1867 I have recorded 59 episodes of
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election violence, compared to a total of 132 between 1868 and 1880.23 As already
noted the lack of disorder in the earlier period reflected the relative weakness of party
conflict and a low incidence of electoral contests.

One of the more recent accounts of the passage of the Great Reform Act comments
that ''when the dust had settled, the political landscape looked much as it had done
before."24 Structurally speaking, at least, this was largely true. Notwithstanding the
long-term effects of Reform on the development of the British political system, the
Act of 1832 left the outline of electoral politics only slightly altered. In the final
count the overall size of the electoral system increased from 379 to 401
constituencies, though the number of members returned to the Commons remained at
658.

Through disfranchisement, enfranchisement and redistribution the boroughs

experienced a net loss of 7 constituencies and 66 members, compared to a net gain for
the counties of 24 constituencies and 65 members. In the unreformed system a total
of 114 counties had returned 188 members to parliament, 262 boroughs had returned
465 members and the universities of Oxford, Cambridge and Dublin provided the
remaining 5 members. After 1832 university representation was increased to six, with
Dublin gaining an extra member. A total of 143 counties returned 253 members and
255 boroughs returned 399 members.
The redistribution of seats in 1832 abolished or partially disfranchised a
number of small boroughs- generally those with fewer than 500 voters. English
boroughs accounted for 61% of the total number of seats in the unreformed House of

23

These figures include duplicate entries and 10 episodes of disorder that occurred at by-elections. For
more detail on the statistics of disorder during the period see Chapter IV.
24
E.A.Smith, Reform or Revolution? A Diary ofReform in England, 1830-2 (Stroud, 1992), p.141.
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Commons, of which 55% had fewer than 300 voters.25 Indeed in 1830 only 43
English boroughs could claim an electorate of more than 1,000. In 1832, in an attack
on nomination and patronage boroughs, a large number of these small constituencies
were completely disfranchised. Schedule A of the Act abolished 56 of the smallest
and most corrupt boroughs including such colourful and decayed constituencies as
Wooton Basset, Old Sarum and Gatton, which by 1832 had just 2 voters! A further
30 boroughs listed in Schedule B lost a single member each. In England and Wales
the redistribution of seats saw 22 large towns gain 2 members each, and an additional
21 medium-sized towns gain a single member.
These changes increased the representation of the industrial north at the
expense of the over-represented south.

From a total of 22 new boroughs each

returning 2 members each, 14 were industrial towns of the north and midlands. These
new constituencies, each with a population in excess of 40,000, included such cotton
and fabric manufacturing towns as Bolton, Stockport, Manchester and Bradford.26 In
England 26 counties were divided: 7 were granted a single member; Yorkshire gained
an extra 2 seats and the Isle of Wight gained a single member.

In Wales the

representation of the counties was increased by 3, the district of Swansea was
established and the iron-manufacturing town ofMerthyr Tydfil was granted separate
representation. Scotland gained 8 new seats in the burghs and in Ireland 4 large towns
gained an extra member. 27 The table below outlines the structure of British politics
between the First and Second Reform Acts.

2SM. h
tc ael
2

Brock, The Great Reform Act (London, 1973), p.l9- 20.

2~ Gash, Politics in the Age ofPeel, p.65.

Charles Seymour, Electoral Reform, p.538.
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Table 2.United Kingdom Electoral System, 1832-1867
England MP's Wales MP's Scotland MP's Ireland MP's

68
186
2
256

142
322
4
468

13
15
0
28

17
15
0
32

30
21
0
51

30
23
0
53

32
33
1
66

64
39
2
105

Total
Constituenc

143
255
3
401

Total
MP's
253
399
6
658

England and Wales remained the electoral powerhouse of the system. Between them
they provided the House of Commons with 500, or 75%, of its members. In contrast
Scotland returned 53 members and Ireland provided 105 members.

England

dominated the partnership with a total of 256 constituencies and 468 members.
Boroughs continued to outnumber county constituencies in the post-reform period.
After 1832 a total of 255 boroughs across the United Kingdom returned a total of 399
members, whereas 143 counties provided Parliament with 253 members.

Despite the reallocation of seats in 1832 anomalies in the scale of representation
continued to characterise the system. Borough representation was concentrated in the
south and south-west of England, where 100 boroughs returned 176 members,
compared to the 144 members drawn from 84 northern boroughs. 28 Structurally the
small boroughs retained their electoral dominance and the industrial districts of
England remained inadequately represented. The scale of the inequity was in some
cases quite glaring.

Before the Second Reform Act the small rural borough of

Thetford with 224 voters, the sprawling county seat of East Suffolk with 6,679 voters,
and the large industrial borough of Manchester with 21,542 voters, each returned two
members to parliament. Indeed on the eve of the Second Reform Act a total of 60

28

These figures were derived by sorting the English boroughs into 10 categories (Northern, North
Western, York, North Midland, West Midland and South Western, SouthEastern, South Midland,
Eastern and London). These divisions were employed in the 1871 British census and are used
extensively in Chapter IV (See p.l68 [fn.121] for details of the counties in each division).
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English and Welsh boroughs had fewer than 500 voters yet returned 87 members to
the Commons.

Table 2 below demonstrates the continued, though diminishing,

presence of small boroughs in England and Wales during the period.

29

Table 3.English and Welsh Borough Sizes, 1857-1880

1857 MP's 1859 MP's 1865 MP's 1868 MP's 1874 MP's 1880 MP's
116 200 119 205 129 221
44
51
97
43
86
88
70
67
70
41
70
42
50
52
65
45
52
41
80
27
55
89
47
34
34
27
24
53
86
24
59
87
62
86
60
0
0
0
0
92
0
0

Prior to the Second Reform Act the term 'small' refers to those boroughs with fewer
than 1,000 voters and a population ofless than 10,000. After 1867, when the size of
the electorate was greatly increased, the term describes boroughs with less than 2,000
voters and fewer than 20,000 inhabitants. Conversely the term 'large' borough refers
to those with more than 1,000 voters before 1867, and with more than 2,000 voters
after 1867.

Table 2 reveals the relative significance of the smaller boroughs

throughout the period. Before 1867 more than half of all English and Welsh boroughs
had fewer than 1,000 voters, with between 59 and 62 having fewer than 500 voters.
Between 1857 and 1867 the small boroughs accounted for about 50% of the total
English and Welsh borough membership- returning between 167 and 178 members
to the Commons. Therefore just prior to the Second Reform Act more than onequarter of Commons members represented a small English or Welsh borough.
The continued electoral importance of the smaller boroughs reflected an early
Victorian ideal that members should represent a wide variety of influences, and not
merely appeal to the 'mercenary' wishes of a mass electorate. The small boroughs

29

Figures for Table 2 drawn from J.Vincent and M.Stcnton (eds), McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll
Book ofAll Elections, 1832 -1918 (Brighton, 1971) and F.W.S.Craig, British Parliamentary Election
Results, 1832-1885 (London, 1977).
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were thus viewed as a safeguard against the tyranny of numbers. During the framing
of the Second Reform Act, the Conservative Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, based
his opposition to equalising electoral distribution, ''upon· the traditional dislike and
fear of granting power to the numerical majority". 30 Due to their size, however, such
constituencies were also perceived as being able to provide a relatively easy entry to
the Commons for a candidate willing to spend a little money in bribes and treats.
Consequently the small boroughs have often been characterised as tidal pools left in
the wake of a receding sea of electoral tradition, corruption and influence.

An

editorial comment in the Nonconformist in April 1859 reflected contemporary opinion
of the politics of the small boroughs,

In the large towns for the most part, the arts of corruption will avail but

little. Public opinion, and the vigilance of non-electors, will do much
to thwart the 'gentlemen in green spectacles and dark wigs'. But in the
small constituencies ofless than 500 voters, corruption, drunkenness
and vice of every hue will during the next few days hold their
carnival. 31

However, despite their colourful reputation as reservoirs of electoral malpractice, the
small boroughs proved largely free of election violence throughout the mid-Victorian
period. This fmding runs contrary to that of Donald Richter, who writes that "It was
in the small towns and rural areas that the great majority of election disturbances
occurred, and it was there that the absence as yet of any effective policing was most
conspicuous". 32 Yet my evidence from England and Wales reveals that it was in the
larger urban boroughs that most of the violence occurred - a factor both of the
increasing number of larger boroughs in the system (see Table 2), and of the low

30

Seymour, Electoral Reform, p.330.
Nonconformist, 27 April1859, p.331.
32
Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot, p.23.
31
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number of contested elections in the smaller boroughs. 33 Electoral violence was a
feature of the large urban constituencies because it was there that a measure of
political freedom encouraged the development of party conflict - and thus of the root
causes of disorder: partisan enthusiasm and electoral malpractice.
The absence of contests in the small boroughs, and thus of violence, was
related to the stability of politics there. Such constituencies tended to be controlled
either by a patron or family, and were places where electoral traditions were likely to
survive for generations. Jaggard writes of these constituencies, "Because of their long
history and slowly growing populations, many small boroughs were also towns where
in some instances political traditions comfortably spanned the first and sometimes the
second Reform Acts". 34 The strength of such traditions, whether motivated by patron
control, party allegiance or bribery, weakened the likelihood of sustained partisan
rivalry - an essential ingredient of contested elections and of violence.

Jaggard

highlights more than 100 small patronage, corporation, venal or proprietary boroughs
identified by O'Gorman in Voters, Patrons and Parties and comments, "Political
activity was absent in almost all". 35 My own analysis confirms the stability of politics
in the small boroughs.

I have identified 69 English and Welsh boroughs with

consistently small electorates throughout the period 1857 to 1880. 36 31 of those
boroughs returned the same party preferences at 4 or more successive elections - 19
of which returned same-party candidates at all 6 general elections of the period. 37 A

33
34
35

For a detailed analysis of election violence in small and large boroughs see Chapter IV.

Jaggard, "Small Boroughs", p.626.

Ibid.
These are boroughs with electorates below 1,000 before 1867, and below 2,000 for the entire period
1857-1880.
37
By 'same party preference' I am referring to the choice of party: in single member constituencies this
meant the same party was successful at successive elections; in double member constituencies the same
pattern of choice was consistent, whether that be the same party or a split between the two parties. For
example both the Welsh borough ofRadnor (which elected a single Liberal at all elections during the
36
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further 26 boroughs returned same-party candidates for at least 3 successive elections.
Thus 57 of 69 small boroughs showed a considerable degree of continuity in their
politics throughout the period.

Party strengths in these boroughs were evenly

matched. Of the 19 boroughs that returned the same preference at all elections of the
period, 10 were safe Liberal seats and 9 were safe Conservative seats. Of the 31
boroughs that returned the same preference at four or more elections, 15 were Liberal,
14 were Conservative and 2 split between the parties. In such an environment the
likelihood of violence was quite remote. Not only were contests quite infrequent in
such constituencies, but also the degree of partisan rivalry required for the outbreak of
disorder was equally absent.

The First Reform Act greatly increased the total size of the British electorate. After
1832 a total of 813,726 individuals were enfranchised, a figure that represented just 1
in 7 adult males in the United Kingdom. 38 Debate continues over the precise extent of
the increase in 1832 due to the difficulty of estimating the size of the unreformed
electorate. The issue is further clouded by arguments over the extent to which the
potential, as opposed to the actual, electorate should be taken into account: the former

being those who were qualified to vote but failed to do so; the latter being those who
actually registered and exercised their franchise. 39 Indeed one recent account has
suggested that "Attempts at careful calculation of the size of the qualified electorate
before 1832 have no great value. Most of the electorate was a stage army, never or

period) and the borough of Warwick (which elected a Conservative and a Liberal at all elections from
1865 to 1880) are included in the initial figure of 31 boroughs mentioned above.
38
E.A.Smith, Reform or Revolution, p.141.
39
See Derek Beales, "The Electorate Before and After 1832: The right to vote, and the opportunity"
Parliamentary History, 11, 1 (1992), pp.139 -150 and Frank O'Gorman, "The Electorate Before and
After 1832 [Reply]," Parliamentary History, 12,2 (1993), pp.171-183.
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rarely voting". 40 In "The Electorate Before and After 1832" Derek Beales draws a
distinction between those who were entitled to vote and those who actually voted. He
suggests that whereas the Act increased the number of enfranchised voters in the
United Kingdom from 495,200 to 813,726, the number who actually voted rose rather
more impressively from 91,092 to 482,022- an increase of 81%.41 In England and
Wales alone the franchise alterations increased the eligible electorate from about
440,000 to 650,000, while the number who actually voted leapt from 74,638 to
390,700.

42

The figures of the actual voting population, as opposed to the potential
electorate, have important implications for the study of electoral violence. The First
Reform Act obviously increased the size of the United Kingdom electorate. Yet
Beales' figures suggest that not only were more people enfranchised after 1832, but
the number who actually voted was also substantially increased.

Indeed Beales

records that between 1831 and 1832 the percentage of the United Kingdom electorate
who actually voted rose from 18.4% to 59.2%. As Phillips and Wetherell write, "The

reformed electorate not only outnumbered its predecessor, it also tended to vote more
often and in greater proportion". 43 The more active post-1832 electorate reflected the
increasing number of contested elections - the natural precursor to electoral violence.
This trend did not, however, continue exponentially. Beales is careful to point out
that in 1835 the percentage of the population who voted dropped to 42.1%.44 This
decrease reflected the steady decline in contested elections that continued from 1835

40

Beales, "The Electorate", p.149.
Ibid.
42
Ibid., pp.147- 8 (Beales records that between 1831 and 1832 the number of people voting in English
and Welsh boroughs rose from 42,254 to 188,738 - compared to an increase in the number of county
voters from 30,934 to 201,962).
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until 1859 (with the exception of 1837 when contests increased)45 , and which
contributed to the relatively few cases of electoral violence in the early Victorian
. d46
peno.

The new franchises of the First Reform Act not only increased the size of the
electorate, they also altered its composition. In the counties this transformation was
less pronounced than in the boroughs, where a new franchise and residence
requirement· disfranchised large portions of the unreformed electorate. The county
electorate remained largely unchanged as a result of the 1832 Act. County seats were
viewed as more prestigious than borough seats and separate franchise requirements
between the two were designed to ensure their social distinctiveness. In the counties
the Act added the £10 copyhold, and the £10 and £50 leasehold qualifications to the
long enfranchised 40s freeholders.

The Act also introduced a new occupancy

qualification in the counties. This new rental franchise was available to tenants who
paid a yearly rent of not less than £50.
The new borough franchise in 1832 was the £10 occupancy qualification.
This conferred the right to vote on anyone who occupied property worth an annual
sum of not less than £10 for more than 12 months as owner or occupier. After 1832
this franchise qualified the majority of the borough electorate, and the newly
introduced residence requirement, "wiped out nearly half of the old voters". 47 Indeed
between half and two-thirds of the reformed borough electorate were enfranchised by
the new £10 qualification. 48 The loss of many older voters tended only to improve the
moral condition of some boroughs. Ancient right franchises qualified voters under a
45
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variety of arcane conditions, few of which were based on ownership of property or the
payment of rates. Seymour writes that "In many cases the electors qualified by these
franchises came from the lowest class". 49 These franchises included scot and lot
voters, burgage voters, potwalloper's, the voting rights of some municipal
corporations and freeman voters. Scot and lot voters were occupiers of property who
paid the poor rate; the burgage franchise depended upon the ownership of particular
pieces of property to which the right to vote was attached; a potwalloper could be a
householder or a lodger, and was enfranchised through his ability to cook a meal in a
room that he had sole control over; the freeman franchise could be conferred by the
municipal corporation, inherited from a relative, obtained through marriage or by
apprenticeship to another freeman for seven years. 5°
Those voters enfranchised under these ancient rights were allowed to continue
voting for the remainder of their lifetime. And in the case of the freeman voters, the
largest category of ancient right voters, they could be found in significant numbers in
some boroughs after 1832.51 Indeed as late as 1865 they could be found in large
numbers in 91 English and Welsh boroughs and in 25 they held the balance of
power. 52 The freeman voters were notorious for their willingness to accept bribes
during elections, and such habits did not disappear after 1832.

Following the

Barnstaple election of 1857 allegations of bribery were proven against a number of
freemen,

There is a petty squabble in this corrupt borough amongst the freemen,
some being highly offended that they only received £2, while others
were favoured with £5 for their independent votes for the successful
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candidates. No doubt existed at two o'clock on the day of the election
as to the system being pursued - although some difficulty was felt as to
legal evidence to establish the fact. This now no longer exists. Several
dissatisfied freemen have volunteered to prove bribery. 53

The venality of these electors may be an acknowledged fact but their involvement in
electoral violence is much harder to determine. Indeed it is difficult to ascertain the
degree to which the changed social or economic composition of the reformed
electorate influenced the nature or frequency of election violence. Certainly neither
those who were newly enfranchised, nor the ancient right voters, proved to be
immune to the electoral abuses that continued to occur in the reformed system. Those
who had grown accustomed to receiving payments during a contest were unlikely to
change their habits overnight. And there were those who, though new to the game of
politics, were quick to realise that the franchise entrusted to them could bring more
than the mere satisfaction of returning a member to parliament.
It is important, however, to remember that electoral violence was not always

the product of corruption. Riots broke out at British elections for a variety of reasons
and direct interference with the voters was only one of them. Indeed the electorate is
not the only place to be looking for answers: those who remained outside the sphere
of official politics were just as likely, if not more so, to be involved in election
disorder. For them a boisterous and physical campaign was their only means of
participating in the political arena. Ultimately the limited source material available
restricts any meaningful analysis of riotous crowds. What evidence there is, however,
suggests that a wide cross-section of society were involved in such incidents. 54
Neither the newly enfranchised voters, nor their older counterparts, were more likely
to participate in violence.
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Throughout the period the potential for disorder existed in the procedures that
governed parliamentary electioneering.

This is not to argue that election riots

occurred entirely because the processes of electoral politics invited them - the failure
of procedural changes to significantly alter the frequency of violence disproves such a
However the public and participatory characteristics of mid-century

theory.

electioneering undoubtedly contributed to the likelihood of conflict. The most potent
of these included the centralization of polling booths, the public nomination and open
voting. The numerical restriction of polling booths focused partisan activity and
public enthusiasm at specific locations thereby increasing the potential for crowd
violence.

Public nominations, in which prospective candidates addressed large

audiences of voters and non-voters alike, provided an event of mass, popular
participation that proved almost as violent as the polling day itself. And the system of
open voting served to facilitate the practice of intimidation by exposing the voter, and
his choice, to the wider community.
However, prior to 1867 no legislation was passed in the Commons that dealt
with these procedural inducements to riot. This was in large part due to the fact that
for much of the century violent electioneering was viewed as a subsidiary feature of
electoral corruption. Indeed Happen writes that "The aspects of nineteenth-century
English electioneering most often condemned at the time were bribery and treating,
rather than violence". 55

This is not to argue that the statutes ignored electoral

disorder, far from it. Many of the reforms passed between 1857 and 1880 were aimed
at producing more peaceful elections. However most were directed principally at
discovering and penalizing corrupt practices, and the history of election disorder is
only partly related to the matter of electoral malpractice.
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Before the Second Reform Act changes to the pattern of election disorder
owed more to fluctuations in the frequency of contests, and to the particular
characteristics of specific general elections, than to alterations in either election
procedure or the law dealing with corruption. Between 1832 and 1867 there were few
measures that dealt with electoral procedure.

The First Reform Act reduced the

period allowed for polling to two days in the counties and one day in the boroughs.
The polling day proved in most cases to be the most violent part of the campaign. It
was the culmination of weeks or months of party activity and provided a focal point
for fmal, perhaps desperate, attempts to generate electoral support. The day also drew
large and enthusiastic crowds determined to enjoy themselves in an atmosphere of
excitement and suspense. My sample of violence shows that between 1857 and 1880
50% of election disorder occurred on the polling day, compared to 22% prior to the
poll. 56 By restricting the duration of polling this measure was a significant step
towards reducing the potential for violence. However the decline in electoral contests
after 1832, and the subsequent reduction in violence, makes it difficult to assess the
direct impact that this measure had on the frequency of disorder. Given that election
violence continued to be a feature of the polling day throughout the period, it seems
obvious that the measure had little real influence over the pattern of disorder.
Throughout the period anti-corruption legislation was primarily aimed at
eradicating the influence of bribery and treating. Both involved a transaction between
electoral agent and voter in which some valuable, usually money or alcohol, was
provided in return for consideration at the poll. And both could be responsible for the
outbreak of violence: the bribery of election 'mobs' to terrorize voters and rival party

56
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supporters did occur; and the ubiquitous use of treating certainly raised the likelihood
of violence by ensuring that significant portions of the electorate passed the campaign
in a reasonable state of intoxication. However there were few measures passed that
proved effective in limiting corrupt practices or in eradicating the disorder that
accompanied them. Between 1839 and 1852 various bills were passed dealing with
the matter of election petitions. These were designed to streamline the machinery
dealing with the trial of controverted elections, and to increase the investigatory
powers of the House in relation to evidence gathered during petition hearings. 57 In
practice they led to an immediate decrease in petitions from 122 in 1852 to 72 in
1857. 58 Yet their influence in eradicating corruption was modest; their impact on the
frequency of violence was non-existent.
The Corrupt Practices Act of 1854 was an important step towards eradicating
corrupt practices at elections. However it was significant largely because it was the
ftrst step and not necessarily the most effective.

The Act established the ftrst

comprehensive defmition of bribery and treating. More importantly it defmed, for the
ftrst time, undue influence (or intimidation). A person was guilty of this offence if
they, "make use of, or threaten to make use of, any Force, Violence, or Restraint, or
inflict or threaten the Infliction ... of any Injury, Damage, Harm or Loss, or in any
other Manner practice Intimidation upon or against any person in order to induce or
compel such Person to vote or refrain from voting". 59 The Act thus established what
undue influence was but provided no mechanism for preventing it. The inability of
this type of legislation to influence the nature of electioneering was a fact
acknowledged in the Commons by W.E.Forster, the Minister for Education. In 1871
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during the first reading of the Parliamentary and Municipal Elections Bill he
commented,

I have been in favour of the Ballot, on the ground that bribery and
intimidation are two of the greatest evils we have to contend with in
connection with our Parliamentary and representative system - and
that the best way to prevent an evil is to stop the cause of it. .. On that
ground I have always thought that we should be more successful by the
Ballot than by Corrupt Practices Acts, or by penalties, however
stringent. 60

The Act also extended a provision of the Election Expenses Regulation Act (1827)
banning the use of ribbons, flags, banners and bands of music during campaigns. 61
These had long been a potent source of disorder. Victorian crowds took their political
displays seriously and parades of colourfully bedecked partisans, often accompanied
by bands of music, frequently led to violence.

The borough of Blackburn in

Lancashire was a frequent scene of disorder throughout the period, and during the
General Election of 1868,

A procession comprising some 4000 persons was formed, and party
colours were freely carried ... When the procession reached that part of
the town chiefly inhabited by the workpeople of the Conservative
member, Mr.Hornby, several fights took place ... a lad riding on a pony
down the street ... was set upon by a number of Irishmen because he
displayed a little orange and blue riband on his pony. He and the pony
were beaten with bludgeons ... and the lad was seriously injured. This
was the sign for a general row. One man was picked up in the streets
quite dead. 62

And during the East Essex county election of 1880,
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During the polling on Monday at Mannington, East Essex, free fights
were of frequent occurrence. A body of roughs, wearing Conservative
colours, attacked a Liberal banner, and nearly succeeded in capturing
it. It was however rescued and borne in triwnph past the Conservative
headquarters. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, in which the Conservative
rough elements had the worst of it. 63

James V emon argues that attempts to restrict the use of such parades, colours and
symbols reflected an official reaction against the development of 'an autonomous
popular politics'. He writes that "Such was the paranoia that visual iconography
aggravated, even created, divisions which disrupted the delicate social and political
equilibrium of both the town and nation, that legislation was passed to outlaw their
However such efforts were to, prove fruitless and Victorian campaigns
continued to be characterised by such colourful, often provocative, displays. During
the South Derbyshire county election of 1868 a serious riot erupted in Ripley
following the introduction of a dog decorated with blue ribbons. 65 And, continuing
· with the canine theme, a retired publican in Ramsgate was sentenced to six weeks
hard labour for causing the death of a dog during the 1880 General Election. The
Salisbury and Winchester Journal reported that he had, "painted the dog all over with

the Liberal and Conservative colours, and the animal was poisoned through licking
the paint off'. 66
The 1854 Act also established a system of election auditors whose task it was
to inspect the accounts payable to candidates following an election. However their
introduction helped to identify only the most obvious cases of bribery and treating.
Their effectiveness was hampered by inefficiency and by the many ways available for
election committees to hide corrupt expenditure. Ultimately the Act was not effective
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in reducing the incidence of bribery or treating, and Charles Seymour writes that "So
far as intimidation was concerned the failure of the Act was generally
acknowledged". 67

The factor of violence was not likely to be diminished from

electioneering by such anti-corruption legislation. Besides being weak and ineffective
it failed to address the structural inducements to riot such as open voting, public
nominations and centralised polling. Bribery and treating continued to generate a
measure of disorder because the procedures in place for preventing them were not
effective as deterrents. The period of the greatest frequency of election violence was
still ahead, and for 14 years after 1854 parliamentary interest in corrupt practices

The nexus between electoral contests and disorder is one of the more salient features
of mid-Victorian electioneering, so much so that it can be used as a crude barometer
of the pattern of party activity. The causality being argued here is this: increased
levels of party activity in the constituencies led to a greater frequency of contested
elections, and thus to an increase in disorder. 68 Therefore, the pattern of electoral
violence between 1857 and 1880 may be understood through an analysis of the
development of electoral activity.

Throughout the period incidences of disorder

increased as the rate of contested elections grew. Contests became more frequent as
old political compromises were disturbed, the power of patrons weakened or as
advances in local organization led the political parties to present candidates where
previously they would not have bothered. The advent of mass electorates, particularly
after 1867, increased the level of party activity in the constituencies. The registration,
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and subsequent defence, of supporters became a more consistent feature of electoral
preparation.

Candidates, too, were required to pay more attention to their

constituencies. The frequency of election meetings during the period reflected the
need for a candidate to cultivate his constituency. At such events candidates (if they
were in touch with their supporters) addressed voters and non-voters alike on matters
of local importance and, increasingly, party policy. The fact that between 1857 and
1880 a total of 21 episodes of violence occurred prior to the nomination day - 19 of
which occurred during election meetings - suggests the frequency of electoral activity
before the official, procedural elements of the contest began. 69 Furthermore, this
trend increased slightly during the period: a total of 8 episodes of violence occurred
during meetings between 1857 and 1865, compared to 11 between 1868 and 1880.
The growth of electoral activity during the period contributed directly to the increased
frequency of violence.
Uncontested elections were a regular, though diminishing feature of midcentury politics. Indeed it was not uncommon during the 1850s and early 1860s for
about half of all constituencies to go uncontested.70

In the 1850s weak party

structures and the confused nature of parliamentary politics, both hangovers of Corn
Law repeal in 1846 and the resulting Conservative party schism, contributed to the
lack of election contests. The fluidity of politics was evident at Westminster where
two Palmerstonian governments, in 1855 and 1857, were brought down by coalitions
of Whigs, Liberals, Peelites, Radicals and Conservatives. 71 And in 1866 Russell's
ministry was defeated on a reform bill amendment after 48 Liberals voted with the
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Conservatives. 72 Indeed in the decade between 1857 and 1867 no fewer than 5
ministries were formed and dissolved, yet there were just 3 occasions, in 1857, 1859
and 1865, when a general election effected the change.· The dislocation of party
politics during the period acted as a dampener on partisan conflict outside
Westminster. Angus Hawkins writes that before the Second Reform Act there was
only one occasion (1832) when more than one thousand candidates stood for election,
whereas after 1867, "there were never less than a thousand candidates". 73
In the 1850s and early 1860s party organisation made little contribution to the
frequency of electoral contests. Neither the Whig-Liberals nor the Conservatives had
anything resembling a national party machine - though the latter were striving to
improve their organisational infrastructure. Party organisation was undertaken by a
limited number of local associations loosely affiliated to embryonic national organs,
and by private correspondence between individual members and their constituencies.
The development of central party administration dates from the early 1860s. The
Liberal Registration Association was founded in 1860, however it had little local
influence and John Vincent describes it as being, "overshadowed by the tendency of
the Whip and the party leaders, particularly at election times, to organise the local
parties through their massive private correspondence".74

In 1863 the National

Conservative Registration Association was founded, yet it lacked support from the
party leadership and played no part in the general election of 1865. 75 Following that
election an official Conservative registration office was established in 1866, however
its significance lies in the period after the Second Reform Act.
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Throughout this period Liberal party leadership left much of the work of
organisation to local solicitors, to local club movements in the wards and to
registration societies. Indeed of greater importance to the Liberals in the mobilisation
of supporters was the emergence of the new, nonconformist, press and the growth of
militant Dissent. The former carried out the task of party propaganda, the latter
marshalled volunteers for Liberal campaigns. 76 Conservative organisation likewise
owed much to local knowledge and personal efforts. The party did, however, work
hard during the period to overhaul a seemingly unshakeable Liberal majority. To this
end solicitors from the firm of Baxter, Rose, Norton and Co. were employed to
coordinate the party's electoral management.

The counties, however, jealously

guarded their electoral independence from outside intervention, and the work ofPhilip
Rose and Markham Spofforth was largely concentrated in the boroughs. Before 1865,
however, there was little substantial improvement in the rate of contested elections.
Indeed between 1852 and 1857 uncontested elections in England and Wales increased
by more than 30% (see Table 4 below). Efforts to improve electoral organisation
were not reflected in a substantial growth of contests much before 1865. Table 4
below shows the number of uncontested constituencies at English and Welsh general
elections between 1857 and 1880.

Table 4.Uncontested Constituencies at English and Welsh general
elections, 1852 -1880 (and the percentage difference between elections)

Year Borou hs

1852
1857
1859
1865
1868
1874
1880
76

58
95
90
70
33
26
16

Counties %Change Total uncontested %Change
+63.8
-5.3
-22.3
-52.9
-21.3
-38.5

55
56
68
55
43
60
29

Vincent, Formation of the Liberal Party., p.83.

+1.8
+21.4
-19.2
-21.9
+39.5
-51.7

113
151
158
125
76
86
45

+33.6
+4.6
-20.9
-39.2
+13.1
-47.7
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To begin with, Table 4 reveals the lack of election contests in the counties during the
ftrst half of the period.

Indeed the number of counties that were uncontested

increased at both the elections of 1857 and 1859, and it was not until 1865 that they
experienced a significant increase in contests (represented above by a 19.2% decrease
in uncontested constituencies). The general elections of 1857 and 1859 proved the
high water mark of uncontested elections. The paucity of contests at these elections
contributed to a relatively low incidence of electoral disorder. The two campaigns of
1857 and 1859 generated a modest 22 instances of violence, compared to 83 at the
next two elections of 1865 and 1868. In 1857 less than half of the total number of
constituencies went to the polls.

The campaign proved disastrous for the

Conservatives who could no longer rely on protection as a unifying theme. In the
counties they lost 23 seats. They fared no better in the small boroughs where they
won only 68 compared to the Liberals who were successful in 109.77 The general
election of 1859 witnessed a modest increase in uncontested elections, despite a
concerted effort by the Conservatives in which an estimated £50,000 was spent out of
the party's central fund. 78 A small decrease in uncontested boroughs in 1859 (5.3%)
reflects the increased attention paid to those constituencies by the Conservatives.
This election provided the party with its best result between 1846 and 1874, with most
successes coming from a recovery in the counties and the small boroughs. In the
latter they won 11 more boroughs than in 1857.79

The result was, however,

insufficient to provide the Conservatives with an absolute Commons majority.
Following Derby's resignation on 10 June, Palmerston formed his second ministry.
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Happen writes that the general election of 1865, "reflected the ambivalent

°

nature of contemporary politics". 8

Certainly no particular question of policy

dominated the campaign, yet Table 4 shows a modest increase in the number of
contested elections between 1859 and 1865.

During that period the boroughs

experienced a 22.3% decrease in uncontested elections, and the counties a 19.2%
decrease. In 1865 the Conservatives lost the gains they had made in the boroughs in
1859; in England alone they lost 12 borough seats. 81 For their part the Liberals were
particularly successful in those English boroughs with more than 2,000 voters, where
they captured 49 out of 59 seats. 82 The increase in contests led to a jump in the
incidence of disorder. The 1865 election generated 24 cases of violence, 14 more
than in 1859. The rise of violence in 1865 owed much to the greater frequency of
contested elections, in turn a reflection of the steady growth of electoral activity. The
potential for violence grew as the political parties strove to disrupt the electoral
somnolence of uncontested boroughs.

Throughout the period county elections

occasioned markedly less violence than the boroughs, a fact reflected in the lack of
contests in the former and the concentration of party activity in the latter. It was not
until after 1867, when greatly enlarged electorates led to rapid advances in party
organisation, that electoral contests in England and Wales began to significantly
increase. Coterminous with the growth in electoral activity was a marked increase in
electoral violence. And whereas the incidence of violence peaked in 1868, it did not
decline to pre-1865 levels during the elections of 1874 and 1880.
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Throughout the nineteenth-century Britain was becoming· an increasingly urbanised
and industrialised society.

The technological advancements of the early century

provided the basis for revolutions in transport, industry and communication which
were gradually transforming the landscape, economy and society. In the 40 years
after 1851 the British population rose by 65% to reach 33 million in 1891. 83 An
accelerating trend towards urbanisation concentrated this growing population in the
expanding conurbations surrounding cities such as Manchester, Bradford and Leeds.
Indeed between 1801 and 1891 the percentage of the population living outside towns
of more than 2,500 people dropped from 66% to 25.5%. 84 The relative importance of
the agricultural sector contracted during the period as mining and industry generated
an increasing share of economic growth. Between 1801 and 1871 the percentage of
the British workforce employed in agriculture dropped from 35% to 15%. 85 The
social and political influence of institutionalised religion gradually weakened in the
wake of these changes, a process aided by the growth of secularism and the emerging
challenge of Nonconformism. By the end of the 1880s, writes Hawkins, "traditional
communities were fmding themselves under growing economic and social pressure.
Old ties of affiliation and obligation were being eroded ... Notions of social status, as
much as being dependent upon region or religion, were becoming increasingly
defined in terms of class". 86 Against this background the Second Reform Act of 1867
marked a significant step towards the creation of a modem democratic electoral
system.
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industrial centres, while franchise alterations added more than one million voters to
the electoral system. The introduction of so many new voters to the system provided
an important stimulus to the development of party organisation in the decades after
1867.

The Reform Act of 1867 refashioned the electoral landscape of England and Wales.
The balance of electoral power shifted away from the smaller boroughs as 52 seats
were taken from such constituencies and distributed to the counties, and in some
cases, to the large urban boroughs.

Through redistribution and disfranchisement

between the 1865 and 1868 general elections 60 English and Welsh boroughs with
fewer than 500 voters disappeared from the electoral system. Whereas in 1857 only
18 boroughs could boast more than 5,000 electors, in 1868 64 boroughs could make
that claim. Throughout the period electoral violence was a feature of the larger urban
boroughs. In those constituencies the preconditions for disorder which existed in the
system of open elections, centralised polling, and extended and ritualised
campaigning, were combined with large and rapidly growing electorates. In such an
environment increasingly sophisticated party organizations worked hard to register
and mobilise their supporters, leading to an inevitable increase in party conflict,
partisan enthusiasm and thus the likelihood of an election contest. An intensification
of party feeling and an increase in contested elections were essential precursors to
disorder.

The consolidation of voters in the large boroughs after 1867 therefore

contributed to the concentration of violence in those constituencies. In the smaller
boroughs and counties an absence of contests, the persistence of political traditions
and the lingering strength of patrons poured cold water on the intensity of partisan
emotion and sapped the source of electoral violence.
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In England and Wales the Second Reform Act resulted in an overall reduction

of 33 boroughs as follows: 11 boroughs returning 17 members were totally
disfranchised for corruption; 35 boroughs were stripped ofone seat; 11 new boroughs
returning 13 members were created and 6 additional seats were allocated to the
burgeoning metropolises of Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Stafford and
Merthyr. Eleven counties in England and Wales received an extra 2 members while
Lancashire gained a further 3 members. In addition London University was granted a
single seat. The changes to the rest of the system were more modest. In Scotland the
new burgh of Hawick was granted a member and both Glasgow and Dundee gained
an extra member each. The counties of Aberdeenshire, Ayrshire and Lanarkshire
were each divided, and the universities of Aberdeen, Glasgow, Edinburgh and
St.Andrews were granted a single member.

There were no changes to the

constituencies in Ireland. Table 4 below outlines the structure of British politics in
the wake of the Second Reform Act.

Table 5.United Kingdom Electoral System, 1867-1884
England MP's Wales MP's Scotland MP's Ireland MP's

Total
Constituencies

82
185
3
270

170
285
5
460

13
15
0
28

17
16
0
33

32
22
2
56

32
26
2
60

32
33
1
66

64
39
2
105

159
255
6
420

Total
MP's
283
366
9
658

England and Wales continued to dominate the electoral system after 1867. Together
they accounted for more than 70% of the total membership of the House of Commons
between 1857 and 1880. England was the electoral heavyweight of the partnership
with almost half of the members at Westminster drawn from the English boroughs
alone.

After 1867 England returned 460 members to the Commons from 270

constituencies. Wales, Scotland and Ireland together returned just 198 members from
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150 constituencies. Within this framework the boroughs outnumbered the counties by
more than 2 to 1 and consistently returned more than half of all members. Between
1857 and 1880 the framework of the English and Welsh electoral system fluctuated
with the ebb and flow of constituencies added and subtracted. The concentration of
disorder in the boroughs reflected their numerical majority, and the fact that county
constituencies were less frequently contested than their urban counterparts. The table
below outlines the number of county and borough constituencies in England and
Wales during each general election of the period.

Table 6.England and Wales Electoral System 1857 ·1880
England
Year Borou hs MP's Counties MP's Universi
1857
184
68
142
2
319
1859
184
2
318
68
142
69
1865
185
144
2
319
1868
185
285
82
170
3
1874
183
3
281
82
170
1880
183
82
170
3
281

Wales
MP's Counties MP's
15
13
17
15
13
17
15
13
17
16
13
17
16
13
17
16
13
17

The redistribution provisions of the Second Reform Act also eroded the numerical
strength of the small boroughs. Thereafter the number of small boroughs in England
and Wales (those with less than 2,000 voters) declined steadily- from 42% of the
total number of boroughs in 1868, to 39% in 1874 and to 34% in 1880. After 1867
the large boroughs accounted for an increasing percentage of the total Commons
membership. In 1868 a total of 200 (or 66%) English and Welsh members were
drawn from boroughs with more than 2,000 electors. The restructuring of the system
eradicated all boroughs with fewer than 500 voters. In the House of Commons about
30% of members were now drawn from the larger boroughs. However Table 3 (see
page 78) reveals that the small boroughs remained a significant feature of electoral
politics throughout the period. As late as 1880 fully one-third of all English and
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Welsh boroughs had fewer than 2,000 voters. In 1868 these boroughs returned 101
members to parliament, in 1874 92 members and in 1880 76 members.

The franchise provisions of the Second Reform Act enfranchised almost 1.5 million
new voters across the United Kingdom. 87 As such it was a more modest increase than
that of the First Reform Act, which had resulted in a 492% increase in the number
actually voting between 1831 and 1832, as opposed to the 172% increase between
1866 and 1868. 88 In the counties the occupation franchise was reduced from £15 to
£12 and the suffrage was extended to those who owned land valued at more than £5.
Liberal amendments in committee further reduced the copyhold and leasehold
qualifications from £10 to £5. 89 As a result of these changes the county electorate
grew by a modest 248,620 voters to a total of 791,253. However it was in the urban
areas ofEngland and Wales that the 1867 Act had its greatest impact. In the boroughs
the introduction of household suffrage and the abolition of compounding increased
the electorate from 514,026 to 1,225,042.90 The increase in the number of voters was
impressive if not uniform. In some urban constituencies such as Finsbury, Lambeth
and Tower Hamlets the increase was comparatively small, whereas many of the
industrial centres witnessed spectacular rises. In Birmingham the number of voters
was tripled and in Leeds the number increased four-fold. In Wales the electorate of
Merthyr Tydfilleapt from 1,387 to 14,577. After 1867 1 in 3 adult males in England
and Wales were enfranchised, with most of the new voters to be found in the largest
towns.
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Disraeli's reform strategy ensured that those elements of the system
traditionally supportive of the Tories were protected. Therefore the Act of 1867 did
not equalise the suffrage between the counties and boroughs, though it did standardise
the ratio of voters to population in each type of constituency. 91 The gulf between
county and borough franchises was maintained in an attempt to ensure the
Conservative's continued domination in the former.

In the boroughs the new

household suffrage enfranchised for the first time a large proportion of the working
class.

However, despite the increase of about 700,000 new voters to the urban

electorate, the Act effectively restricted the enfranchisement of les classes
dangereuses by obstacles both planned and unforeseen.

The one year residence

qualification and abolition of compounding directly affected the working classes - for
whom short-term shared rental accommodation was not uncommon. Furthermore the
poor law overseers proved inadequately prepared to deal with the massive task of
registration that faced them, particularly in the large cities like London or Manchester.
The formal obstacles to enfranchisement were, however, removed by Goschen's Act
of 1868- which restored compounding- and Dilke's Act of 1878 which allowed the
registration of multiple occupiers. 92 Consequently, by 1881-2 the borough electorate
reached a total of 1,629,373 voters.

Neither the Second Reform Act nor the legislation of 1872 and 1883 proved effective
in limiting the potential for violence, though the Ballot Act did alter the pattern of
disorder. Certainly beyond an increase in the number of county polling places the Act
made no direct alteration to electoral procedure. After 1867 the counties were free to
"enable each Voter, so far as is practicable, to have a Polling Place within a
91
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convenient Distance of his Residence" .93 However the same was not to be extended
to the boroughs until 1872. This provision had no effect on the pattern of disorder
because more than half the cases of mid-century election disorder occurred in the
boroughs and not the counties. Furthermore, given that contests were less frequent in
the counties, the multiplication of polling districts there was unlikely to greatly
influence the overall pattern of disorder. Likewise the 1868 Parliamentary Elections
Act, which transferred the trial of election petitions from the Commons to the
constituencies in which they were presented, made no impact on violent
electioneering.
Indeed election disorder increased in the years immediately following the
Second Reform Act. Several factors contributed to the rise in disorder. The Act
greatly expanded the size of the electorate in those constituencies that traditionally
experienced the most disturbances: the large urban and industrial towns. This new
electorate included many working class voters whose economic position exposed
them to the pressures of intimidation and coercion. The need to mobilize and register
the new electorate after 1867 gave added impetus to the growth of local party
organizations, registration associations and national organs of party control. Hawkins
points to the years between 1867 and 1886 as the period when political parties
developed

"extensive

constituency

organization

and

centralized

party

bureaucracies". 94 This is not to argue that party organization emerged rapidly after
the Second Reform Act, or that its influence and efficiency was either widespread or
established. Rather it is to stress that the demands of an enlarged electorate impressed
upon the political parties the need for greater organizational efforts. This realization
contributed to the intensification of electoral activity and to a rise in the number of
93
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contested elections. Between 1865 and 1868 the number of contests in England and
Wales jumped from 158 to 223. The result was an increase in the frequency of
violence. The General Election of 1868 followed hot on the heels of the Reform Act
and proved to be the most disorderly, corrupt and petitioned campaign of the period.
Indeed there were more cases of electoral violence in 1868 than during the 1857, 1859
and 1865 elections combined.
The rioting and flood of petitions that followed the general election of 1868
formed the background to a recommendation for a select committee inquiry into the
subject of elections and electioneering.

H.A.Bruce, the Home Secretary who

presented the motion for a select committee on 4 March 1869, admitted that "For
years past Parliament has been struggling in a vain endeavour to give to our elections
the dignity that should preside over ceremonies of such great importance". 95 In his
speech Bruce mentioned the 'national taint' of corruption, the 'injurious expense' of
electioneering, the 'evils' of bribery and intimidation, the 'annoyance and trouble' of
paid canvassers, and added that "There is one other feature connected with our system
of election which I think will be generally condemned; I refer to those scenes of
rioting and violence which so frequently characterise a contested election". 96 The
Committee gained bipartisan support despite Conservative concerns that an agenda
regarding secret ballot was at its core. It was subsequently appointed to inquire into
all modes of procedure connected to both parliamentary and municipal elections, "in
order to provide further guarantees for their tranquillity, purity and freedom". 97 The
Select Committee, headed by Lord Hartington, examined 80 witnesses during 5
months of deliberation and produced over 500 pages of evidence pertaining to
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electoral procedure. Among the issues addressed by the Committee were public
nominations and declarations, the use of rooms in public houses during elections, the
multiplication of polling places, the subject of voting papers, the law relating to the
recovery of expenses for damages committed by rioters, election expenses and the
introduction of secret voting.
The inquiry's fmal report was tabled in the Commons on 15 March 1870.
However recommendations were made regarding only a few of the issues that were
investigated. A resolution to prohibit the use of paid agents and canvassers was
rejected because of doubts about the possibility of policing such a measure.

In

addition the Committee concluded, "an election cannot always be conducted without
paid agents of some kind" .98 The multiplication of polling places was recommended
though there were questions as to the effectiveness of such a measure. A resolution
on the use of voting papers, a system in use at university constituencies, was not
passed on the grounds that it would tend to increase, rather than decrease, corruption.
A considerable portion of the Committee's time was spent investigating the issue of
secret voting. In the final report the inquiry concluded that "the weight of evidence
leads to the conclusion that this change in the mode of voting would not only promote
the tranquillity both of Municipal and Parliamentary Elections, but will also protect
voters from undue influence and intimidation". 99

This recommendation was

ultimately carried into existence with the passage of the Secret Ballot Act of 1872.
The effect of that legislation on the pattern of electoral violence will be discussed
below.
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The Committee made no recommendation to abolish the public nomination,
despite a wealth of evidence describing the event as a meaningless farce and a potent
source of disorder. The fmal report did, however, conclude that "the addresses which
are delivered are rendered inaudible by noise, tumult, and wilful interruption, and
occasionally, serious disturbances begun on the nomination day are continued through
the election" .100 A resolution in favour of abolishing the ceremony was defeated by a
single vote on the grounds that no practical alternative could be found.

The

Committee further concluded that the majority of uncontested elections were
concluded on the nomination day without any disturbance. The public nomination
thus remained until the passage of the Secret Ballot Act of 1872, when it was replaced
by the sending in of papers.
The Ballot Act of 1872 had potentially the greatest impact on the frequency of
electoral violence of any legislation during the period. Yet even so it had a limited
influence over the pattern of violence down to 1880. The abolition of the public
nomination undoubtedly reduced the opportunities available for crowd violence.
After 1872 disturbances before the polling day declined sharply. Between 1857 and
1872 26% of election disorder occurred before the polling day compared to 13% after
the nomination was abolished. 101 The same cannot, however, be said for the impact
of secret voting.

Prior to the Ballot Act the polling day accounted for 49% of

electoral violence, after 1872 that increased slightly to 52%. 102

The continued
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outbreak of riots and disturbances during the general elections of 1874 and 1880
suggest that what influence the Ballot Act had was slight.
The scale of violence after 1872 must also be viewed within the context of the
entire period. The General Election of 1868 was an unusually contentious campaign
that followed a major piece of reform legislation. In addition the issue oflrish Church
disestablishment provided a divisive religious issue, the influence of which was
hardly diminished by William Murphy's inflammatory anti-Catholic lectures. The
scale of violence in 1868 -it accounted for 40% of all cases of disorder between 1857
and 1880 - thus stands out as something of an anomaly during the period. The
peculiar circumstances of that campaign were unlikely to occur repeatedly, much less
at consecutive general elections. Thus the reduced frequency of violence after 1868
should not be viewed as a consequence of reform in 1872. The levels of disorder in
1874 and 1880 were still higher than those of the late 1850s and early 1860s. What
the Ballot Act did achieve was to alter the pattern of disorder: the removal of the
nomination ceremony merely increased the proportion of violence occurring on the
polling day.

The death of Palmerston in October 1865, just 4 months after the general election,
signalled the end of an era in British politics. Within three years changes in party
leadership on both sides of the House would see Russell and Derby retire in favour of
Gladstone and Disraeli. Not only was the reintroduction of parliamentary reform
inevitable after Palmerston's death but, as Angus Hawkins writes, "the 'truce of
parties' was over". 103 The trend toward contested elections barely visible before 1867
accelerated after the Second Reform Act as party activity intensified. The registration
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of voters became an increasingly important element of party management in the new
age of mass electorates. Richard Shannon writes that after 1867, "this time and
money-consuming

procedure

became

a

standard

feature

of rival

party

manoeuvring" .104 He records the example of Blackburn where the revision in 1863
took three hours, compared to seven days in 1868! 105 The new urgency in revising the
registers, combined with central party efforts to bring local associations under their
control, contributed to a post-1867 growth in electoral activity.
Between 1867 and 1880 party organisation, on both sides, made undoubted
advances. For their part the Conservatives were quicker to establish the framework of
a national party bureaucracy than were the Liberals.

In 1870 the Conservative

National Union was brought under the auspices of the Central Office, directed by
Spofforth's successor, John Gorst.

Under his guidance the Union developed a

network of centrally-affiliated local associations, whose activities included
supervision of the registers, the distribution of pamphlets and the organisation of
political meetings. 106 Yet the control exercised over these provincial associations by
the Central Office should not be exaggerated. Hawkins writes that "The National
Union trod carefully. It assisted local organisations when requested, while avoiding
exciting local suspicions of central control" .107 Yet the work of Gorst and the Central
Office certainly paid dividends for Conservative electoral fortunes. At the general
election of 1874 the party reaped the benefits of organisational efficiency and was
returned with 352 seats compared to the Liberals' 243 seats. 108 Thereafter the party
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machinery entered a period of decline, culminating with the Conservative defeat of
1880 - when the party captured fewer seats than in 1847.
The Liberals did not achieve a similar degree of centralised party control until
1886 when, following the split over Irish Home Rule, the National Liberal Federation
and the Liberal Central Association came under the joint-stewardship of Francis
Schnadhorst. 109 Before that date the party relied upon the joint efforts of the Liberal
Registration Association and various pressure groups like the National Education
League, the Reform League, the Liberation Society and the United Kingdom
Alliance. 110 These groups, with often divergent aspirations, made it difficult for
popular liberalism to coalesce around a central party organisation. By 1877, under the
direction of the Liberal chief Whip W.P .Adam, the Liberal Registration Association
had been remodelled to become the Liberal Central Association. In that same year the
Birmingham-based National Liberal Federation was established. As the National
Union was for Gorst, so the NLF was a platform for the political ambitions of one
man: Joseph Chamberlain. Its influence on party organisation, apart from providing a
possible model for local party development, was slight. Hoppen writes that as late as
1884, "the majority of borough associations (110 out of 198) were not even
affiliated" .111 Of greater importance in building a consensus of liberal opinion was
the influence of militant nonconformity which, "provided the moral conscience of
Liberal activism". 112
These developments in central and local party organisation, coupled with the
renewed vigour of registration efforts, contributed to a growth in electoral contests.

In 1868 a total of 49 more seats were contested than at the general election of 1865.
1o9H
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Table 4 shows a 52.9% decrease in uncontested borough elections between 1865 and
1868, while the counties experienced a 21.9% decrease over the same period.
However the steady decline in uncontested elections did not continue uninterrupted
thereafter.

Whereas in 1874 the pattern of decline in the boroughs continued

unbroken, there was an almost 40% increase in the number of counties that failed to
produce a contest. An explanation for this can be found in the sweeping Conservative
victory of that year. The party's success in 1874 was most evident in the counties,
where they captured all but 33 of the 187 English and Welsh county seats. This
achievement was based as much on Liberal disunity as on advances in Conservative
organisation. The Liberals were less prepared to fight an election than were the
Conservatives, and their organisational weakness was compounded by internal schism
and disaffection.

Under cover of the ballot large numbers of Liberal desertions

contributed to the loss of 136 parliamentary seats. The Conservatives benefited from
organisational advances begun after their defeat in 1868 and increased their
representation by 73 seats. In 1874 the Conservatives were able to field between 40
and 50 more candidates than in 1868, compared to the Liberals who fielded about 70
fewer candidates. 113 The strength of Conservative organisation contributed to their
victory in 47 of the 60 uncontested counties recorded in Table 4. The increase in
uncontested county elections in 1874 is therefore a reflection of Conservative party
dominance, and Liberal weakness, in those constituencies.
Greater partisan activity in the constituencies after 1867 inevitably led to an
increase in the potential for election violence. Table 1 (see page 62) reveals the
general rise in violence between 1857 and 1868 (with the exception of 1859).
Thereafter the level of disorder declined, but remained relatively high compared to the
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pre-1868 period. As the temper of constituency electioneering rose so too did the
frequency of contested elections, and with it a greater likelihood of disorder. The
incidence of violence was certainly related to more than just the frequency of electoral
contests: contentious campaign issues, local party conflict and the strength of
disruptive electoral traditions could all contribute to the level of disorder. Yet the
correlation between contested elections and the outbreak of violence is an important
one. Table 8 (see Chapter N) reveals that fluctuations in the incidence of violence at
elections between 1857 and 1874 mirrored changes in the frequency of electoral
contests. Only in 1880, when the number of contests increased but the amount of
disorder declined, was the link between them disrupted. It has already been noted that
alterations in electoral procedure had little, if any, impact on the frequency of
electoral disturbances.

The growth of electoral activity, measured here by the

increasing frequency of contested elections, provides the most compelling explanation
for the pattern of mid-Victorian election violence.

IV

This chapter posed two questions related to the nature of election violence. Firstly,
were Robert Lowe's fears regarding the influence of franchise extension justified on
the grounds of contemporary electoral realities or on his own, somewhat biased,
experiences?

Secondly, did reform in 1832 and 1867 increase the frequency of

electoral violence? These two questions are, in fact, interrelated: The first queried the
empirical basis of Lowe's statement that a rise in violence would follow the
enfranchisement of the lower classes; the second involved an assessment of the
impact of such reforms on the pattern of election disorder. The first question is

115
perhaps better answered in later chapters. Chapter Ill examines violence within the
context of Victorian electioneering, while Chapter IV outlines the scale and frequency
of disorder and attempts an analysis of the participants of such events - were they
drawn exclusively, as Lowe predicted, from the bottom of society? However, given
the sudden and dramatic rise in electoral riots in 1868 - the ftrst general election after
the passage of the Second Reform Act - and the contemporary perception that
widespread corruption of the new working class voters had contributed to the
increase, Lowe' s fears of 1866 appear largely to have been realized. Yet the influence
of reform on the frequency of disorder is more complicated than a direct casual link
between increasing numbers of lower class voters and violence. The growth of the
urban electorate in 1867 was a powerful stimulus to party organization which in turn
contributed to a rise in party conflict, and thus to an increase in electoral contests.
English and Welsh elections produced more violence after 1867 because more
elections were contested - providing more occasions at which partisan conflict,
popular enthusiasm and corruption could lead to episodes of crowd violence.
In answering the second question this chapter has suggested that alterations in
electoral procedure were less responsible for fluctuations in the pattern of disorder
than were structural changes to the system and the steady rise of organized party
bureaucracy.

The Reform Act of 1832 acted as a long-term stimulus to violent

electioneering because, through the introduction of a system of registration and
franchise extensions, it established the basis for a gradual rise in partisan activity, an
important precursor of electoral conflict. However, a post-1832 decline in contested
elections led to a reduction in the potential for violence. In the 1860s, however,
increasing party activity and the growth of contests contributed to an increase in
disorder. After the relative somnolence of electoral rioting in the 1850s and early
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1860s, the Second Reform Act laid the foundations for an increase in disorder because
further franchise extensions, increased registration efforts, the growth of party
organization and the growing importance of consistent electoral management helped
stoke the flames of partisan conflict.

Therefore, rather than interpreting mid-

nineteenth century electoral violence as a sort of cultural or political 'hangover' from
a more vulgar and unreformed era, it should be recognized as a phenomenon that was
generated, and indeed fostered, by the processes and structures of the electoral
system. Violence did not continue into the Victorian era and beyond despite reform
legislation, it continued in large part because of reform. Reform in 1832 and 1867
failed to remove those structural aspects of the system that encouraged violence, and
added to the potential for disorder by stimulating partisan conflict and the
development of political organisations by which that conflict could be pursued at the
local and national level.
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Chapter IV

A Statistical Analysis of Electoral Violence

I

The Game of MP- The turmoil of a General Election, with all its rows
and riots, has at least suggested one peaceful amusement into which
the youngsters of the day may enter without any fear of 'pains and
penalties.' Messrs Stanley Rivers and Co. have published the Game of
MP ... wherein the juveniles may indulge in harmless mirth while their
seniors are engaged in a synonymous game with graver aspects. 1

It is hardly surprising that the publication of a board game based on the chaos of

electioneering should have been announced in December 1868. The general election
of the previous month had set new benchmarks for venality and violence. Players of
Game of MP would hardly have been short of riotous examples to emulate
because the 'licensed saturnalia' of a contested election was a recognised feature of
political culture by the nineteenth-century.

Contemporary newspaper

Following the 1865 general election the Nonconformist reported that

alliance with the scum of the population".2 During the middle decades of the century
crowd violence, physical intimidation, rioting and general disorder had become an
expected dimension of British electioneering. And when the Hartington Committee
reported to the Commons in March 1870 that "Serious rioting frequently takes place
on the polling day", 3 their fmdings were not so much revelatory as stating the
obvious. And yet the extent to which the hurly-burly of Victorian campaigning gave
way to actual and serious violence has remained somewhat obscured. Given the

1
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2
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26
July
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Municipal Elections,' p.3.
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considerable quantitative vacuum in which previous discussions of election violence
have been conducted, a survey of this phenomenon throughout the period is long
overdue.

The 23 years between 1857 and 1880 yield an impressive catalogue of electoral
violence. A survey of contemporary newspapers, Home Office correspondence and
election petition reports found a total of 191 cases of violence during that period.4
The six general elections of 1857, 1859, 1865, 1868, 1874 and 1880 contributed 181
episodes of disorder between them. A further 10 episodes were located during byelections in 1860, 1861, 1862, 1867, 1869, 1871 and 1877. Examples ofby-election
violence are not the primary focus of this study, however they are included in the
sample because they contribute to a general picture of mid-Victorian electioneering.
A careful search of local records and provincial newspapers would undoubtedly find
more examples of such violence. Table 7 below reveals the distribution of disorder at
each general election of the period and by-election violence as it was uncovered. 5
The table includes 25 duplicate episodes of disorder during the period. A duplicate
entry records the occurrence of more than one instance of violence in a single
constituency during one particular campaign. In Carlisle, for example, the 1865
borough election was disrupted by violence twice: the frrst time during the nomination
ceremony; the second time on the polling day. Duplicate entries are included in the
sample because they provide a clear picture of the frequency with which violence
occurred at Victorian elections. 6

4

This figure includes the 25 duplicate entries ofviolence recorded during the period.

: In Table 7 years in bold type are general elections, other years are by-elections.
Because duplicate entries can not be included in statistics that compare disorder with constituency
numbers, they are discarded for some of the analysis which follows. When included in the tables of
electoral violence they are clearly indicated.

120

QhapteriV
Table 7. Election Disorder by Year: England and Wales, 1857- 1880
Year

Separate Cases of Violence

Duplicate Cases

Total Cases

1857
1859

12
10

0
1

12
11

1860
1861
1862

2
1
2

0
0
0

2
1
2

1865

24

5

29

1867

2

0

2

1868

59
1
1
25
1
26
166

12

71

0
0

1
1

7

32

1869
1871
1874

1877
1880

0

1

0

26
191

25

Table 7 reveals an increase in the scale of violence at elections between 1857 and
1868, and a gradual decline thereafter. The period opened with two relatively quiet
elections in 1857 and 1859, with 12 and 11 cases of violence respectively. A low
incidence of contested elections during those campaigns contributed to the relative
lack of disorder. In 1857less than half(47%) of all English and Welsh constituencies
went to the polls, a figure that decreased further in 1859 (43%). 7 At the general
election of 1865 an increase in contests was paralleled by an increase in the scale of
violence. Despite the fact that no especially divisive issue dominated the hustings the
election generated 29 episodes of violence. In 1868 an extended campaign, enlarged
electorate, contentious political issue (Irish Church disestablishment) and an increase
in contests contributed to a massive increase in cases of disorder.

The general

election of 1868 was the most violent of the period with 59 cases of violence.
Election contests declined in 1874 during a campaign in which the Liberal hegemony
that had existed since 1847 was broken. Despite the introduction of secret voting in
1872 the election of 1874 was characterized by rioting and violence. A total of 32

7

See Table 8 on page 121.
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cases ofviolence were found, many of which occurred on the polling day. In 1880
the Liberals returned to government amid a Conservative whitewash in which the
latter lost 114 seats. This brief and bitter campaign was the most heavily contested of
the period.· 84% of English and Welsh constituencies went to the polls, and a total of
26 episodes of violence were recorded.
What then, was the frequency with which English and Welsh constituencies
experienced violent electioneering? Given the relatively low level of mid-Victorian
contests, comparisons between figures of violence and the total number of
constituencies in the system are misleading.

Table 8, therefore, reveals a more

accurate picture of the frequency of disorder by showing the percentage of contested
elections that experienced some degree ofviolence. 8

Table 8.Contests and General Election Disorder:
England and Wales, 1857 - 1880
(Excludes duplicate entries)

Year

1857
1859
1865
1868
1874
1880

Total
Constituencies

280
280
282
295
293
293

Contested
Disorder
Constituencies Figures

134

124
158
223
214
250

12
10
24
59
25
26

% of contests that
e~erienced

disorder

8.9
8.1
15.1
26.4
11.6
10.4

The figures in table 8 reveal the substantial portion of the electoral system that was
characterised by violence. During the relatively quiet elections of 1857 and 1859
almost 9% of contested elections witnessed some form of disorder, while in 1868 as
much as 26.4% of contests were violently disrupted. Table 8 provides a unique view

8

Note for Table 8: ''Total Constituencies" excludes universities; "Disorder Figures" excludes duplicate
entries of violence.
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of the scale of mid-nineteenth century violence. It reveals that the phenomenon
occurred at a significant number of contested elections, and highlights the extent to
which it continued throughout the period.

Indeed as late as 1880 fully 10% of

electoral contests continued to be disrupted by violence. It is worth noting that the
sample of violence is not drawn from a handful of unreservedly venal and disorderly
constituencies. The sample includes a wide range of boroughs and counties, many of
which were disrupted by violence only once.

Throughout the period (excluding

duplicate entries) only 37 constituencies witnessed more than one case of violence, 11
witnessed more than two and just three constituencies could claim more than three
disturbed elections (Lincoln, Nottingham and Hull). A total of 80 constituencies
experienced a single case of violence between 1857 and 1880. Indeed out of 26
episodes of disorder in 1880, 18 occurred in constituencies never before disrupted by
violence. 9
Table 8 highlights the important link between electoral contests and violence.
In one respect the connection is an obvious one: English and Welsh elections
experienced scenes of disorder only under the conditions of intense excitement,
enthusiasm and interest that were generated by a contest. In the absence of a political
contest the likelihood of disorder was remote. Consequently during the period no
episode of violence was found that took place during an uncontested election. Table 8
reveals that between 1859 and 1874 decreases in contests were paralleled by
decreases in violence. Thus between 1859 and 1865 a 27% rise in contests was
mirrored by a 140% leap in cases of violence, and between 1865 and 1868 electoral
contests climbed by 41% and violence rose by 145%. However after 1868 this pattern
is disrupted. In 1874 contested elections declined by just 4%, yet episodes of disorder
9

For more details on how many constituencies experienced multiple episodes of violence see Table 13
on page 167.
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And in 1880, for the first time during the period, the percentage of
contests that experienced violence declined when the rate of contests increased.
What can therefore be said about the relationship between contests and
violence? The level of contested elections undoubtedly contributed to the potential
for disorder by raising the number of opportunities at which it might occur. After all,
without a contest there was no likelihood of violence.

However, the particular

circumstances of each general election played a crucial role in the scale of violence.
During the 1868 election 75.5% of English and Welsh constituencies were contested
and 59 separate cases of violence occurred. Yet in 1880 there were just 26 episodes
of disorder during a campaign in which 85.5% of constituencies were contested. The
difference in the scale of violence at these elections has a two-fold explanation:
firstly, the phenomenon of electoral disorder was undoubtedly declining during the
late-Victorian period. Between 1868 and 1880 the proportion of contested elections
that experienced violence dropped by 60%, from 26.4% to 10.4%; secondly, there is a
strong but not defmitive correlation between the frequency of electoral contests and
the scale of violence. Other factors obviously contributed to the scale of disorder.
The 1868 general election owed its temper to the length of the campaign (four
months), to the divisive issue of Irish Church disestablishment, and to the antiCatholic lecture tour of the evangelical activist William Murphy.

The 1874

campaign, by contrast, lasted just three weeks and included no issues of comparable

The figures in Table 8 suggest that English and Welsh electoral violence
enjoyed something of a mid-Victorian revival. From a relative low-point in the 1850s
the frequency of election disorder increased steadily in the mid-to-late 1860s.
Thereafter the phenomenon began to decline with progressively fewer cases of
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vio1ence in 1874 and 1880. Table 8 shows a small numerical increase in cases of
disorder between the last two elections of the period (from 25 to 26 cases of violence),
but a 16% growth in contested elections in 1880 resulted in a net decline in the
percentage of violent contests (from 11.6% to 10.4%). Table 8 therefore reveals three
important points.

Firstly, that mid-Victorian election violence occurred at a

significant number of English and Welsh contested elections.

Secondly, that the

percentage of contests that experienced violence increased between 1857 and 1868,
and declined in the years that followed. Thirdly, that despite the relative decline in
violence after 1868, late-century contests continued to experience considerable levels
of violence.

Indeed both the 1874 and 1880 general elections witnessed more

violence per contest than either 1857 or 1859, suggesting, as Stevenson has argued,
that electioneering remained a potent source of disorder well beyond the midVictorian period.

The sample reveals the serious nature of election disorder. Hoppen questions the
severity of the phenomenon and argues that most English violence of the period was,
"merely a general disorder on the streets which only occasionally turned into
something more serious". 10 He records various election 'excesses' between 1837 and
1868 that hardly extend in severity beyond a few smashed windows, a fractured kneecap and the singing of 'obscure local songs'. 11 Hoppen thus describes the Beverley
election of 1868: "'several gentlemen on the hustings were struck by stones and
sticks, and the ladies were obliged to retire'- hardly the stuff of murderous
confrontation". 12 Indeed it is not, if that described the worst excesses of the 1868

10

Hoppen, "Grammars", p.607.
Ibid. see especially pp.607- 608.
12
Ibid., p.607.
11
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general election. Hoppen implies that election violence was more of an 'enjoyable
circus' than a serious matter of public disorder. However Table 9 shows the nature of
Victorian electoral violence to have been overwhelmingly serious, and even
potentially fatal.

Table 9.The Scale of Disorder, 1857-1880
(Includes duplicate entries of violence)

Year
1857
1859
1860
1861
1862
1865
1867
1868
1869
1871
1874
1877
1880

Riot
1
1
0
1
2
8
1
27
1
1
11
0
9
63

Disturbance
5
5
0
0
0,
14
0
30
0
0
12
1
10
77

Incident
6
5
2
0

0
7
1
14
0
0
9
0
7
51

Total
12
11
2
1
2
29
2
71
1
1
32
1

26
191

Table 9 shows that between 1857 and 1880 English and Welsh elections accounted
for 63 riots, 77 disturbances and 51 incidentsY

'Riots' and 'disturbances' are

regarded as serious cases of disorder as both involved destruction of property,
personal assault and some degree of magisterial response. The less serious category
of 'incident' invoked little official reaction and commonly involved disruption to the
electoral process through noise, minor assault or stone-throwing. The table reveals
that during the mid-Victorian era serious cases of election violence outnumbered less
serious cases by 140 to 51. Violent electioneering during the period also resulted in
11 fatalities: a police constable was killed during a riot in Kidderminster in 1857/4

13

14

For a detailed discussion of the definitions of'Riot', 'Disturbance' and 'Incident' see Chapter Ill.
See Kidderminster case study in Chapter V for details.
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the Grantham borough election of 1865 left one voter dead after a crowd of Liberal
supporters attempted to up-end the hustings into a frre; 15 in Newport during the 1868
Monmouth borough election a woman was killed as soldiers cleared the streets during
a riot/ 6 the county election of Monmouthshire in the same year left 3 people dead; 17
in Blackburn in 1868 two men died during violence at the municipal and
parliamentary elections; 18 in North Durham a riot during the county contest resulted in
the death of a 63 year-old man after a paving stone was smashed over his head; 19 in
Cambridge the porter of Christ's College was stoned to death during an election
skirmish; and in Gravesend the leader of a riot during the borough contest died after
his leg was broken.20 With the exception .of Kidderminster and Grantham all reports
of fatalities occurred during the bitter campaign of 1868. 11 fatalities in 23 years is
not a significant number of deaths. Yet alongside the statistics of violence they
contribute to an impression that Victorian elections could generate serious levels of
disorder.

n
Mid-Victorian election disorder was predominantly a feature of large, urban
constituencies. In contrast to Richter's assertion that "It was in the small towns and
rural areas that the great majority of election disturbances occurred"/1 the sample
reveals violence to have been concentrated in the boroughs, with fewer cases of

15

Lincolnshire Chronicle, 14 July 1865, p.7.

:~Manchester Guardian, 5 December 1868, p.S.
Gloucester Journal, 28 November 1868, p.2; Boston Gazette, 28 November 1868, page unknown.
Nonconformist, 11 November 1868, p.1,104; Carmarthen Journal, 16 October 1868, p.7.
~~Manchester Guardian, 26 November 1868, p.6.
Gloucester Journal, 5 December 1868, p.3; Gravesend Journal, 2 December 1868, p.3.
21
Richter, "The Role ofMob Riot", p.23.
18
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disorder located in the largely rural counties. Table 10 below reveals the distribution
of electoral violence across England and Wales between 1857 and 1880?2

Table 10.Constituency Disorder: England and Wales, 1857-1880
Year
1857
1859
1860
1861
1862
1865
1867
1868
1869
1871
1874
1877
1880

Borough Borough
Disorder Duplicate
12
0
9
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
19
3
0
0
36
4
0
0
0
0
19
5
0
0
14
0
109
13

County
County By-Election
Disorder
Disorder Duplicate
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
5
2
0
0
2
23
0
8
0
1
0
1
0
0
6
0
2
0
0
1
12
0
0
10
47
12

Total
12
11
2
1
2
29
2
71
1

1
32
1
26
191

Throughout the period borough elections accounted for 122 cases of general and byelection violence. By comparison the counties contributed just 59 cases of violence.
Therefore 63.8% of all entries of disorder took place in the boroughs, and just 30.8%
occurred in the counties. To a large extent the lack of county violence reflected the
numerical majority of borough constituencies. Between 1857 and 1880 boroughs
outnumbered county constituencies by slightly more than two to one. In 1865 there
were 200 boroughs and 82 counties across England and Wales. The very fact that
there were more boroughs than counties increased their chances of experiencing
disorder.

Furthermore, the boroughs were more likely to be contested than the

counties. In the latter politics were generally less open and political control might be
in the hands of established land-owning families. During the period 72.6% of the

22

Note on Table 10: "By-Election Disorder" refers to borough by-elections. No disorder was found at
county by-elections during the period.
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total number of borough elections were contested, compared to 44.6% of all county
elections? 3 However such figures can obscure the frequency of county violence. A
comparison with the statistics of electoral contests provides· a more accurate picture of
constituency disorder.

The sample reveals that proportionately more contested

county elections experienced some degree of violence than contested borough
elections. Between 1857 and 1880 a total of 17.7% of the total number of county
contests witnessed violence, compared to 12.4% of all borough contests.

This

percentage difference serves to illustrate that, in proportion to the total number of
constituencies, county elections experienced similar levels of violence to the

Larger boroughs in particular were prone to violence because of their
concentrated population, larger electorate and greater political organization. The link
between party organization and electoral disorder is made by John Stevenson. He
writes that the passage of Reform in 1832 made, "little difference to the traditional
tactics of electoral intimidation and violence ... the Act ... raised the level of
constituency organization by enforcing the registration of voters, thus stimulating the
formation of political clubs and associations". 24

As the sizes of constituency

electorates increased throughout the century, local party organizations became more
important in mobilising partisan support. The development of local party associations
could sharpen political divisions, intensify partisan rivalry and lead to the tit-for-tat
hiring of marching bands, polling-booth 'defenders' or even armed gangs: all of
which contributed to the potential for violence. The larger boroughs were thus more

23

Between 1857 and 1880 there were 1,194 possible borough contests of which 867 were actually
contested (72.6%). The counties experienced 236 contests out of a possible total of 529 (44.6%).
Figures drawn from Vincent and Stenton (eds), McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll Book, and corrected
Tihere necessary with Cr~ig, British Parliamentary Election Results.
Stevenson, Popular D1sturbances, (1st edn), p.287.
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likely to experience violent electioneering because the circumstances that helped
generate partisan conflict was more pronounced.
The distribution of borough violence is shown below in Table 11.25 For the
years between 1857 and 1867 "small" refers to those boroughs with fewer than 1,000
voters and "large" to those with more than 1,000 voters. After the redistribution of
constituencies in 1867 small boroughs are classed as those with fewer than 2,000
voters, and large boroughs with an electorate over 2,000.

Table 11.Distribution of Borough
Violence by Size of Electorate
(Excludes duplicate entries)

Year
1857
1859

Borough Sizes
Small
Larg_e
4
8
3
6

1860
1861
1862

0
0
0

2
1
2

1865

7

12

1867

1

1
........................................................

2

34

1869
1871

0
1

1
0

1874

2

17

1877

1

0

1880

4

10

25

94

...........1.868'"'""'""'"

•~~•~wow"'"•'""'""'""'""'""'""'""'

Table 11 shows that election disorder was consistently a feature of the large boroughs,
with 79% of violence occurring there compared to 21% in the small boroughs. This
concentration of violence was despite the fact that between 1857 and 1867 small
boroughs dominated the electoral system. Before the Second Reform Act of 1867
approximately 57% of all English and Welsh boroughs had less than 1,000 electors.
Despite the majority of small boroughs, violence appears to have been far more likely
25

Table 11 includes 119 cases ofborough violence (including 10 episodes ofby-election violence).
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in the larger constituencies. Indeed of the 12 boroughs that experienced violence in

1857 5 had more than 3,000 voters and in 1868 borough disorder occurred in 20
constituencies with more than 5,000 voters, including 11 with an electorate over
10,000. These figures suggest that far from being restricted to 'small towns and rural
areas', electoral disorder was located in the greater urban centres. The borough of
Wednesbury with a population of 116,809 and 14,277 voters experienced turbulent
elections in 1868 and 1874; Sheffield with 185,172 inhabitants and an electorate of
36,701 witnessed violence at contests in 1857 and 1874; and Finsbury with a
population of 452,484 and 25,461 voters encountered serious election violence in
1859 and 1868.
The timing of disorder reveals a pattern of rising intensity as election
campaigns progressed. Table 12 below reveals the timing of election disorder during
the period. 26

Table 12.The Timing of Election Violence, 1857 ·1880
(Includes duplicate entries of violence)

26

Year

Canvass

Meeting

1857
1859
1860
1861
1862
1865
1867
1868
1869
1871
1874
1877
1880

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2

2
4
0
0
0
2
0
4
0
0
4
1
2
19

~ouuou"'""'"''""""'"n>>n»nm>o

'"""""'RDODDORRORD<nDO .. D<UD000

Nomination Polling Day Declaration Unknown

5
1
0
0
0
5
1
9
1
0

·················a·················
0
0
22

2
3
1
0
2
12
0
44
0
1
21
0
10
96

DDORR>D0RR0RD>DD>DDODDODHODHODDO .. DO

3
3
1
0
0
3
0
8
0
0
6
0
3
27

0DUODDODDODD<DD>D>DD0D00DD0DgoDDODD

0
0
0
1
0
6
1
6
0
0
0
0
11
25

DOD . . ODDODDODDODDOD . . ODDODDODOD

Table 12 includes all figures of disorder including duplicate entries and by-election disorder. The
dotted line above the 1874 column indicates the point at which the nomination ceremony was
discontinued and secret voting established- both of which were introduced in 1872. ''Unknown"
entries of disorder include those where it was difficult to establish the exact timing of the disturbance.
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While the declaration of the poll often generated scenes of violence, it was more often
the polling day that provided the riotous denouement to the proceedings. Given the
incendiary nature of English crowds at times of popular excitement it is little wonder
that the forms and processes of constituency electioneering resulted in disorder. The
rituals and ceremonies that comprised Victorian campaigns provided ample
opportunities for mass participation. The entry of the candidate to the constituency,
the nomination ceremony and the declaration of the poll all attracted enormous
crowds. However throughout the period none resulted in violence more frequently
than the polling day.

Canvassing was a door-to-door process by which candidates and their supporters
could meet their constituents, obtain promises for votes and gauge their chances in the
coming contest. As the size of electorates increased however the personal canvass
became less used as a method of securing support. The single case of disorder during
a canvass occurred in Cheltenham during the borough election of 1865. On that
occasion the Liberal member for the borough, Colonel Berkeley, was mobbed by
Conservative roughs ''while on a canvassing expedition at the lower end of the
town". 27
The term "meeting" refers to any official gathering of voters or non-voters
organised by a candidate or his supporters, for the purpose of making known some
information relating to the election campaign. Meetings could be called to announce
a new candidature, to refute allegations made by political rivals or to deliver a speech
on some topic of local or national importance. Jon Lawrence argues that such events
provided a stage for what he describes as the 'politics of disruption'. He writes that

27

Cheltenham Examiner, 12 July 1865, p.2.
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"the physical control of civic space- of public squares, meeting-halls, factory gates or
polling-day crowds -remained central to the symbolism of political legitimacy for
politicians, as much as for their supporters".28 Election meetings provided a visible
battleground for rival partisans who often sought to disrupt proceedings through noise
or violence. During the period these meetings accounted for 19 cases of disorder. In
Finsbury in 1859 an election address by the Liberal candidate Sir S.Morton Peto drew
an estimated 3,000 people. As the meeting unfolded a large Radical element threw
the proceedings into disarray, "A general melee ensued, terminated only by many of
the gas fittings being tom down, the darkness causing the vast crowd to disperse" .29
Between 1857 and 1872, 22 episodes of violence occurred on the day of the
nomination of candidates. Before it was abolished in 1872 this procedure occupied a
central role during an election campaign and was usually conducted in a central
position in the constituency. James Vemon writes, "the sense of mounting tension
generated by this ritual unfolding of the campaign ... reached a crescendo, with the
construction of the hustings in preparation for the nomination". 30 The process of
nomination consisted of several speeches followed by a show of hands for each
candidate. Involvement in the process was not restricted to voters, and nomination
crowds commonly included women and children. Traditionally the contest could be
decided without a poll of the electors if one candidate received a majority of the show
of hands. However by the mid nineteenth-century the procedure had become largely
redundant. A candidate could demand a poll regardless of the number of hands raised
in his support, and in large constituencies the proceedings were often completely
inaudible due to the size of the crowds that attended.

28

Lawrence, Speaking for the People, p.l81.
Manchester Guardian, 20 April1859, p.2 .
30
Vemon, Politics and the Pe,ople, p.158.
29

.
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The poll normally followed the nomination by a single day. This proximity to
the actual casting of votes made the ceremony an important focal point for corrupt
practices. Indeed the Hartington Committee of 1869 found that in some cases the
nomination day served to intensify the efforts, both legal and illegal, of a legion of
party agents and canvassers. A member of the Liberal Central Committee in Bristol
gave evidence to the Committee that men were hired to disrupt the nomination by
giving "a hearing only to those people for whose side they are hired". 31 The potential
for disorder was always high during the nomination simply due to the size of the
crowds that gathered. The amount of disorder recorded during the nomination day
would doubtless be far higher if the sample included all instances in which the
ceremony had been merely disrupted. Electoral law provided for the adjournment of
the nomination "in case of riot...[or] until the obstruction ceases". 32 In many cases
the noise and excitement of a nomination crowd were an expected, though deplored,
part of the process. In places such as Bradford, where nomination crowds were
regularly - though doubtfully - estimated to reach 70,000, few people could clearly
see the hustings and only press reporters were able to hear the speeches. In 1869
Edward West, the Mayor of Bradford, described the 1868 nomination to the
Hartington Committee:

After the proposers and seconders of the two gentlemen had spoken,
and spoken amidst very great interruption, very few of their remarks
being heard, except by those close in front of the hustings, a battle
royal ensued between some men carrying boards; they broke the
boards in pieces and armed themselves with the pieces, and with sticks
and stones, and other weapons that they could get hold of, and
immediately commenced a riot. 33

31

British Parliamentary Papers, 1868-9, VIII, "Report from the Select Committee on Parliamentary
and Municipal Elections", p.221.
32
Leader, The Franchise, p.83 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 36, s.8).
33
British Parliamentary Papers, "Report from the Select Committee", p.144.
'
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In 1872 the public nomination was fmally legislated out of existence, a belated victim
of the Hartington Committee's inquiry. The procedure was replaced by the sending in
of nomination papers, and a potent cause of violence was removed from the election
process.
Several historians of popular disturbance in England have pointed to the
impact of reform in altering the pattern of election violence. Quinault's study of
public order in Warwickshire concludes that "electoral reform sapped the sources of
electoral disorder''. 34 Quinault argues that increases to the electorate after 1867 made
voter intimidation more difficult. He stresses that the introduction of secret voting in
1872 "further shielded the individual voter''. Quinault is not alone in suggesting that
larger electorates and vote by ballot reduced the opportunities for disorder. Stevenson
suggests that after the introduction of secret voting most violence took place during
the campaign and not at the polls: "an obvious comment on the open hustings and
centralised voting as a cause for disorder prior to 1872". 35 Yet Table 12 suggests that
little change occurred in the timing of electoral violence during the period. Between
1857 and 1872 the polling day accounted for 49.6% of all cases of violence (131),
whereas after 1872 the proportion of violence that occurred during the poll increased
fractionally to 52.5% (31 cases out of a total of 59 post-1872 episodes of disorder).
The percentage of cases that were unable to be categorised must be taken into
account. These comprised 30.5% of all post-1872 episodes of violence. However
Table 12 shows that after the introduction of secret ballot more than half of all
disorder continued to take place on the polling day. The removal of voters from the
public hustings therefore failed to significantly alter the pattern of election violence.
Reform in 1867 and 1872 similarly failed to remove the potential for disorder. Indeed
34
35

Quinault, "The Warwickshire County Magistracy", p.202.
Stevenson, Popular Protest, p.288.
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as the constituencies grew in size individual attempts at coercion gave way to
organised crowd violence or to treating, and neither outcome was likely to reduce the
temper of electioneering.
The declaration, like the nomination, attracted considerable public attention.
The announcement of the election result was always an anticipated and well attended
event. The appearance on the hustings of defeated or victorious parties was often the
signal for disorder. Successful candidates who were unpopular could be made to run
a gauntlet of abuse, missiles or worse. In 1857 Richard Malins, the recently reelected member for Wallingford, was attacked and chased from the Town Hall
following the declaration and forced to t~e shelter in a tavern until after dark. 36
Neither were agents or supporters of candidates immune from attack. Following the
York borough declaration in 1868 Captain John Sutton, described as a principal
supporter of the Conservatives, "was attacked by a number of Irishmen. He was in a
cab at the time, the windows of which were smashed in with sticks ... and after
defending himself with his umbrella, had to seek refuge in a passage". 37 The return of
a popular candidate could also trigger violence. In Lincoln in 1868 the announcement
of Radical victory in the borough election resulted in celebrations that saw lighted tar
barrels rolled about the town and the chief constable's house attacked.
Throughout the period 27 cases of disorder occurred during or after the
declaration. This relatively high incidence of post-poll violence throws doubt upon
the suggestion that much of the violence of the period was the result of corrupt
practices. Instead it highlights the popular appeal of elections as entertainment. Once
a contest was decided the apprehension and excitement of the campaign gave way in

~~The Times, 30 March 1857, p.7.
Manchester Guardian, 20 November 1868, p.3.
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some cases to scenes of celebration or retribution.

Neither were necessarily the

outcome of corrupt inducements.

m
In mid-Victorian Britain the scale and distribution of election violence owed much to

the particular features of each campaign, as well as to the number of contested
elections. These included the relative strengths of party organization, the divisiveness
of specific issues, local electoral traditions, personalities, influence and corruption.
All could sharpen the intensity of constituency campaigning and thus contribute to the
potential for disorder. The following section will examine electoral violence within
the context of each general election of the period. This will be followed by a more
thorough analysis of the geographic distribution of disorder.

The 1857 general election produced 12 episodes of parliamentary violence. A lack of
contested elections contributed to this relative lack of disorder: in England and Wales
only 47% of constituencies went to the polls, making this campaign the least
contested since 1832.38 Furthermore the fragmentation of party politics contributed to
the blurring of distinctions between the parties. In 1857 there were 34 contests
between Liberals alone. Contests between Liberals and Peelites also "reflect[ed] the
dislocation of Conservatism in the 1840s". 39

The Liberal party benefited from

Conservative disarray in 1857 and was returned to power with a Commons majority
of 92 seats. The Conservative failure was most pronounced in the counties where the
Party lost 24 seats in England alone. The general election of 1857 has often been
38
39

Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.61.
Jackson, "The British General Elections", p.164.
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described as a personal victory for Lord Palmerston: a "triumphant plebiscite" in
support of the ageing premier based largely on his foreign policy record. Whereas
the profile of parliamentary reform rose during the campaign, and religious questions
gained importance in Ireland and Wales, it was support or criticism ofPalmerston and
his government's handling of the Chinese Question that divided most candidates. The
Liberals may have swept into power based largely on the premier's popular appeal but
they were not to remain there for long. The new administration met in May 1857 and
was gone by February 1858, driven from office by scandal, political blunder and
foreign crisis.
The pattern of disorder in 1857 reflected the general distribution and character
of mid-century electoral disturbance. Episodes of violence occurred in the north,
south and midlands of England (See Map 1 below) and included 1 riot, 5 disturbances
All cases of disorder took place in borough constituencies.
Furthermore the nature of the violence encompassed the full scope of electoral
interference from organised intimidation to what contemporaries labelled 'rough
sport'.

Successful Conservative candidates who opposed Palmerston proved

unpopular with election crowds in Tewkesbury, Wallingford and York.

At

Tewkesbury in Gloucestershire the Liberal monopoly of the borough since 1841 was
broken with the election of a Conservative. The new member, Frederick Lygon, was
opposed to "an aggressive foreign policy" and found himself pelted with stones and
mud as he stood on the hustings. 40 The treatment of Richard Malins at the hands of a
Wallingford crowd has already been noted. 41 In York the election of a Conservative
opposed to Palmerston led to fighting between the crowd and the police.42

:~ Berrows and Worcester Journal, 4 April1857, p.2.
42

See page 108.
Berrows and Worcester Journal, 4 April1857, p.2.
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Map l.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1857
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However not all violence in 1857 was related to the simple issue of support for
Palmerston.

Elections in the 1850s were still largely constructed within a local

context and issues of nationwide significance were often secondary to those of a more
provincial character.

Indeed of the 12 cases of disorder in 1857, 8 occurred in

boroughs where no Conservative was elected. In many cases the violence was more
related to local concerns than to national political issues. Disorder in Beverley grew
out of allegations that the Peelite candidate, E.A.Glover was ineligible to stand for
election. Despite his success at the polls Glover's indignant supporters burnt an
effigy of his principal accuser and attacked the Liberal party chairman.43 The serious
riot in K.idderminster was due to the economic and political situation in the borough,
and to the personality of its bellicose member, Robert Lowe. 44

In Rochdale an

election meeting was broken up by colliers organised and paid for by the local
Conservative association. During the disruption, "Alderman Livsey and the table in
front of him were tippled (sic) over, he upon the table, and both upon the remains of
the front seats, which were all smashed".45

Less serious instances of violence

likewise showed little relation to national issues: at Harwich a crowd attacked and
demolished the hustings following the declaration and "made a clean sweep of the
materials in not more than ten minutes"; 46 at the Sheffield nomination it was the local
police who came under fire from a crowd armed with furnace coke and tumips; 47 and
the Nottingham declaration was disrupted by a group of Chartists upset that their
nominee had not been retumed. 48 In few places can the imprint of national politics be
found.
43

Much of the violence had its origins in either local partisan rivalry

British Parliamentary Papers, 1857, Session 2 (243), Vol.l59, "Select Committee on Beverley
Borough Election Petition", p.6.
44
A detailed analysis of the K.idderminster borough election of 1857 can be found in Chapter V.
45
North Lincolnshire Herald, 4 April1857, p.3.
46
The Times, 30 March 1857, p.8.
47
Ibid., 28 March 1857, p.7.
48
Ibid.
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(Wallingford, York); corruption (Rochdale); campaign excitement and enthusiasm
(Harwich, Sheffield, Brighton); or local personalities and issues (Beverley,
Kidderminster).

On April Fool's Day 1859 the Conservative ministry led by Disraeli was defeated on
a Commons' motion attacking the Government's proposed reform legislation. The
bill was too obviously favourable to Conservative electoral fortunes and was defeated
by a coalition of opposition groups. 49 The announcement that a general election
would be held was made on the same day. Thus the stage was set for a campaign in
which parliamentary reform would prove the most important political question.
Foreign policy was again an issue, this time over the war between France, Austria and
Sardinia. In 1859 party organization played a more important role than in 1857,
particularly for the Conservatives. Improvements in organization and an increase in
funding to the constituencies from the party's central fund contributed to a
Conservative recovery. 50
Electoral contests declined further than in 1857 and just 124 constituencies (or
43% of the total) across England and Wales went to the polls in 1859.

The

Conservatives regained ground lost in 1857 and returned more than 300 members for
the first time since 1841. They gained 16 county and 16 borough seats compared to
the Liberal's 5 county and 28 borough seats. However the Conservative recovery was
not enough to retain office and they were defeated by a liberal coalition with a
majority of 40 seats. The election also witnessed the further marginalisation of the
Peelite faction, which returned just 22 members in 1859 and which would soon be
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drawn into the emerging Liberal Party. 51 The drop in contested elections in 1859
contributed to a reduction in violence, with just 11 cases found including a duplicate
entry from the Lancashire borough of Bury.

The sample records one riot, five

disturbances and four incidents in 1859. These cases were scattered across northern
and southern England (See Map 2 below). The violence was concentrated in the
boroughs with a single episode recorded in a county constituency (Yorkshire, W.R).
In the single member borough of Bury the political battle was fought between
moderate and radical Liberals. The Liberal split, which dated from 1852, proved
bitter enough that rival allegations of corruption were common during elections. In
1857 the borough was contested by the moderate Frederick Peel and the radical
R.N.Philips.

Caroline Jackson writes that the election ended in "a welter of

accusation and last minute slanders". 52 Peel's supporters lodged a petition against
Philips' return citing the intimidation of voters but were unsuccessful. In 1859 Philips
declined to contest the borough and his replacement was the radical Thomas Bames, a
stranger to the town. Peel stood again and was this time successful due to his support
among the town's publicans and to "an outlay of bribes of considerable value". 53
During the campaign drunken 'Peelites' disrupted Bames' election meeting and at the
declaration fighting erupted between the rival parties. The Manchester Guardian
reported that "the friends of Mr.Peel took forcible possession of that portion of the
hustings allotted to the friends of Mr.Bames, not permitting the latter to retire by the
way of the staircase, but throwing them over the front of the hustings, to the great
danger of life and limb". 54
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Map 2.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1859
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The Beverley election again resulted in disorder albeit of a more sedate character. In
1859 E.A.Glover returned to contest the borough after being stripped of his election in
1857 and having spent time in jail during 1858 for false declarations as to his property
qualifications. The nomination was described as ''very disorderly" and stones were
thrown at the hustings. The most serious case of disorder in 1859 occurred in Calne
in Wiltshire. Two years after almost being killed at the hands of a K.idderminster
mob, Robert Lowe found himself again at the centre ofan election riot. Lowe's
return for Calne with the aid of his patron, Lord Lansdowne, was the signal for
serious rioting. The Bridlington Free Press commented,

The mob ... attacked the police in force, and drove them into the Town
Hall, where they kept them prisoners for two hours ... The mob then
demolished every pane of glass in the police station, smashed the
windows of the agent ofMr.Lowe and Lord Lansdowne's solicitor, and
kept the town in terror until a very late hour at night. 55

Election violence in 1859 was characterised by disrupted political meetings with
disorder attending speeches in Finsbury, Bury, Salford and Leeds. William Massey's
election address in Salford was disturbed and in Hull the Conservative party were met
with a boisterous reception at the declaration and pelted with mud, sticks, lumps of
paper(!) and stones. 56

The relatively quiet elections of 1857 and 1859 gave way to the more violent election
of 1865. On the surface however there was little to indicate that the campaign would
be a bitter one. The parliament elected in 1859 "had died a natural death" and no
single contentious political issue dominated the hustings. Government expenditure,
malt tax, church rates and foreign policy all rated more attention than parliamentary
55
56

Bridlington Free Press, 7 May 1859, p.3.
Manchester Guardian, 29 April1859, p.4.

reform in 1865.

The Liberals relied on careful domestic management and an

unspectacular record in foreign policy. There was little doubt about the outcome and
the Liberals were re-elected with the 80 year-old Palmerston again at the helm. The
party actually increased their majority by 20 seats and in the Commons 359 Liberals
faced 299 Conservatives. Yet the campaign was the most heavily contested since
1841, a factor attributable to the retirement of many older members. Indeed the 1865
election returned 105 members to the Commons for the first time. 57 In England and
Wales there were 158 contests, an increase of 34 over 1859, representing 55% of the
total number of constituencies. At £750,000 the official election expenses were the
highest yet recorded. A total of 35 petitions went to trial in 1865, a figure that
represented one-fifth of all petitions lodged since 1832. 58 The election occasioned
more violence than the 1857 and 1859 campaigns combined. A total of 29 cases of
disorder were recorded in 1865, including 5 duplicate entries. 59 The Nonconformist
commented of the campaign, "The great triumph of Liberal opinion at the General
Election has been greatly tarnished by the senseless and disgraceful scenes which
have been witnessed in various parts of the United Kingdom". 60 The violence was
located principally along a north-south corridor between Yorkshire and Wiltshire (See
Map 3 below), with isolated cases in Devon, Pembrokeshire and Cumberland.
Five county elections were disrupted by violence in 1865, with the North and
South Warwickshire campaigns each contributing a duplicate entry (7 cases of county
violence in total).

Despite the increase in county disorder the large boroughs

continued to dominate the sample.
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Map 3.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1865
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There were 19 cases of borough violence in 1865, including 12 boroughs with more
than 1,000 electors (Hull with 5,566 voters and Nottingham with 5,934 voters). The
scale of violence reflected the general pattern of mid-century disorder with 8 riots, 14
disturbances and 7 incidents.

Serious riots broke out at elections in Rochdale,

Lincoln, Nottingham, Chippenham, Cricklade, Dudley, Huddersfield and at
Rotherham during the Yorkshire, West Riding contest. The general election resulted
in a rare fatality: In Cheltenham a Liberal supporter died after being shot in the face
by a Conservative voter. 61

In Pembrokeshire election enthusiasm led to the old

practice of 'cooping' voters prior to the poll.

The Welshman reported of the

Haverfordwest election, "A large number of tallymen had been engaged on both sides,
and many an unsuspecting voter was taken captive only to be set at liberty after the
turmoil had ended". 62 The two cases of borough violence recorded in Pembrokeshire
in 1865 (See Map 3 or appendix) represent the frrst instances of Welsh disorder
during the period. The lack of violence in the Principality before 1865 reflected the
lack of contests there. At both the 1857 and 1859 general elections there were just 4
constituencies in Wales that went to the polls. This situation did not alter markedly in
1865, when there were 5 contests. Welsh electoral lassitude during this period owed
much to the political power of the local Anglican gentry; their decline and the
resulting rise in contests (and therefore violence) date from the late-1860s.
In Chippenham the election of two Conservatives, Sir. J.Neeld and Gabriel

Goldney, sparked a riot in which the houses of at least 50 Conservative voters were
attacked including that of Goldney' s election agent.

Chippenham was a small

patronage borough in Wiltshire with just 392 voters in 1865. The Neeld family, one
of the most influential in the county, exercised a controlling influence over the
61

Nonconformist, 19 July 1865, p.587.
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62Th

borough's two seats. The violence in 1865 demonstrates the risks that patrons ran by
openly ignoring popular sentiment. While the election result may never have been in
doubt, the violent upheaval that followed the Liberal candidate's loss certainly reveals
the unpopularity of the patron's political control.

The local police force of 12

constables faced an estimated 500 men, women and children infuriated at the loss of
William Lysley. The Times reported the violence which rapidly escalated from stonethrowing to destruction of property,

For nearly three hours the windows, window panes, and furniture in
the houses of obnoxious persons were destroyed ... In order to show
their feelings against the Vicar, the Rev. J.Rich, the mob proceeded to
the churchyard and tore up the tombstones, which they hurled against
the windows of his house. 63

In the borough of Nottingham corruption and intimidation led to serious riots and
ultimately to a void election.

This large borough of 5,964 voters returned two

members to parliament and had a well-established tradition of corruption. The hiring
of organised mobs, or 'lambs', in the Conservative interest had become something of
a local institution. The bitterly contested election of 1865 proved no exception, with
violence being a feature of both the nomination and polling days. Three candidates
stood in the Liberal interest including Sir R.J.Clifton, a former Peelite and the owner
of several local collieries, Samuel Morley, a hosiery manufacturer and prominent
nonconformist, and Charles Paget, a Nottingham manufacturer and deputy lieutenant
ofthe county. A.G.Marten, QC stood as a Conservative. The employees ofClifton's
collieries were prominent during the disturbances which punctuated the election
campaign.

63
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On the day of the nomination a large group of framework knitters came by
train to Nottingham in support of the Liberal candidates.

When they arrived,

however, they were "set upon by a violent rabble and driven back into the station". 64
The Nonconformist reported that ''Numbers of roughs waited in various avenues in the
town for Messrs. Paget and Morley, but they did not make their appearance". 65
During the nomination the violence continued and "the hustings was got possession
of, the flags tom down, the scaffolding set frre to, and totally consumed. The rabble
pelted each other with stones, and several persons were severely wounded". 66 On the
polling day Paget and Morley's committee room was attacked and gutted and "bands
of men armed with sticks [committed] serious outrages on the property and persons of
the inhabitants". 67 The violence continued to escalate and a request was made for
military assistance. However the excitement declined after the declaration of the poll,
no doubt due to Clifton' s success.
The election result was petitioned against and both Samuel Morley and Sir
Robert Clifton were unseated. Morley's supporters were found to have bribed over
600 voters, ostensibly as protection against the intimidation practiced by his
opponent. Clifton and his agents were found guilty of intimidation. For his part
Morley denied any complicity in corrupt practices. In a letter to Gladstone following
the verdict on the petition he wrote,

It has been a great disappointment to find myself compromised by acts

of which I was entirely ignorant till I heard of them last week; but for
which I am justly held responsible, though I doubt whether the
[election] Committee fully appreciated the difficulty my friends had to

64
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encounter owing to the shameful conduct of unscrupulous opponents. 68

Gladstone regretted Morley' s departure from the Commons and remarked during the
Church Rates debate that his "absence from this House I deplore on personal as well
as moral grounds". 69 Regardless of Morley's innocence or guilt in the matter, this
incident provides an insight into how politicians found guilty of corruption were
·viewed by their contemporaries. Morley's political career was not damaged by his
association with corrupt practices. He was returned for Bristol in 1868 and remained
member for that borough until1885.

The scale of disorder during the 1868 general election undoubtedly casts a long
shadow across the period, the prolonged campaign was certainly the most violent of
the mid-Victorian era and, in terms of petitions lodged and corruption uncovered, one
of the most venal. This election alone accounts for one-third of all cases of election
disorder between 1857 and 1880. Fifty-nine English and Welsh elections experienced
some form of disorder in 1868, representing an incredible 26.4%, or almost onequarter, of the total number of election contests in that year. 70 A total of 57 serious
cases of violence (27 riots and 30 disturbances) left at least 9 people dead in
widespread rioting that stretched from Cumberland in the north to the Isle ofWight in
the south. The violence was predominantly located in the midlands and in Lancashire
and Yorkshire, though violence was also reported as far afield as Devon, Kent,
Suffolk, Carmarthenshire and Carnarvonshire (See Map 4 below).
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Map 4.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1868
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The military were needed to restore order in several towns during the 1868 campaign
including Ashton-under-Lyne, Bolton, Blackburn, Blaenavon, Brierly Hill, Newport
and Wakefield. 71 At Shepshed in North Leicestershire the-Pensioners and Yeomanry
were put on alert after rioters clashed with police reinforcements sent from
Loughborough. 72 During the West Staffordshire election the polling was abandoned
at Brierly Hill after the hustings were destroyed and mobs of Liberal and Tory roughs
fought in the streets. 73 In North Durham a riot erupted on the polling day during
which rival partisans fought for control of the hustings. A fierce stone-throwing battle
ensued during which the Manchester Guardian reported: "the shrieks of women and
children for assistance [were] ... awfully distinct even above the din that prevailed
during the stampede down Framwell-gate". 74 At the close of the poll in Whittlesey,
Cambridgeshire an organised mob of navvies and labourers descended on the town
and "demolished everything they could lay their hands on". 75 In all the general
election generated a total of 27 riots, 30 disturbances and 14 incidents. The increase
in county violence in 1868 reflected the growth of contests in those constituencies. In
1865 only 17.8% of English and Welsh counties were contested compared to 40.3%
in 1868, an increase fuelled by a leap in Welsh county contests from 5 (in 1865) to 15,
and by contests in 16 English counties that were new creations of the Second Reform
Act.
There were unique reasons for the scale of violence in 1868. This bitter
election featured a recently enlarged electorate, a lengthy campaign and a significant
increase in the number of contests.

71

The reforms of 1867 ensured that a larger

These towns were not all boroughs in their own right, and include some county towns where polling
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proportion of the working class were enfranchised in 1868 than at previous elections.
These new voters included many who were vulnerable to the pressures of intimidation
and to the lure of bribery. Martin Pugh writes that "the· exercise of influence was
naturally marked in the election following immediately upon the 1867 Reform Act,
when large numbers of working men voted for the first time but under the old
conditions of open voting". 76 These newly enfranchised voters were sought after by
the established political parties, and the increase in contests. in 1868 is evidence of the
stimulus Reform had on party organization.

A total of 223 English and Welsh

contests in 1868 represented 74% of the total number of constituencies, and an
increase of 65 from 1865.

Widespread press reports of bribery, treating and

intimidation clearly indicate the efforts of party agents to capture the new electorate,
and the increased level of party activity, whether legal or illegal, led to a significant
increase in both official election expenses and the number of petitions lodged.
Though grossly underestimated the 1868 expenses totalled £1.3 million, almost
£700,000 more than in 1865.77 The voters themselves proved no less immune to
political pressures or corruption than their predecessors; 101 petitions, or double that
of 1865, being presented following the election, and 22 contests were declared void,
an increase of 16 over the previous general election. 78
The campaign itself lasted from August to November and was described by
the Home Secretary H.A.Bruce as "the long agony which preceded the general
election".79

Disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland was the most

prominent and most contentious issue during the election. Gladstone committed the
Liberals to a policy of reform in Ireland where the established Church commanded a
76
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° Furthermore the issue of Irish reform

membership of just 12% of the population. 8

coincided with a rise in Anglo-Irish tensions. Several high profile Fenian attacks on
the British mainland in the winter of 1867 were followed by the controversial lecture
tour of the anti-Catholic evangelist William Murphy. Local causes of disorder were
thus less important during a campaign in which a single political issue dominated the
hustings. And in 1868 the subject of Irish reform forced "a national agenda on local
platforms to an extent previously unknown in mid-Victorian elections". 81 English
working-class hostility towards immigrant Irish labour merely exacerbated strongly
held anti-Catholic sentiment. Anglo-Irish conflict thus played a prominent role in
many election disturbances in 1868. In Lancashire in particular William Murphy's
talks generated a considerable amount of disorder, one example being in Wigan,
where two Liberals headed the poll, a body of Tory colliers attacked houses in the
Irish section of town. However, "The Irishmen ... soon organised themselves, drove
out their assailants, and also repulsed a second attack". 82 Irishmen and women were
also reported as being prominent in disturbances in Blackburn, Bury, Bolton and
York.
However not all disorder was influenced by the divisive national agenda of
Irish reform. Corruption in the form of treating and undue influence provided a ready
precursor to violence. In Bolton local Irishmen were reported as indulging in serious
fighting, but defeated Liberal's also accused the Conservatives of importing "large
bodies of armed and violent men" 83 into the town. Violence in Warrington flared
after Conservative supporters kidnapped several Liberal voters. 84
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following the Mid-Cheshire election, a riot broke out after rival gangs of 'roughs'
clashed in the streets. On that occasion the police came under serious attack and
"several of the constables were received with a volley of stones. One was beaten with
a flagstaff, another had his head cut open, and Captain Smith was injured in the
side". 85 And during the West Staffordshire election a ferocious riot ensued after a
body of "lambs" from Dudley marched on body of "roughs" from Cradley-Heath. 86
The concentration of violence in 1868 raises important questions about the
nature and frequency of mid-century electoral disorder. What implications does this
cluster of violence at a single campaign have for conclusions about disorder across the
entire period? Was the general election of 1868 merely an anomaly in an otherwise
peaceful period? It seems reasonably clear that a peculiar convergence of factors
contributed to the scale of violence in 1868.

A greatly enlarged electorate, the

intensification of party activity with its adjutants of corruption and undue influence, a
divisive religious issue, all exacerbated long held traditions of participation, carnival
and disorder.

The violence in 1868 led directly to a Commons investigation into the procedure of
both parliamentary and municipal elections. The Hartington Committee presented its
fmdings to the House in March 1870.

Its report on electioneering in mid-Victorian

Britain concluded that many borough elections were characterised by fighting,
drinking and various forms of corruption. Among the recommendations made by the
Committee to improve this situation were the abolition of open nominations, an
increase in the number of polling booths, an improvement of the law relating to
electoral malpractice and the introduction of secret voting. These proposals were
85
86
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included in the Parliamentary and Municipal Elections Bill (Ballot Act) passed in July
1872. The simultaneous passage of a Corrupt Practices Act outlawed the use of
public houses as committee rooms. 87 These changes may have led some to hope for
an improvement in electoral conditions. However such hopes were soon to be proved
illusory. The scale of violence in 1874 was second only to that of 1868 and proved
that alterations to the procedure of electioneering made little impact on the outbreak
of violence.
The General Election of 1874 provided the Conservatives with their only
electoral victory of the period. A mere three weeks were provided for the campaign
which was characterised by Liberal disunity as much as Conservative cohesion. Since
1868 the Conservatives had assiduously tended to the machinery of party
organization. The National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations
was formed in 1867 and was followed in 1870 with the establishment of the
Conservative Central Office. The creation of these two bodies was an important step
in the development of national party organizations. 88 However their effectiveness in
1874 should not be overdrawn. Conservative organization was more advanced in the
larger urban boroughs and the counties remained largely under the influence of their
traditional landlords. The smaller boroughs were often left with a single party agent
or no organization at all. Yet the Conservatives were far better prepared than the
Liberals in 1874 and were able to present a coherent and unified front.

Their

campaign addresses followed broadly similar lines including: "defence of the Church
of England, an end to Gladstone's domestic hyperactivity, more religious teaching in
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schools, opposition to Home Rule, relief for local taxpayers, and the vaguest of
vagueness on foreign affairs". 89
By comparison the Liberal Party was divided and in disarray. Without an
issue such as Irish Church disestablishment to rally the various elements of liberalism
the party struggled to maintain unity. Radicals and nonconformists were unhappy
with the pace and extent of government reforms and the Whigs and moderate Liberals
were increasingly alarmed at Gladstone's democratic rhetoric.

Nonconformist

disillusionment contributed to a split in the Liberal vote. In 1874 official Liberals
were challenged by unofficial candidates in 34 constituencies.90 The passage of the
1872 Licensing Act had alienated both the temperance movement and the brewing
interest. The former believed the licensing reforms had not gone far enough, the latter
was angry with increased industry regulation. By reducing the opening hours of
public houses the Liberals created a powerful enemy in the publicans. A total of 214
English and Welsh constituencies were contested in 1874, representing a marginal
decrease from 223 in 1868. The election proved a spectacular Conservative victory,
with the Liberal majority of 100 seats obtained in 1868 being converted into a
Conservative majority of 52. In England the Conservatives captured 143 out of 170
county seats and "pushed Liberal electoral support back into Northern England". 91
The 1874 general election produced an all too familiar inventory of riot,
mayhem and destruction. In al119 borough elections and 6 county elections produced
a total of 32 cases of electoral violence. There were 11 riots, 12 disturbances and 9
incidents at elections as far field as Cornwall, Norfolk and North Durham (See Map 5
below).
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Map 5.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1874
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The scale of disorder in 1874 marks it as the second most violent of the period.
Violence was most marked on the polling day (See Table 12) which accounted for 21
out of 32 cases of disorder. Such figures contradict Richter's argument that most
violence took place after the declaration of the poll. Similarly Comelius O'Leary
writes that "the riots that occurred in 1874 took place (as before) during the campaign,
not on polling day". 92 The scale and distribution of violence in 1874 challenges the
notion that electoral disorder had largely disappeared by the late-Victorian period.

The election campaign of 1874 may have been, as Hoppen asserts, "notable for its
calmness and quiet"93 in comparison with its immediate predecessor. However it was
still far from peaceful: in Sheffield an armed mob paraded through the streets,
attacked passers-by, "entered a beer house ... and got nine gallons of beer from the
landlord under pressure"; 94 as in 1868 the polling at Barnsley for the South-West
Yorkshire election ended in riot. The police were pelted with "stones, oranges [and]
earthenware" before the windows of seven hotels were smashed and a cab carrying
the ballot boxes was attacked; 95 several borough elections in Staffordshire proved
disorderly, as at Wolverhampton where the ironworks and factories shut early and
there were pitched battles between rival mobs of partisans.

At half-past one a mob of youths, wearing Conservative colours, and
armed with staves, collected in the centre of Wolverhampton, and
commenced an indiscriminate attack upon all wearing the Liberal
colours ... Vehicles and horses and even women were beaten ... The
Liberals responded and commenced a similar sally, armed with timber,
which they tore down from fences. 96
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In April 1874 the Chief Constable of Staffordshire, William Congreve, wrote to the
Home Office concerning his preparations for the recent county and borough elections.
He described how by-elections in 1873 for East Staffordshire, Stafford and Tamworth
had, "led me to hope that under the Ballot the excitement which frequently prevailed
under the former system was not to be anticipated". However his optimism was
''undeceived by the riotous proceedings at Dudley on the

4th

of February". The

borough elections for Wednesbury, Stoke and Wolverhampton all took place on the
same day. Congreve admitted that in many places his force was "at times more or
less overpowered" and that "most of the oldest officers affirm that never, on any
previous occasion, have they seen at Elections so savage and determined a mob". 97
As during the rest of the period, the causes of violence in 1874 were many and
varied. Violence was always likely to be marked during a campaign in which the
publicans were supposed to have taken an active role.

In some places anti-

government campaigning by the licensed victuallers led to disorder. In Hull a number
of publicans who had supported the Conservative interest had their windows smashed,
while public houses were also the focus of riotous mobs in Barnsley, Nottingham,
Sheffield and Bewdley.

Such places were, however, perennial targets for attack

during mid-Victorian elections. In Dudley the intimidation of voters by an armed
mob led to a void election. At Penryn in Cornwall partisan rivalry erupted into
violence when a Liberal procession was attacked by a body of Conservatives. The
police were frequent targets of mobs throughout the period and this was particularly
obvious in 1874. For example a force of constables from Stourbridge were sent to
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April1874.
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Lye during the East Worcestershire election only to be stoned halfway home again.
Several of their comrades were left in Lye, "being too much injured to march away". 98
Election crowds often responded violently to police interference, particularly
when force was required to restore order. In North Durham a riot developed after a
constable struck a rioter with his truncheon. This act precipitated a general attack on
the police, the rescue of several prisoners and attacks on houses in which the police
had fled for safety. 99 However the violence in North Durham was more complicated
than mere police-mob conflict. One of the Conservative candidates was unpopular
with the local miners. George Elliot was a self-made man and an ex-miner himself
The Nonconformist described him as, "very wealthy ... but, like some others, he is
dead against the class from which he has risen" .100

He was credited with an

unpopular insertion in the Mines Regulation Act and during an election meeting in
1874 was stoned by hundreds of miners. They campaigned vigorously against him,
employing exclusive dealing and intimidation against Tory tradesmen. The result was
serious rioting in many county towns including Seaham where the mob, "ftred a truck
containing 25 barrels of tar, and burnt a stack of pit props and other timber". 101

The Conservative government elected in 1874 limped into its seventh session in 1880,
the ftrst to do so in the nineteenth-century, dogged by foreign and domestic troubles
and hounded by a re-invigorated and morally outraged Gladstone.

Disraeli's

dissolution on 8 March thus proved the party leadership to be out of touch with the
state of its electoral strength and complacent in the face of Liberal reorganisation.
Gladstone's return to the political limelight came in the wake of the Bulgarian
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atrocities and as a candidate for the Scottish county of Midlothian. His campaign
speeches there in November and December 1879 harshly criticised Conservative
foreign policy in the Balkans and South Africa.

A ·worsening industrial and

agricultural depression in the late 1870s added to Conservative ills. In addition the
failure of the government to protect the landed interest against falling food prices and
cheaper imports eroded their traditional support base. 102 Conservative prospects in
1880 were further weakened by the deterioration of the party's organization. Since
1874 the work of Gorst and the Central Office had been allowed to decay until the
latter had "practically ceased to exist except as a clerical agency" .103
By contrast the Liberals had steadily improved their organization since 1874.
The split between Whigs and radical nonconformists had been repaired and in many
large boroughs Liberal associations were being remodelled to reflect a more 'popular'
appeal. Working-class participation was encouraged in these new organs of Liberal
party machinery, the most famous model of organization being the Birmingham
'caucus'. In 1877 the National Liberal Federation was created to coordinate local
party associations. By the end of that year 47 English and Welsh boroughs were
affiliated. 104 The national scope and effectiveness of the NLF should not, however, be
overstated.

Its power was weakened by internal divisions and both Whigs and

moderate Liberals were wary of its radical nature. 105 The Federation was also largely
controlled by Joseph Chamberlain and the Birmingham Liberals and was resented by
party associations in Scotland and Wales. 106 Despite these divisions the Liberal Party
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was in a much better position to contest the 1880 election than were the
Conservatives.
The dissolution in March left three weeks for the campaign. The session
ended with the controversial passage of the Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt
Practices Act (1880). This legislation repealed a section of the 1867 Reform Act
which prohibited the payment of travel expenses for voters. 107 The use of paid cabs
and conveyances was thus marked during the bitter campaign that followed. There
were 249 electoral contests in England and Wales in 1880, an increase from 214 in
1874. The Liberals were returned in a stunning victory with their largest nominal
majority since 1832. Conservative numbers in the Commons fell from 352 to 238
while Liberal numbers increased from 300 to 414, including 61 Home Rulers. 108
Liberal gains were marked in the counties where they captured 38 English and
Scottish seats. 109 In many ways the election marked the transition towards a more
modern style of politics. It was the ftrst 'national' campaign to be fought by two mass
party organizations and the involvement of the party leadership in campaigning was a
portent of the future. Yet the influence of an older style of politics lingered in the
continued significance of local issues and the local influence of party associations.
Members of parliament who enjoyed strong local support were unlikely to be

°

influenced by the 'party machine' or the party leadership. 11 Finally the prevalence of
corruption and violence during the campaign proved that, at least at the constituency
level, little had changed since 1857.
The Nonconformist could always be counted on for the most vitriolic and
high-minded denunciations of electoral disorder and in 1880 commented that "The
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election excesses visible in the present contest have much of the rancour and brutality
of old times without the humour that at least enlivened the grossness" .111 There were
indeed serious riots in 1880 but not all the humour had been·stripped from the system.

In Richmond during the polling for mid-Surrey a tradesman 'of liberal views' was
captured by Conservatives and, "pasted over with Tory bills, put in a boat and sent
down the river ... after having been covered in flour''. 112 The campaign proved an
exceptionally bitter one and 26 elections witnessed violence of some kind. In all there
were 9 riots, 10 disturbances and 7 incidents (See Map 6 below).

Conservative

candidates proved generally unpopular during the election. In South Shields the
borough election drew an enormous crowd that barricaded the Conservative
candidate, H.B.Hamilton, inside his hotel.

During the melee that followed "six

policemen were severely cut about the head and face" .113 Conservative candidates
and voters were the focus of crowd violence in Warrington, Dorchester, Pontefract,
Rotherham, Devonshire, Winchester and Northwick (Mid-Cheshire).
However Liberals also suffered at the hands of riotous crowds. At Shanklin
on the Isle of Wight a Liberal election meeting was disrupted by a body of 'navvies'
who, "smashed the furniture and fittings, and a fight between them and the
townspeople took place, in which several persons were seriously hurt". 114 More
serious violence occurred in Shaftesbury and Rotherham, at the former a large crowd
prevented the Mayor and the successful Liberal candidate from leaving the Town
Hall, while at the latter the Riot Act was read and the 21st Hussars paraded through
the streets "with drawn sabres" .115
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Map 6.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1880
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At Chester the candidacy ofF .L.Malgarini led to a riot, owing to Liberal working men
believing he was a 'tory decoy' sent to Chester to split the Liberal vote. He appeared
at an election meeting wearing "evening dress, white kid gloves and [a] silk hat". 116
However after being chased from the meeting he was attacked in the streets and
viciously assaulted, his committee-room was trashed and he was forced to leave town
before the polling. Chester was an extensively corrupt borough and a subsequent
investigation revealed that £9,000 was spent in 1880 treating an estimated 2,000 venal
voters. 117 The election was ultimately declared void on the grounds of bribery and
treating by Liberal agents. 118
Following the election 42 petitions were presented of which 28 came forward
for trial. The election may have borne the imprint of modernism but it was still
largely operating within an older model of politics. The removal of the prohibition on
paid conveyances had seen a considerable increase in the practice. Combined with
the lack of a legal limit to election expenses and little public condemnation of
corruption there was little likelihood that fiscal restraint or electoral morality would
be shown. Given the scale of violence in 1880 it is little wonder that Cornelius
O'Leary described the campaign as "an unparalleled orgy ofextravagance". 119

IV

The location of electoral violence across England and Wales is shown in maps 1 to 7
(See Map 7 below). For the 1857 and 1859 elections the maps reflect a scarcity of
disorder and the dominance ofborough violence.
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Map 3 (1865) reveals a notable increase in mid-century violence and establishes a
pattern of concentration through the midlands and northern England. The widespread
distribution of violence in 1868 is illustrated clearly in Map 4, particularly in
Lancashire where there were numerous Anglo-Irish conflicts. Maps 5 (1874) and 6
(1880) show the continued, and widely dispersed, nature of electoral violence in the
later half of the period, while map 7 shows the distribution of all 166 separate cases of
parliamentary disorder that occurred between 1857 and 1880. 120 Map 7 reveals two
important features of mid-Victorian election disorder: violence occurred at
constituencies spread across England and Wales; and the area of greatest
concentration was in the west midlands and in northern England.

What if any

explanations are there for the patterns of violence shown in the maps, and do they
shed light on the incidence of electoral violence?
The wide distribution of disorder shown in map 7 reinforces the importance of
this study. Election violence was not an isolated or regional anomaly but a nationwide phenomenon. The sample therefore does not reflect a large amount of violence
in a small number of constituencies. Table 13 below reveals the frequency with
which individual boroughs and counties experienced violence.

Table 13.The Frequency of Violence at Borough and County Elections, 1857 ·1880
(Excludes duplicate entries of violence)
Constituency
Type

Boroughs
Counties

Number of occasions each constituency type experienced violence

1 case
57
25

2 cases
20
5

3 cases
3
4

4 cases
2
0

5 cases
1
0

Total
Constituency

Total Cases
of violence

83
34

119
47

Between 1857 and 1880 a total of 117 English and Welsh constituencies accounted
for 166 separate cases of electoral violence. Table 13, which excludes duplicate

120

Map 7 excludes all duplicate cases of violence.
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entries, shows that disorder was more likely to occur in a new location than an old,
with only 10 constituencies experiencing more than two disrupted elections.

In

England and Wales as few as six counties escaped any form of electoral disturbance:
Surrey, Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Rutland and Westmoreland all
failed to produce a single episode of violence; and in Wales there were no reports of
election disorder in Anglesey, Breconshire, Cardiganshire, Flintshire, Merionethshire,
Montgomeryshire or Radnorshire. The lack of violence in these districts is largely
due to the fact that they included few boroughs, and fewer still of any notable size.
The 6 English counties included just 8 boroughs, of which 5 had fewer than 1,000
voters before 1867. In the 7 Welsh counties there were 6 districts, none of which had
more than 1,000 voters before 1867.

In Wales the scarcity of large boroughs

combined with the rarity of contested elections resulted in relatively few cases of
disorder until 1868.
Map 7 shows that electoral violence was largely concentrated in the west
midlands and northern districts of England. These areas were classified by the 1871
Census (England and Wales) as the West Midland, North Midland, North-Western
and York divisions. 121

These four districts accounted for 105 separate cases of

violence during the period, compared to 61 cases in the remaining 7 divisions. 122 The
concentration of disorder in these areas can largely be explained by the distribution of
large urban constituencies. The point has been made that electoral violence was
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The divisions as classed in the 1871 Census were as follows: London (London and metropolitan
areas of Middlesex, Surrey and Kent); South Eastern (Surrey, Kent, Sussex, Hampshire, Berkshire);
South Midland (Middlesex, Herts, Bucks, Oxford, Northamptonshire, Hunts, Bedfordshire,
Cambridgeshire); Eastern (Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk); South Western (Wiltshire, Dorset, Devon,
Cornwall, Somerset); West Midland (Gloucester, Hereford, Shropshire, Staffordshire, Worcestershire,
Warwickshire); North Midland (Leicestershire, Rutlandshire, Lincolnshire, Notts, Derbyshire); North
Western (Cheshire, Lancashire); York (Yorkshire); Northern (Durham, Cumberland, Northumberland,
Westmoreland); Wales (Monmouthshire and all counties of Wales). British Parliamentary Papers,
Session 1873 (18), LXXI, I, "1871 Census England and Wales, III", p.63.
122
If duplicate episodes of violence are added: the first four divisions experienced 123 cases of
violence, the remaining 7 divisions experienced 68.
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predominantly a feature of large borough constituencies. The midlands and northern
districts of England incorporated a considerable number of large boroughs compared
to areas which recorded less disorder. Table 14 below outlines the number of small
and large boroughs in each of the 11 divisions that constituted England and Wales.
The figures for both 1857 and 1880 are included for comparative purposes.

Table 14.Eiection Violence and the Distribution of Boroughs by Size and
Division, 1857-1880
(Excludes duplicates entries)

Division
West Midland
North Western
York
North Midland

Cases of
Violence
26
31
26
22

Welsh
South Eastern
Northern
South Midland
Eastern
London

10
12
9
8
5
2

Small Boroughs
1857
1880
16
10
3
0
10
6
4
1

Large Boroughs
1857
1880
11
18
14
19
8
13
6
9

·sali.ifi··westam····················· ·····-······Ts············· ·············3·3···························24············ ···············6······························a·.............
11
18
6
9
5
0

3
12
3
7
3
0

4
15
6
4
5
5

12
20
12
6
5
7

The dotted line in Table 14123 divides the bulk of the divisions from the four that
experienced the greatest frequency of disorder. The West Midland, North Western,
York and North Midland divisions are characterised by fewer small boroughs and a
greater number of large boroughs. By comparison the divisions with the least amount
of disorder, South Midland, Eastern and London, had the lowest number of large
boroughs. In 1857 the four most disorderly divisions included 33 small boroughs and
39 large boroughs. By contrast the remaining 7 divisions incorporated 82 small and
45 large boroughs. This table reinforces the point that it was in the larger urban

123

In 1857 "small" refers to a borough with less than 1,000 voters and "large" to a borough with over
1,000 voters. In 1880 "small" refers to a borough with less than 2,000 voters and "large" to a borough
. with more than 2,000 voters.

Chapter IV

170

boroughs that electoral disorder was more likely to occur, and not in the smaller
country towns as suggested by Donald Richter. Violence was centred predominantly
in the midlands and northern districts due to the concentration of larger boroughs in
some of those areas.

Thus the South Western division had the most number of

boroughs during the period but experienced relatively little disorder because most of
those were small in size.

The maps show electoral violence to have been concentrated in the industrial districts
of England where the employment of those engaged in, "Art and Mechanic
Productions ... the textile fabrics and dress ... in food and drinks ... [and] Animal
Substances" 124 was high and employment in agriculture was generally low. Thus it
was in the Black Country, the Potteries, and the cotton, woollen and metal production
and manufacturing areas of Lancashire and Yorkshire that much of the disorder
occurred. Table 15 below shows the division of labour across the 11 divisions of
England and Wales.

Table 15.Explaining the Pattern of Disorder: Labour, Ethnic and Police Statistics
(Includes duplicates)

Division
West Midland
North Western
York
North Midland

Violence %Employed %Employed %General
%Irish
Police to
Industry
Agriculture Labourers Immigrants Population

40
33
27
23

·sa.litti··wastern-· ···········1·6·········
Welsh
South Eastern
Northern
South Midland
Eastern
London

124

14
12
11
8
5
2

·~~·~~·~

24
31
29
23
..................................................
18
19
14
23
19
14
22

7
3
6
11
12
10
10
6
13
15
1

......................................... 0 .....................

2.5
1.4
1:1317
2.1
6.6
1:1473
1.4
2.4
1:1167
1.9
0.8
1:1200
....................................................
············a·:y············ ········1·:·1'277"'' '
2.4
1.6
1:1658
3.1
1.8
1.8
1:1043
2.6
4.7
1:1176
2
1
1:1309
0.5
2
1:1217
2.8
2
1:268

British Parliamentary Papers, "1871 Census England and Wales", p.63.
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Table 15 125 includes duplicate entries of violence to provide a more accurate picture
of the scale of Victorian disorder. The table shows the percentages of the population
in each division that were employed in industry, agriculture or general labour. The
figures are drawn from the 1871 Census. The West Midland, North Western, York
and North Midland divisions all recorded high percentages of industrial employees
and correspondingly low rates of agricultural employment. Those divisions with
fewer industrial and more agricultural labourers generally experienced less disorder.
Somewhat surprisingly the figures for "General Labourers" are not higher in the four
most disturbed divisions.

Given that navvies, lumpers, and colliers featured

prominently in electoral riots it is surprising that there is not a greater correlation
between this category and the more disorderly divisions. Table 15 shows no obvious
link between violence and the presence of general or itinerant labourers. However it
is important to remember that these demographic figures do not serve to discount the
involvement of particular occupational groups in electoral violence. Rather they
provide a means of understanding the general distribution of disorder. The lack of
violence in a predominantly rural area does not rule out the participation of
agricultural labourers.
A case in point is the involvement of the Irish. Hoppen suggests that during
the period "many of the more violent riots ... were, in some close or remote mannerconnected with the local presence of Irish immigrants" .126 Certainly contemporary
opinion would have agreed with such a verdict and accounts of electoral disorder
contain numerous references to Irish involvement. Yet Table 15 reveals that the

125

Figures for Table 15 drawn from 1871 Census England and Wales. Those classed as employed in
Agriculture included "Persons possessing or working the land, and engaged in growing Grain, Fruits,
Grasses, Animals and other Products. Persons engaged about animals." (p.63). General Labourers
constituted a sub-division of what was classed an Indefinite and Non-Productive Class and included,
"labourers and others- branch labour undefmed" (p.63).
126
Hoppen, "Grammars", p.605.
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pattern of disorder was not necessarily concentrated in areas with large numbers of
Irish immigrants. The West Midlands could claim just 1.4% of its population were
Irish-born yet it experienced the most cases of disorder. The North Western district,
with 6.6%, had the largest Irish population and a high frequency of violent
electioneering, yet the same could not be said for the Northern division. Likewise the
Irish population of the North Midlands reached only 0.8% yet it was the fourth most
disorderly division during the period.

Thus the pattern of disorder can not be

quantitatively linked to the distribution of Irish immigrants, although in the North
Western division it does perhaps account for the scale of violence in 1868, when the
issue of Irish Church reform inflamed Anglo-Irish conflict.
Donald Richter asserts that election violence was a feature of small rural
towns because "it was there that the absence as yet of any effective policing was most
conspicuous" .127

It has been noted already that violence was overwhelmingly

concentrated in large urban constituencies. Yet to what extent did a police presence
influence the outbreak of election violence? Throughout the period borough forces
remained small and in many cases were bolstered by county reinforcements during
elections. The policing of campaigns was a difficult business given the large numbers
of people involved and the lack of sufficient trained constables. In 1876 the borough
of Blackbum had 80 officers to police 76,339 people, Nottingham had 120 police to
86,621 people and Wolverhampton had just 69 police to a population of 68,291. 128
Community policing was still in its infancy during the period and the quality
of recruits was sometimes questionable. David Large writes that "In the eighteenfifties policemen were not infrequently found drunk on duty, failing to carry out all
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their beat, taking naps while on duty [or] idling their time away chatting to ladies of
dubious reputation". 129

William Congreve, Chief Constable of the Staffordshire

Police, in special orders to his force on the eve of the 1868 general election exhorted
his men, "to observe the strictest sobriety, punctuality and attention to orders" .130 In
Hampshire following the general election of 1880 Superintendent Littleton of the
County Police was charged with misconduct after being found, "the worse for liquor
and unfit for duty" .131

In many instances, however the police were merely

outnumbered and unable to prevent crowd violence. At the Harwich borough election
in 1857 a mob destroyed the hustings: "notwithstanding the protection of a large body
of the county constabulary" .132 In such c~ses the local force was supplemented by a
military presence. In Nottingham during the 1865 general election a body of special
constables and regular police were "not deemed sufficient to keep the peace", and
were replaced by a squadron of the 1oth Hussars. In 1868 the Manchester Guardian
reported that during the Newport election in Monmouthshire, "rioters had beaten back
the police before the military was called in". 133 Nevertheless local forces were not
completely ineffectual and where reinforced could prevent the escalation of violence.
It should also be noted that the police were often targeted by election crowds.

Police intervention could also lead to an increase in violence, particularly if rioters
were arrested. In a study of popular disturbance in the Black Country between 1835
and 1860, D.Philips writes that "The forces of authority, clumsily used, may provoke
a crowd and offer it something to unite against, thus turning a disorganised protest
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into a riot". 134 In North Durham in 1874 a constable's use of his baton against a rioter
precipitated a riot in which the prison was attacked and policemen pursued by an
angry mob. Richter himself writes that "Where the police constituted a defensible
force, they attempted to control the rioting as best they could, but in most instances
the crowd attacked them with far greater fury and with more formidable weapons than
they the people". 135 Establishing the role of the police in the incidence of electoral
violence is thus problematic. The figures in Table 14 do not reveal an obvious pattern
between police numbers and electoral disorder. It is possible that an analysis of
police numbers in each borough of each division would provide a different result. Yet
such a task is beyond the scope of this study. Given that in some cases police action
prevented disorder and in other cases inflamed public opinion, it appears likely that an
explanation for election violence based on police presence, or lack of it, is not
plausible.

The distribution of disorder shown in Map 7 reveals that election violence was most
likely to occur in areas where large, urban conurbations coincided with industrial
districts. Large boroughs experienced a greater frequency of disorder because they
occasioned more contests, a vital pre-requisite for election violence. The politics of
small rural constituencies were often more tightly controlled by patron influence or
corruption, thus limiting the opportunity for an open contest. Furthermore small
boroughs were less likely to possess the highly organised party associations more
common in larger constituencies.

Such organizations could act as an engine for

partisan enthusiasm and thus conflict.

Areas with a high density of industrial

employment recorded high levels of disorder possibly due to the concentration of
134
135

Philips, "Riots and Public Order", p.l71.
Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.24.

Chapter IV

175

labour in a single area. There are numerous examples of factories closing early on the
polling day, disgorging into the street crowds of machine operatives keen to enjoy a
half-day within the carnival atmosphere of a contested election. Norman Gash, in
writing of election disorder argued that "In the big industrial towns the poorer class
formed the raw material for mob riots". 136 However the identification of those who
participated in electioneering violence, and their motives for doing so, is a less precise
enterprise and one not revealed by the maps or through statistical analysis.

V

Sprinkled very thinly here and there, you might find a few fighting
men, but the great majority are labourers bent on rough play, and with
nothing else in view than 'a lark' and in far larger numbers you may
count the disreputable idlers who frequent low public-houses and the
corners of dirty streets. As regards this last class, their physical powers
are in direct proportion to their intelligence and sobriety. 137

A survey of those involved in election disturbances is necessarily anecdotal. The
sources available which might be used to compile a profile of participants in crowd
violence do not often provide detailed lists of rioters' occupations, social status, ethnic
or religious background. In many cases individual details were subsumed in favour of
generalised labels such as 'mob', 'crowd' or 'roughs'. However it seems clear that
the majority of election crowds were made up of non-voters; women, children and
men unenfranchised by virtue of their socio-economic status. Participation in such
events was not exclusive though, and there is evidence that voters could and did
become involved in violence. Contemporary descriptions of rioters ranged from the
common to the extraordinary. In Carmarthenshire a number of Conservative 'lambs'
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were led by, "the leading professors of fistiana in the neighbourhood" .138 The Bristol
Daily Post in 1868 commented that "at every Tory gathering which takes place

organised gangs of the flat-nosed, close-cropped genus are found regularly
marshalled, frowning defiance at all who hesitate to bow down before the Blue
rag" .139

Newspaper articles usually provided descriptions of rioters only when

criminal charges had been laid, or when participants were regarded as unusual either
because of their sex or social position. Election petitions, police reports and Home
Office correspondence also provide limited details of the identity of rioters. However
a survey of these sources can provide some insights into the composition of violent
election crowds.

To contemporary observers at least there was no doubting the social make-up of
election 'mobs'. When in 1867 the Bradford Observer wrote, "to whom [do] we owe
it that the fountains of the great deep of ruffianism were, as it seemed, broken up,"
they did not question who had been involved. It was, in their words, "these sons of
Belial, flushed with insolence and beer," or more specifically, "the spume of the inns

°

and pothouses for miles all round". 14

Frequently blame fell on the ubiquitous

'rough', although fistmen, bludgeon-men, lambs and ruffians were all drawn from the
'lower orders' or the 'poorer classes'. Indeed Victorians identified a 'dangerous
class' to whom they attributed much of the violence of the period. This class was
commonly seen as a product of the large, industrial cities which were viewed as
"breeding grounds of both physical and social disorders" .141 John Stevenson writes
that "Violence was the product of a residuum which remained to be brought under the
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ameliorative influences of Victorian philanthropy". 142 Thus disorder was popularly
viewed as the preserve of particular groups such as the Irish or itinerant labourers. In
1868 the Boston Gazette blamed members of "the lower -class" for an attack which
destroyed the hustings, 143 and violence in Staffordshire in 1868 was credited to, "the
lower class of voters, who had been drinking too freely". 144
Historians of English crowd violence have likewise attributed disorder to
specific ethnic or occupational groups. Richter focused on the 'labouring classes' for
whom, "the prospect of happy relief from the dreary responsibility of their pedestrian
lives in a boisterous outburst ... was too appealing to resist". 145 Gash looked to the
'poorer classes' in the industrial cities and in the smaller boroughs, "the England of
the luddites and chartists ... could usually provide the dissolute, the lawless, the
unemployed, the professional bully, to carry out the will of any one with money and
influence". 146 Hanham writes that corruption too was blamed on the residuum in the
big towns, ''where the dregs ofthe population tended to accumulate". 147 Certainly all
such groups were included in reports of election violence. Yet our impression of
Victorian rioters should not be restricted to a 'rabble' of idle and lawless labourers or
malcontent Irish imports. Indeed a surprising cross section of society appeared within
contemporary accounts of disorder.
The involvement of general labourers in election violence was frequently
recorded. Numerous reports of riots included descriptions of navigators or 'navvies'.
These were Irish or Scottish labourers employed to work on the canals and waterways
of England. Their participation in violence seems often to have been organised and
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even bought. In Bristol in 1868 the Tories were accused of hiring "a regular army
of... 'navvies' drawn from the dock works, to spread terror amongst the peaceably
disposed citizens". 148 In Lyme Regis a large number of navvies were brought in from
Axminster during the 1859 borough election to hold up their hands for the
Conservative candidate on the nomination day. 149 And at Shanklin on the Isle of
Wight in 1880 a body of navigators employed at the harbour invaded a Liberal

°

meeting and fought with those present. 15 Colliers, miners. and factory workers were
also notable· participants; in Blackburn it was "the great ruffians of the mills" who
initiated violence. The riotous contribution of factory operatives was recognised by
William Congreve, Chief Constable of Staffordshire, in a letter to the Home Office in
1874.

I might also point out the inexpediency of closing works employing a
large number of hands for the whole or part of the day at such times of
excitement. This was done by several finns on the present occasion,
and was the means of adding largely to the crowds of idle and
disorderly persons. 151

However mob violence was not restricted to unskilled or semi-skilled labourers.
Artisans and tradesmen were included in transcripts of election trials and
investigations. In Ripley in 1868 a moulder and a butcher gave evidence of their
involvement in an electoral riot. A shoemaker from Cambridge was charged with the
manslaughter of a porter from Christ's College after a fatal election disturbance in
1868. Those charged following the vicious riot at Kidderminster in 1857 included, "a
forge man, a mason, a pump-maker, a weaver, a boatman, an umbrella maker, a
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butcher, an innkeeper, several publicans, a railway contractor, a beer-house keeper, a
corn-dealer and a town councillor". 152 The Coventry Weekly Times also described the
crowd that attacked Robert Lowe as consisting of, "numerous tradesmen ... the most
violent appearing to be bricklayers, masons and stonecutters". 153 During the Bristol
riots in 1868 a druggist was charged with inciting a Conservative crowd to violence,
and a large body of working men organised to protect Liberal voters was comprised,
"for the most part of stalwart artisans" .154 In some notable cases members of the
commercial or business class were reported as being prominent in disorder. A young
man charged with breaking windows during the riot in Kidderminster in 1857 was
described as, "apparently in the situation of a clerk, and decently attired", 155 while at
Haverfordwest in 1868 a number of 'roughs' were allegedly, ''urged on by a few
respectably dressed 'men of business"' .156

However the participation of urban

professionals was most likely exceptional.
Though Table 15 failed to show a clear correlation between the distribution of
Irish immigrants and the outbreak of disorder, the Irish were often reported as being
prominent during moments of election violence.

During the period they were

specifically identified as being involved in riots or disturbances in Ashton-underLyne, Blackbum, Bolton, Bradford, Bury, Famworth (S.E.Lancashire), Newport
(loW), Preston, Warrington, Wednesbury, Wigan and York.

This should not be

considered an exhaustive list of Irish involvement in rioting. To this list should be
added any case in which navvies or dock workers were recorded as both groups
included Irish immigrants. The Irish were not always reported as having initiated
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outbursts of violence, and in many cases they found themselves the targets of violent
crowds. Following the close of the poll in Wigan in 1868 a body of Tory colliers
attacked Irish homes and commenced a riot. 157 The defeat of two Conservative
candidates in South East Lancashire in 1880 precipitated similar scenes in which, "the
wearers of the blue ... invaded the Irish district", smashed windows and fought with
the police. 158 Contemporary accounts of crowd violence also recorded the presence of
professional fighters or pugilists. In a number of cases these men headed election
crowds.

In July 1865 the Cheltenham Examiner reported the actions of a

Conservative crowd led by "James Paul, a pugilist, and James Burge, a member of the
same 'honourable fraternity"'. 159 And d~g the Wednesbury borough election in
1868 a "party of prize-fighters" in the Conservative interest fought with the Irish.
Women appear to have been willing and enthusiastic participants in election
violence. Throughout the period both women and children feature consistently in the
records of electoral disorder. Bohstedt writes of female involvement in English riots
between 1790 and 1810, arguing that women were most prominent in food riots yet
were virtually absent from political riots. 160 However by the middle of the century
women were recorded as participating in a number of electoral disturbances. In
Warrington in 1880 a violent election crowd included "a great many Irishwomen and
female factory operatives", while a fisherman who voted for the Tories at Carmarthen
in 1868 was "assaulted by a band of female viragos" .161 In Boston the nomination in
1868 was disrupted by a body of ''women, girls and boys", all of them apparently
from a local factory. 162
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The origins of electoral disturbance were rarely straightforward or obvious. Violence
could be the direct outcome of corruption either as organised intimidation or as the
end product of excessive treating, or it could be the result of popular opposition to a
candidate or his supporters. Isolating the motives of riotous crowds is a largely
speculative process. An election riot could be caused by a number of factors that
might only come to light under sustained local analysis. A comprehensive survey of
all cases of disorder in the sample is obviously beyond the scope of this study.
However Chapter IV includes four case studies which highlight the sometimes
complicated, often parochial nature of electoral disturbance. For the bulk of the
sample there are usually only brief media accounts to rely on or the fmdings of
election petitions. In some cases a motive for violence is suggested while in others no
explanation is given. Thus in Nottingham in 1857 a disturbance was blamed on
Chartists who were "disappointed that their nominee had not been elected"/ 63
whereas in 1865 the only explanation offered by the Times for violence in
Kidderminster was: "Here as usual great excitement prevailed ... this was all that could
be ascertained out of the borough for the mob became riotous (as usual) and smashed
the telegraph wires." 164
Hoppen suggests that "much (my emphasis) of the English election violence of
the period" was related to bribery and corruption. Yet he goes on to suggest that
'letting off steam', "might well be the most accurate description of what went on at
the majority of English elections". 165 Hoppen's comments echo those of Richter who
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suggests that not all cases of election violence were attempts to influence the outcome
of the polling. Rather he suggests that "many of the most serious disorders ... were
spontaneous outbursts of sheer ebullience" .166 Both studies subscribe to the idea that
participation in riots was often pursued merely as a form of working-class
entertainment. Richter writes that "the magnetic attraction of excitement for its own
sake cannot be minimized, especially in an era notoriously deficient in public
amusements". 167 It is certainly true that Victorian elections were popular events and
occupied a position roughly analogous to that of modem sporting events. However
this interpretation of violence strips the phenomenon of any meaning within the
context of electoral politics. What is left is the motiveless, boredom-driven outburst
of an overworked industrial populace.

Such a reading renders irrelevant any

examination of the process of political modernisation in the light of continued election
violence.
Yet the premeditation and organization of many riots in targeting specific
people, places and events suggests that discounting election violence as purely
"enjoyable circuses" is premature. Richter asserts that "For the labouring classes the
prospect of happy relief from the dreary responsibility of their pedestrian lives in a
boisterous outburst for which they would, in all probability, incur no personal
responsibility, was too appealing to resist". 168

Yet the deficiency of public

amusements in the Victorian era is debatable. Various studies of popular recreation
during this period have suggested a gradual improvement in leisure opportunities and
facilities. Peter Bailey writes that growing concern for social order and public health
in the 1830s and 1840s led to the promotion of 'rational recreation' for an
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increasingly industrial and urban population. This movement represented attempts by
the middle class to reform and 'improve' popular modes of recreation for the
'labouring classes'. He writes that "popular recreations were to be improved, not
through repression, but through the operation of superior counter-attractions". 169
Robert Malcolmson may have concluded that the public house was the most important
"recreational centre for the common people," 170 but other alternatives were gradually
becoming available. H.E.Meller writes that in Bristol the provision of public baths,
botanical gardens, tennis courts and football pitches dated from the 1860s,171 and in
Bradford David Russell found that by 1830, "popular recreation ... was taking on a
more 'modem' aspect". 172
During the early Victorian period the working population of Bradford could
choose from a variety of entertainment options including musical performances,
regular travelling theatres and circuses and various village fairs and feasts.

In

addition he argues that "it must be remembered that the public house itself was not
merely a source of drink and company, but acted as a focus for such diverse activities
as music, botany, geology, cricket and bowls". 173 In Blackbum in 1841 the mill
owners Homby and Kensworthy opened a gymnasium for their employees which
"provided for football, tennis, skittles and quoits among other pastimes". 174 The
factory picnic or trip also became increasingly common during the second half of the
century. There is no suggestion that the Victorian working class were spoiled for
choice in terms of leisure time or amusements. And certainly many popular forms of
169
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recreation such as cockfighting, dog fighting, bear baiting and coursing were violent
in nature. In the field of mass entertainment too there was little development until the
advent of organised sport later in the century. Yet as David Russell writes, "there can
be no doubt that the Victorian age saw a massive expansion of recreational
opportunity for a community better endowed in terms of money and free time than
their immediate ancestors". 175
The improvement of recreational choice during the period brings into question
the idea that much of the electoral violence of the period was the product ofboredom.
Indeed the scale of violence at each general election was the product of various
converging influences: great political issues divided communities along lines of race
and religion; contested elections galvanized highly politicised electorates and raised
the temperature of partisan enthusiasm. In addition the inadequacies of both electoral
scrutiny and community policing allowed wealthy candidates and unscrupulous
agents free reign over the stage of electoral politics. Thus ambition and opportunity
increased the likelihood of corruption and with it the spectre of organised intimidation
and violence.

Mid-century elections were public spectacles and popular

entertainment as well as a mechanism for electing parliamentary representatives. The
public casting of votes until 1872, lengthy campaigns, centralised polling and longestablished traditions of bribery and treating further undoubtedly exacerbated the
excitement and ritual of contested elections, and in some places this led to the
outbreak of physical violence.
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The evidence presented in Chapter IV demonstrates the often serious and widespread
nature of mid-Victorian electoral violence. Yet how far are the general trends shown
in the tables, statistics and maps representative of what was occurring within
individual constituencies? A closer examination of the causes of election disorder
provides a means of testing conclusions drawn from quantitative evidence. So the
following case studies allow a close insight into the character of English electoral
culture, and a grass-roots perspective of the complexities that lay behind episodes of
election violence.
The chosen constituencies represent, as far as is possible for such a small
number, the range and diversity that existed within the English and Welsh electoral
systems. Four constituency-types are included in the case studies including: one
small borough, two large boroughs and one county.1 The boroughs are drawn from
mid-western, north-eastern and northern districts of England, while the county is
drawn from the south of Wales. The comparative lack of county violence during the
period accounts for the single county case study, whereas the three English boroughs
represent the most common type of constituency during the period.

The four

constituencies include: the small mid-western borough of Kidderminster; the large
north-eastern borough of Lincoln; the large northern borough of Bradford; and the
sprawling south-coast county of Carmarthenshire.
Kidderminster in Worcestershire was a small proprietary borough with a
population of 15,399 in 1861 and an electorate that numbered just 612 prior to the
Second Reform Act of 1867. In the 1850s Kidderminster was largely reliant on a
1

The boroughs are described as 'small' or 'large' according to the size of their electorates. "Small"
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single, struggling industry: carpet manufacture. The large borough of Lincoln was the
county town of Lincolnshire, with a population of 20,999 (1861) and a pre-1867
electorate of 1,713. During the 1850s and 1860s Lincoln was emerging as a semimanufacturing town in the centre of an agricultural district. The much larger urban
borough of Bradford in Yorkshire was the centre of the English worsted industry and
the global textile trade. In the 1860s the town had a population in excess of 100,000,
and an electorate that leapt from 5,189 to 21,518 as a result of the Second Reform Act
of 1867. Carmarthenshire was the third most populous county in Wales with an 1871
population of 115,710 and an electorate of more than 8,000. Although the county
remained predominantly agricultural during the period, some mineral exploitation
near Llanelly saw the development of a fledgling mining industry.
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Kidderminster

The mob came up, and though Mr.Lowe was bleeding, his white hair
dabbled in blood had no effect on them - they kept pelting him with
cowardly ferocity and the most horrid imprecations.

Worcester Herald, 4 Apri11857. 2

The violent scenes that engulfed the Kidderminster election of 1857 would have
surprised few contemporary Englishmen. This small proprietary borough in the west
of Worcestershire was no stranger to corruption and disorder, and as the election
campaign unfolded the likelihood of violence became a certainty. The contest was
fought between Robert Lowe, the unpopular and aloof Liberal member and Vice
President of the Board of Trade, and William Boycott, a popular local solicitor and
Conservative manufacturer. Arrayed against Lowe were many of the town's nonvoters, disgruntled unemployed and part-time weavers who were victims of the
town's economic depression.

They were as bitter at Lowe's ignorance of their

condition as they were angry at his refusal to treat and bribe them. In the five years
since his election to the borough Lowe had alienated himself from the constituency.
An almost blind albino he had compounded his natural ability for upsetting people

with a complete disregard for the borough he represented, thus when the polling day
dawned on 28 March 1857 all the ingredients were present for the outbreak of serious
violence.

2
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Robert Lowe was not long returned from Australia when in 1852 he was offered the
chance to contest the borough of Kidderminster. During his eight years in Sydney
Lowe had earned a reputation as an eminent lawyer, politician and scholar. He was
prominent in local politics and while a member of the New South Wales Legislative
Council had campaigned successfully for the abolition of imprisonment for debt
(1843) and the establishment of a national school system (1847). He also opposed the
squatters' claims for "land aggrandizement", and through his journal the Atlas lobbied
for responsible government and local control of colonial land. In 1848 he was elected
as a popular candidate for one of Sydney's two seats in the legislative council.
Despite his nomination by the city's tradesmen Lowe was not a champion of working
class political aims. He was opposed to class legislation and manhood suffrage, and
his refusal to support either would win him no friends among his constituents. When
in 1849 he announced his decision to return to England there were few in Sydney who
mourned his departure. 3
Upon his arrival in England Lowe began work as a barrister on the Northern
Circuit and contributed articles to The Times. His eloquence as a critic of Russell's
colonial reforms brought him to the attention of a faction of Whigs opposed to the
government. Through Joseph Parkes, the Whig election agent, they endeavoured to
fmd him a seat in the Commons. In 1852 Lowe was introduced to Lord Ward who,
Parkes knew, "could deliver the liberal vote in the Worcestershire town of
Kidderminster". 4 Ward was a Whig and a large investor in that town's struggling
carpet industry. He was the architect of a recent coalition of Whigs, Radicals and
Tories concerned about corruption and working-class militancy in the borough, and
was searching for a liberal candidate who supported free trade and parliamentary
3
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reform, and who was "not closely associated with either the Palmerston or Russell
factions". 5

Lowe was certainly a free-trade Liberal but he was opposed to

parliamentary reform and the extension of the franchise. On these points of principle
Parkes convinced him to remain silent, at least for the moment, and Ward gave him
his support. On 7 July 1852, despite being a complete stranger to the borough and
pitted against a popular local candidate, Lowe was elected by a majority of 94 votes.
Unfortunately for Lowe his inability to compromise on political principles
would bring him into conflict with his new constituency almost immediately. He was,
as his biographer states, an intelligent man and an eloquent and forceful speaker; he
was also "arrogant and inflexible, he did not bend to meet changing circumstances nor
would he compromise with principle; conciliation was a word unknown to him". 6 It
was only a matter of time before his true political colours were shown. His election
as a popular candidate in Australia was well received by Kidderminster' s Radicals,
yet unknown to them Lowe had refused to assist Sydney's unemployed in their efforts
to obtain welfare from the government. His opinion on the evils of charity would gain
immediate relevance as Kidderminster slid into economic depression. Furthermore
the influence of his patron was far from assured. Ward's interest in borough politics
was not due to his pre-eminence as a territorial magnate, or even his contributions to
the town's carpet mills. His influence rested on a compromise that depended on
Lowe 's ability to please the various elements of the coalition. As such his silence
during the debates on Lord Russell's Reform Bill in 1852 did not go unnoticed by the
Radicals.
In the 1850s Kidderminster was a volatile town with a recent history of class
conflict, corruption and strike-related violence. Indeed at the election of 1841 the
5
6
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Liberal candidate Ricardo Samson reportedly spent £4,000 in one week, an exorbitant
sum, and still lost to Richard Godson (Peelite) - albeit by a paltry twelve votes. 7 In
the 1850s Kidderminster was a small constituency with an electorate that numbered
just over 500 voters in 1857. Carpet weaving, the dominant industry in the borough
since the eighteenth century, was hard hit by an economic downturn during the
Crimean War. The old carpet mills were also facing increasing competition from
mechanised factories in the north. Wages were down and the number of unemployed
weavers was growing. James Winter writes that "the people of Kidderminster were
easily provoked to riot because their livelihoods were dependent on an industry which
was particularly sensitive to any fluctuati~ns in the economy". 8 Violent disturbances
during strike action in 1853 and 1854 underlined the seriousness of the situation.9
The borough's reputation for corruption was the result of a political struggle between
Kidderminster's traditional oligarchy (Conservative) and the emerging elites of the
carpet industry (Liberal).
The compromise engineered by Lord Ward in the 1850s ensured that all but
160 of the borough's 502 voters would support the coalition's candidate. Robert
Lowe's election in 1852 without recourse to corruption undoubtedly put him on a
collision course with those in the borough who were accustomed to receiving electoral
'compensation.'

The town's parlous economic condition, and Lowe's seeming

ignorance of his constituency's plight, only added to an atmosphere of hostility
towards the sitting member. His opposition to the extension of the Factory Act in
1853, which would have reduced the hours of carpet weavers, added to his
unpopularity amongst the town's unenfranchised. Furthermore his failure to give
7
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willingly to local charities also told against him. In 1855 the Mayor's relief fund was
keeping more than 200 families from starvation, yet applications to Lowe for
assistance were met with miserly donations and lectures on the futility of charity and
welfare. 10 In 1855 Lowe's appointment as Vice President of the Board of Trade
created a by-election in K.idderminster, and he was opposed by William Boycott, a
local Conservative solicitor.

Boycott's candidacy revealed frrst hand Lowe's

unpopularity with the unemployed weavers. Violence was avoided only after Boycott
withdrew from the contest, presumably due to the strength of Lord Ward's coalition.
Lowe was elected unopposed but the signs were ominous for the peace of future
elections.

William Boycott opposed Lowe again in 1857 and his election campaign skilfully
exploited the sitting member's weaknesses.

He gave generously to charities,

addressed issues of local importance such as the price of bread and unemployment,
and used his position as Alderman on the town council to criticise the Whig-Tory
compromise that kept Lowe in power.

Throughout the campaign he played on

Lowe's unpopularity and contributed to a considerable amount of popular antipathy
towards him. Lowe's local standing was further handicapped by his association with
his patron and James Pardoe, the local Liberal leader. Lord Ward was a large investor
in the town's newest carpet mills, and the power looms of his factories required fewer
employees, while Pardoe was the manager of the town's largest carpet factory and
head of the Liberal association in K.idderminster.

He was also the chairman of

Lowe' s election campaign and the man who nominated him. His factory survived the
depression and competition from mechanised mills by reducing wages. Consequently

10
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Lowe's principal supporters included two men who had contributed to both
Kidderminster's unemployment level and the reduction of wages. It would not be
exaggerating to say that on the eve of the election the Liberal camp included some of
the town's most unpopular personalities.
For his part Lowe continued to blunder through the campaign. His election
addresses ignored local issues and concentrated on Palmerston's foreign policy
towards China. Indeed his only concession to the issue of unemployment was to
recommend an increase in the flow of emigrants to Australia, hardly a suggestion
calculated to improve his popularity!

He was opposed by the town's publicans

because he had refused to support their petition in 1855 for an extension to the
Sunday trading hours. As a result, during the campaign the majority of
Kidderminster's 150 public houses became focal centres for Boycott supporters.
Furthermore his cross-party support had effectively ended the lucrative practice of
treating in the borough. His unwillingness to play the part of 'beer lobbyist' earned
him a dangerous enemy in the publicans.

His biographer A.P .Martin

characteristically blamed the beer interest for much ofLowe's unpopularity.

Further it may be remembered Lowe had opposed some Beer Bill in
the House, while his pointed remarks on the malt tax and the brewing
interest were not likely to be forgotten at election time in a borough
blessed with such a superfluity of pothouses. 11

Lowe's public addresses failed to improve his position. At one noisy election meeting
he lost his temper and called the crowd 'children' for not allowing him to speak. A
local lawyer later commented that "the employment of the term 'children' towards the
electors was calculated to irritate and annoy them and to excite the feelings of the

11
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populace against that gentleman". 12 At the nomination an estimated crowd of 5,000
people chanted cries of 'children, children' at the sitting member and nothing could be
heard beyond the hustings. This was probably just as well for Lowe chose this
opportunity to reveal that he had been offered £16,000 in expenses to contest the
borough of Manchester. His motives in explaining this offer, and his refusal to accept
it, may have been calculated to demonstrate his loyalty to K.idderminster. Yet the
arrogance with which he addressed the issue, as reported by the press, seemed rather
to suggest that he could do without the borough if he so chose. At any rate the crowd
were spared the details as "the uproar continued so great that the right honourable
gentleman was compelled to desist" .13 The show of hands was overwhelmingly in
favour of Boycott, and a poll was demanded on behalf of Lowe for the following day.

In anticipation of disorder the Mayor had earlier added seventy 'special constables' to
the regular borough force of twenty, and their presence was almost immediately
required, for several fights broke out as the nomination ended and more occurred as
the evening progressed. That night there was an attack on the Swan Inn after it was
rumoured that Lowe's supporters were holding several voters there against their
wi11. 14 As the election day dawned there must have been few in the town who
believed that the polling would pass off quietly.

The polling day was fixed for a Saturday and the polling was relatively peaceful until
the mills closed at two o'clock. Up to that time there had been little confrontation
between voters and the unenfranchised, and only a small crowd was gathered around
the principal polling booth on Blake-way Green. Once the factories shut, however,
the crowd began to swell until an estimated 6,000 people surrounded the hustings.
12
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The Manchester Guardian reported that if a voter was known to be a Liberal, "the
mob assailed him with groans and execrations, spat upon him, kicked and cuffed him,
and subjected him to the most dastardly ill-usage." 15 Robert Lowe remained inside
the polling booth for the entire day, whereas William Boycott visited periodically to
loud cheers of support. The Whig-Tory-Radical compromise held firm, though, andwhen the result was made known at four o'clock Lowe was declared victorious by 88
votes.
The already volatile situation rapidly deteriorated and soon the mob began to
pelt the polling booth with stones and pieces of brick. Boycott and his supporters
allegedly offered Lowe and his committee safe passage through the crowd but they
refused, ostensibly because they believed the disturbance was organised. 16 Amid
cries of "throw them out", "kill the pink-eye" and "pitch the ------- out", 17 Boycott
stood on the hustings and urged the crowd to disperse. He was ignored and soon after
left the hustings and walked through the mob unharmed. The Manchester Guardian
reported that the departure of Boycott and his supporters ''was a signal to the cowards
surrounding the booth, and instantly missiles of every description, stones, brickbats,
pailings and even penny pieces, were thrown at Mr .Lowe and his friends" .18

It soon became apparent that the polling booth was too dangerous a refuge.
Those police constables and 'specials' still inside formed a ring around Lowe and his
friends and they attempted to escort him through the mob.

Their progress was

followed by a shower of stones, so that after just one hundred metres all were injured
in some way. Their passage forward was blocked and they were forced to take shelter
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in the home of Reverend Sheppard, principal ofthe town's Grammar School. A local
newspaper commented on what had awaited the group further down the road.

In the street called the Battery, a deep hollow way through which

Mr.Lowe and his friends were to pass, heaps of stones were piled on
the terrace, which would have done fearful execution. Water was kept
boiling, and sinister expressions left but little doubt of the horrible use
to which it was to be put; and buckets of filthy liquid had been
accumulated to be discharged on the passengers below. 19

Once inside the house Lowe was found to have sustained a fractured skull and serious
bruising. Few of his supporters had escaped unhurt. Outside, the mob turned on the
policemen and those 'specials' who had not already fled. A constable named Jewkes
was dragged into the house "in a state of insensibility" / 0 and he later died in hospital
of his injuries. Shortly afterwards the mob decided that their prey had escaped to the
Albert Inn and they "defiled into the town, amusing themselves by the way with
occasionally smashing windows, insulting every well-dressed person they met, and
lustily yelling 'Boycott for ever! "'21 Robert Lowe was smuggled out of town at
eleven o'clock just as another disturbance threatened in front of the Lion Hotel. A
body of fifty hussars from Birmingham arrived, however, and after the Mayor read
the Riot Act the crowd were eventually dispersed, but not before smashing more
windows and attacking any Liberals brave enough to show their faces.

The local newspapers provided full, and often conflicting, accounts of the rioting and
of the trial that followed.

The Coventry Weekly Times reported that Boycott's

supporters had offered Lowe their assistance in leaving the polling booth, whereas the
Worcester Herald wrote that Boycott had left the area despite being requested to stay
19
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and calm the mob.

The Herald quoted the Conservative candidate as saying,

"Mr.Lowe and his friends might take care ofthemselves".22 There was also confusion
over the involvement of certain prominent townspeople. Two of William Boycott's
principal supporters, Alfred Talbot and Henry Chellingworth, were prosecuted for
their role in the violence. Talbot was charged with leading a mob to the hustings and
urging them to riot. The prosecution accused him of bringing to the hustings a crowd
of people, "of different appearance to the carpet weavers". 23 Several witnesses also
testified that· they had heard Talbot say "go it lads" prior to the mob stoning the
polling booth. Paradoxically, he was also later reported as being present with Lowe
when he was stoned by the very crowd he was supposed to have incited. He also
contributed £50 to a fund that was established to prosecute those arrested for attacking
Lowe.
Chellingworth was similarly charged with inciting the crowd. During the trial
a witness testified that he had laughed at the violence and had commented, "let
everyone have a taste". 24 His sympathy with the rioters may have been due to his
involvement in corrupt practices, as he was a local contact for the Conservative chief
whip and had been involved in organising votes. In 1859 William Jolliffe wrote of
Conservative chances in Kidderminster that "Mr.Chellingworth says Mr.Huddleston
can get in for £500". 25 However the evidence against both men was circumstantial
and based on conflicting testimony. The charges were eventually dismissed for lack
of evidence.

Indeed most of those charged with riotous offences escaped with

suspended sentences after witnesses refused to come forward. James Winter writes
that "Witnesses against Boycott's associates were, in some cases, jeered at in the
22
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streets, threatened and beaten up, and when the case came to trial, the prosecutors
discovered that they had insufficient evidence to make a case"?6 The list of warrants
issued for participation in the riot included a wide cross-section of the town's
population, including some who were presumably voters. Those prosecuted included
2 forge-men, 2 masons, 2 weavers, 2 innkeepers, a pump-maker, a boatman, an
umbrella maker, a butcher, a railway contractor and several town councillors. There
were also reports of large numbers of bricklayers and carpenters involved in the
fighting. Women were also prominent; one witness stated that "there were many
women there who had collected stones in their aprons, in the corners of their shawls,
and in baskets". 27
Blame for the riot has been variously apportioned. Lowe's contemporary
biographer laid responsibility for the violence at the feet of those who wished to
return the borough to its corrupt past. He argued that the mob disliked Lowe because
he had deprived them of "all the fierce excitement of an uncertain and hotly contested
fight, during which some thousands of pounds would be spent in their midst". 28 He
also blamed the introduction of a mob hired for the purpose of starting trouble. There
is certainly evidence to suggest that this occurred. Many townspeople commented on
seeing strangers in the borough on the polling day, some with cards in their hats.
Reverend Sheppard remarked that "the great majority of the men immediately
assailing Mr.Lowe and his friends were not from Kidderminster". 29 While it is
possible that this was an attempt to protect the town's reputation, the result of the
polling suggests that some voters at least may have been intimidated.

Lowe's

supporters had certainly expected a larger majority at the polls. It is likely that the
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violence of the mob deterred some voters from polling. Lowe himself seems to have
favoured this interpretation of events, not least because it absolved him of any
personal responsibility in provoking the riot. When in 1859 he declined to contest the
borough due to an adverse canvass, he blamed the forces of corruption, "Even to the
Tories and the parsons it can be no source of permanent gratification to see the town
fall back into the slough in which it had been for so many years wallowing when we
pulled it out". 30
John Winter has described the riot in Kidderminster as an example of 'class
conflict.'

He writes that the stones which fell on Lowe's head ''were painful

reminders that the latent power of demos was beginning to awaken inside as well as
outside Great Britain". 31

Certainly Lowe's association with the town's factory

managers and his patron made him a target for working-class frustrations, and yet he
was frequently singled out by the mob for special attention despite the presence of
James Pardoe in the crowd. This, as well as the personal taunts and abuse hurled at
Lowe, suggest that personality as well as class conflict was at the core of the
disturbance.

The events in Kidderminster in 1857 reveal the complex interplay of personalities and
issues that characterised small borough elections in the mid-Victorian period. The
contest demonstrated the predominance of local concerns over national political
issues: Lowe's focus on Palmerston's foreign policy and his unwillingness to engage
adequately with local issues therefore lost him popular support. His ignorance of the
town's needs and his impatience in dealing with the subtleties of constituency
electioneering alienated him from the bulk of Kidderminster's population. His seat
30
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was never in any danger as long as the Whig-Tory-Radical coalition remained unified.
Yet the violence of the mob demonstrated the danger that politicians faced by
ignoring the unenfranchised and their allies. Lowe's reduced majority reflected the
power of the rioters to influence the outcome of the election, and although the popular
candidate failed to be elected the results highlighted the weakness of Lord Ward's
coalition in the face of popular pressure. Lowe recognised as much in the wake of the
coalition's demise in 1859. In a letter outlining his retirement from the borough after
the Conservatives decided to promote their own candidate, Lowe wrote, "I never for a
moment doubted Lord Ward's goodwill ... unfortunately his power is not equal to it". 32
Ultimately the violence in 1857 was the result of a combination of economic,
social and political factors. In the popular mind Lowe had failed his constituency by
ignoring the extent of its economic difficulties - his alliance with the employers of the
town's carpet factories did nothing to improve his standing amongst the working men
and the unemployed. He further alienated himself from powerful interests in the
borough, who then worked hard to campaign against him. It is impossible to know
whether part of the mob were hired to create a disturbance, although it is likely that
any outside involvement only added to the scale of the violence.

The extent of

popular resentment towards Lowe and his principal supporters, and the borough's past
history of disorder, meant that violence was always likely to occur. And given the
ferocity of the mob it was fortunate for Lowe that he managed to escape with his life.
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Lincoln

The Polling - Commenced at eight o'clock on Wednesday
morning ... The 'fair and legitimate influence,' so frequently alluded to
by the Liberals during the contest, had, during the past week, been
exercised in a most extraordinary manner, many cases of gross
intimidation and open bribery having been brought to our notice.

Lincolnshire Chronicle, 14 July 1865. 33

Lincoln city elections during the mid-nineteenth century were remarkably disorderly
even by the standards of the period. Violence and a disregard for civic authority seem
to have been perennial features of Lincoln elections, and serious rioting occurred
there in 1847, 1852, 1862, 1865, 1868, 1874 and 1880. The riots that followed the
by-election of 1862 and the general election three years later in 1865 therefore form
part of an established pattern of disorder in this ancient borough. Radical non-electors
were the principal and repeat offenders in Lincoln.

In 1847 drunken radical

supporters of Charles Seely (Radical) kidnapped voters on the eve ofthe poll, in 1852
a radical mob stormed the election headquarters of G.F .Heneage (Whig), and in 1865
they attacked the hotel of the defeated Tory

candidate J.Bramley Moore and

attempted to set frre to its doors. The violence of these years reflected the growing
strength of radical opinion in Lincoln after 1850, and was the result of conflict
between the town's established political hierarchy and an emerging commercial class
of reformers and Dissenters.
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In 1861 Lincoln had a population of just over 20,000 and an electorate of 1,713.
Despite being the county town and the venue for the annual assizes, the borough had
little influence over Lincolnshire politics. No member for the borough had ever been
elected to a county seat and no county interest intruded on borough politics. Lincoln
was an ancient cathedral town and as the seat of a bishopric the influence of the clergy
was strong in the borough. Both the gentry and the clergy supported the Tories who
were established in the borough's first seat. Conservative domination in the borough
was also the product of bribery. Colonel Sibthorp, the eccentric Tory member for
Lincoln between 1835 and 1856 was said to have retained his seat through extensive
treating. Prior to 1865 the Whigs held the city's second seat through a combination of
support from Conservatives and the majority ofthe £10 householders created in 1832.
However the mostly lower middle-class householders were likely to support Liberal
or Radical candidates as they became available, and by the early 1850s they were
becoming increasingly impatient with the Whig-dominated Liberal Association. The
borough's 690 resident freemen were also an important equation in Lincoln elections
as their politics were largely determined by pecuniary considerations. The Great
Reform Act of 1832 removed about 1,000 non-resident freemen from the borough, as
well as introducing the £10 householder franchise.

The changes increased the

electorate from 1,233 to 1,713 voters, but failed to improve the tone of electioneering
in the borough.

The resident freemen remained and proved as venal as their

disfranchised cousins. 34
Political conflict in Lincoln coincided with the city's economic development.
Though still an important market town for the surrounding countryside, in the 1840s
Lincoln was emerging as a significant industrial centre. In 1842 the iron foundry of
34
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Clayton and Shuttleworth opened and in 1846 the Midland Railway connected
Lincoln to Nottingham and the rest of the country. Only a decade later the borough
was described by a countryman as having become a "semi-manufacturing town in the
centre of an agricultural district". 35 As Lincoln's manufacturing industry grew so did
the political aspirations of a new generation of commercial men. These newcomers
included maltsters, ironmasters and corn merchants, many of whom were Dissenters,
and were commonly Liberal or Radical. They found themselves in competition for
local leadership with the Whigs and Tories who had combined in the 1840s over
defence of the corn laws. The political divide in Lincoln, between the Whig-Tory
element and the Liberal-Radicals was a bitter one, and between 1832 and 1884 only
three borough elections went uncontested. The Radicals were unable, however, to
make much progress in borough politics due to the strength of the Whig-Tory
compromise. It was not until 1868 that the Liberals were able to capture both seats,
and that was largely due to the fact that the Conservatives failed to field a candidate,
after years of control of one seat.

In the 1840s and 1850s, therefore, on both the town council and in borough
politics the established Whig-Tory compromise faced an emerging Liberal-Radical
challenge. The municipal divisions of the city were divided between the Whigs and
Tories, who controlled the upper and middle wards, and the radicals who held the
lower wards. These political alignments were reflected in the borough elections, and
it was often the case that parliamentary battles were really extensions of municipal
conflicts. In 1847 the borough election was declared void after a petition uncovered
widespread treating and bribery. This petition marked the only occasion between
1832 and 1884 that an election result was disputed in Lincoln, and it demonstrates
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both the strength of the liberal split in the borough and the nexus between municipal
and parliamentary politics.
The 1847 election was a four-way contest between the incumbent Tory
members Colonel Sibthorp and William Collett, and two Liberals E.G.B.Lytton
(Whig) and Charles Seely (Radical). Sibthorp was an old fashioned Tory and a strong
advocate of the agricultural interest. Collett was a banker, a railway investor and the
owner of a slate mine in Ireland. Both men were elected in 1841 when feeling ran
high over the corn laws, and it would prove the only time that the Conservatives
would capture both borough seats. Lytton was a Whig in the reforming interest who
had been Member for Lincoln between 1832 and 183 7. While originally in favour of
the corn laws his changing views on free trade did not endear him to the Tories. In
1847 his position was weakened further by his support of the new Poor Law. Lytton's
principal supporter was William Rudgard, an influential local maltster and a former
Mayor of Lincoln. Rudgard was an opponent of Seely's on the Town Council and the
two had clashed repeatedly, most recently over sewerage reform. Charles Seely, who
was Mayor of Lincoln in 1840, had emerged as the borough's leading radical in the
early 1840s. He was the son of a London baker and a partner in a local corn merchant
and miller firm. A wealthy, arrogant man who doggedly pursued a borough seat, Hill
writes that in his determination to be elected he "made no attempts at conciliation; he
quarrelled with the Whigs, and even his friends regarded him as selflsh". 36 When he
took over the mayoralty in 1840 he snubbed Rudgard's retirement dinner.

As

opponents on the town council Seely and Rudgard transferred their political enmity to
the parliamentary contest.
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Ultimately Sibthorp was returned at the head of the poll, and Seely was elected
ahead of Lytton and Collett. In the victory procession that followed drunken radical
supporters dragged an effigy of Rudgard through the streets of the city. A petition
was soon brought forward against Seely on the grounds that voters had been treated
and bribed, and Rudgard was prominent amongst the petitioners. Lincoln city was no
stranger to electoral corruption.

Certainly no political party held the moral high

ground during elections, and borough campaigns were frequently characterised by
allegations of corruption levelled by one side against the other. However cooler heads
commonly prevailed before a petition was brought forward, as it would not do to have
the borough investigated and possibly disfranchised. Given, therefore, that corruption
was not a recent phenomenon in the borough, and that no petitions had previously
been presented, it is hard not to judge that personal animosity informed the 1847
election petition. Seely and Rudgard's political quarrel on the town council had thus
spilled into the parliamentary arena, resulting in the very dangerous presentation of an
official inquiry into Lincoln electioneering. The borough was not disfranchised, but
Charles Seely was unseated and the investigating committee concluded that "a system
of treating has for a long time prevailed in the city ofLincoln". 37
The evidence uncovered by the election petition does provide an interesting
insight into the mechanics of mid-century electoral corruption. It appears that on the
polling day Seely's agents were involved in offering meals and drinks to willing
supporters.

A witness, who was a freemen voter, described how he and several

friends were met at the train station by two men named Emmerson and Gresham.
They were then conveyed to the Black Goats Inn and treated to a drink and a meal.
The committee inquired as to what followed,
37
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After drinking there some time do you remember going up to the poll?
-Yes.
Who .did you poll for? -For Sibthorp and Seely
At the time that you went up to poll from the Black Goats, did your
friends from Bramston go with you?- We all went together; four ofus.
Did anyone take you up to the poll? - Emmerson and Gresham went
into the polling booth with us. 38

These particular voters were subsequently taken to the George and Dragon where they
were treated to porter and ale and two glasses of rum each. The following day they
returned to the city to receive 18s each. A number of freemen voters also testified
that they were treated at the Black Goats Inn. The process of corruption, at least in
Lincoln, appears to have been an organised and disciplined affair. From the public
house to the polling booth voters were shadowed by electoral agents who scrutinised
their vote and then 'compensated' them accordingly. Even more surprising is that the
bribes were not expected to ensure a plumper for Seely, as his agents equally provided
treats to those who split their vote between Sibthorp and Seely. This arrangement
likely suited Seely because neither Lytton nor Collett benefited. It does, however,
reveal how desperate he was to be elected; something he failed to do in 1847 as his
election was declared void due to bribery.

As in Kidderminster, election violence in Lincoln owed more to local conflicts than to
national pressures. Indeed R.J.Olney writes that Lincoln was "not easily influenced
by reports of agitation in London and the provincial capitals". 39 Violence in Lincoln
was the product of local tensions and local antagonisms. The by-election of 1862 was
the result of a decision by the sitting member, G.F.Heneage (Whig), to contest the
Lincolnshire borough of Grimsby. Incidentally his move there proved disastrous as
he was both defeated and caught in the middle of a serious riot. Lincoln's vacant seat
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was contested by J.Bramley Moore (Conservative) and J.Hinde Palmer (Liberal).
Palmer, a local barrister, was the popular candidate as he supported both the ballot
and the extension of the franchise. He was supported by the iron foundry interest of
Clayton and Shuttleworth, which gave him the backing of the town's radical nonelectors but little else. Moore was a Liverpool merchant and ship owner. He was a
staunch Tory and could count on the support of the borough's gentry and clergy. His
election committee also included William Rudgard who had previously backed the
Whig candidate Lytton. Moore was an unpopular candidate, possibly because he was
a stranger to the borough, and his campaign was marred by allegations that he had
profited from slavery.

His denials obviously proved unconvincing and at the

nomination, "Mr Bramley Moore was met with groans and hooting". 40
Given the borough's record of electoral disorder it is little wonder that city
authorities viewed the pending contest with apprehension. In early February a public
petition was presented to the Lincoln magistrates seeking an assurance that
precautions would be taken regarding the election. The Mayor of Lincoln, John
Torry, promptly wrote to the Home Secretary to "secure the attendance of a
detachment of the military, or of an efficient body of Police Constables ... on the day
appointed for the election". 41 Subsequently a force of some 100 constables from the
County Police were drafted into the borough for election duty. They bolstered the
borough force which numbered just 23 men, yet their presence was ultimately to
prove both a blessing and a curse.
The election was a close-run event and Moore defeated Palmer by just 25
votes, precisely the number accredited to Rudgard's influence. In the wake of the
declaration a crowd gathered outside Moore's election headquarters and began
40
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breaking windows and assaulting the police. When the city Police intervened they
were stoned and those who were arrested were promptly rescued by the crowd. The
County Police were brought up and ordered to clear the streets, though no attempt was
made to read the Riot Act. Apparently they were excessively rough in the execution
of their orders, and many complaints were lodged about the degree of force used by
the 'rurals'. A local newspaper described the riot in which "several persons were
struck severely over their heads and bodies by the police, .. and many of the police
were much injured. Many women and children who had congregated around the
Guildhall were thrown down and trampled upon by the mob".

42

The involvement and behaviour of the County Police in the borough were
deeply resented by the townspeople, and their departure from the town the following
day signalled a resumption of the violence.

This time the Mayor's house was

attacked, apparently in retaliation for ordering the County Police into the city.
Curiously the rioters were polite enough to allow the Mayor's wife and children time
to leave the house before they "commenced breaking the windows with stones and
bludgeons, and before they were satisfied that they had done a sufficient amount of
damage scarcely a whole pane of glass was left in the house". 43 At length the military
were summoned but they arrived only after the rioters had dispersed.

Colonel

Amcotts, the High Sheriff, anticipated further rioting and wrote to the Home Secretary
that "a vindictive spirit has been awakened amongst the [rioters] ... and reliable
information has been received that they intend to use violence to attack the home and
perhaps the life ofthe ChiefConstable". 44
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Both the Mayor and the Chief Constable of Lincolnshire were later to blame
the escalation of violence on the rioters' resentment of the County Police. However
that may have just been an excuse for further rioting. At any rate the political bias of
the perpetrators was obvious. The houses of Charles Ward and William Marshall
were attacked, and both men were supporters of Moore. William Rudgard's house
was also targeted though the crowd were prevented from reaching there. It is likely
that many of the rioters were employees of the various iron foundries,: the
involvement of Clayton and Shuttleworth in the riots being particularly overt. They
were stopped in the street by the High Sheriff during the riot, and warned that they
would be held responsible for any pe~onal injuries inflicted by the crowds.45
Whatever their degree of complicity in the violence they were responsible for ending
the rampage. A local newspaper reported that the rioters were met on the road by
"members ofMr.Palmer's committee", which included Shuttleworth, who "addressed
the excited throng [and] drew them away from any further mischief in that locality". 46
These allegations of bias and. involvement in the riots by the iron foundries were
discounted by the ironmaster John Ruston at a public meeting following the election.
Certainly the extent of control that the ironmasters had over the mob is questionable,
as during the riot Palmer's committee rooms were also attacked.

The Lincoln ·crowds would not have to wait long for another opportunity to riot. The
General Election of 1865 proved an unwelcome case of deja vu for the city. In a
repetition of events in 1862 the Mayor's house was attacked and Moore found himself
again besieged in his hotel by an angry crowd. The Liberals were in a strong position
in the months leading up to the election. The borough's two sitting members Charles
45
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Seely (Radical) and Moore (Conservative) stood in defence of their seats, and the
Liberals brought in a second candidate in the person of E.Heneage (Whig). The
Conservatives did not field a second candidate. Heneage's·father had been a member
for Lincoln between 1852 and 1862. He favoured liberal solutions to the question of
church rates and the extension of the franchise, and stood as a supporter of
Palmerston. 47

Rioting was anticipated and the new Mayor of Lincoln, Richard

Harvey, organised a detachment of Kings Hussars to be pre~ent in the borough. This
decision instantly made him unpopular with the radical rioters, and both Seely and
Heneage later denounced the presence of the military as an insult to the city.
On the polling day voting was brisk at the borough's eight booths. The
foundries were closed and the Lincolnshire Chronicle described how "the streets were
filled with ardent admirers of the several candidates, the Radical section becoming in
the course of the afternoon, so excited that the tradesmen of the city took the wise
precaution of closing their establishments". 48 Amid allegations that the Liberals had
bribed and intimidated voters, Moore failed to retain his seat, being defeated by 105
votes. Seely was elected at the head of the poll, closely followed by Heneage. At the
declaration Seely described the attendance of the soldiers as "an unnecessary act on
the part of the Mayor". 49 Heneage complimented the crowd on their good behaviour
and then called on them "to show by not kicking up a row that they did not require
any soldiers to keep them in order". 50 His speech was greeted with loud cheers and
laughter, but that evening a serious riot broke out and a great deal of damage was
done. The rioters, who were mostly radical non-electors tried to set fire to the doors
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ofMoore's hote1. 51 This time the Riot Act was read and the soldiers were called out
to restore order. In a letter to the Home Secretary after the election Richard Harvey
lamented the mob's propensity for violence.

In the election of 1862 the then Mayor John Torry's authority was
disregarded, his house partially demolished and he himself had to seek
safety by flight, and I the Mayor of 1865 have had my house injured, and
my windows smashed, and but for the timely arrival of the military I do
not doubt but that it would have been gutted and personal violence
afforded to myself and family. 52

Although the troops proved more restrained than the County Police in 1862, their
conduct was also called into question. Heneage accused the Captain in charge of the
Hussars of allowing "a parcel of drunken [soldiers] to galop (sic) on the footpath and
indiscriminately cut at everyone". 53

There was obviously some truth to these

allegations as Harvey himself had been concerned for the soldiers' sobriety. He even
visited their inn at four o'clock on the morning after their arrival to prevent any sale
of liquor to them. He told the Home Office that he remained there until nine o'clock,
"so that I might be sure they would enter the Barracks, and be placed without
interruption, under the immediate command of their own Officers". 54 The basis for
Seely and Heneage's criticisms of the Mayor are difficult to discern. There was little
likelihood that Seely and Harvey had opposed each other on the town council. Both
men were municipal reformers and had voted together over the adoption of the Local
Government Act of 1858.55 Perhaps they realised that the presence of the military had
provoked the anger of the parochial Lincoln crowds. At any event Harvey' s response
to the allegations that he had acted improperly was to ask the Home Office to
51
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establish an impartial inquiry into the riots. However there is no record that such a
commission was ever established, and ultimately the Lincoln magistrates upheld his
actions. 5 6
The advent of Reform in 1867 and the triumph of Liberalism at the 1868
General Election failed to curb the riotous instincts of Lincoln's radicals. In 1866 the
prospect that Gladstone's reform bill would raise the borough electorate to 1,377, of
which 62% would be working class, cheered the radicals into believing they could
throw off the Whigs for good. 57 However the defeat of Gladstone's government, in
which the Whig E.Heneage played a part, resulted in public protests and a widening
of divisions between Whigs and Radicals. In 1867 a Tory government passed the
Second Reform Act and the borough electorate rose to 4,157. It was obvious that
working-class voters would now dominate the constituency. Both Seely and Heneage
were put forward by the Liberal Association in 1868, although the inclusion of the
latter upset the new voters. Large public meetings were organised at which Palmer
was endorsed as a popular candidate. In the confusion surrounding which Liberal
candidate would be officially supported Heneage withdrew from the contest. The
Conservatives failed to field a candidate for the first time, perhaps in recognition of
the fact that the power of the clergy and gentry was likely to be swamped by a tide of
working class voters. Seely and Palmer were therefore elected unopposed, only the
second such outcome in the borough since 1832. The election of 1868 must certainly
have been one of the purest elections in the borough's recent history. The new
working class voters had effected the defeat of the Whigs without recourse to their
newly found privilege of voting.
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Palmer himself knew nothing of his election until it was thrust upon him. He
had been nominated in absentia and was elected without being aware that he was even
in the running.

He found himself Member for Lincoln. without contest, without

expense and without consultation. 58 The election of two Radical members resulted in
celebrations that soon led to disorder. Hill writes that "a vast crowd occupied the
centre of the city for hours, and lighted tar barrels rolled about for two nights, the
police office and the chief constable's house were wrecked". 59 The Boston Gazette
reported the cost of the riot as in excess of £300; £200 for damage and £100 for the
hire of special constables. 60 Similar scenes followed the elections of 1874 and 1880.
The military and borough police were called out in both cases to restore order. In
1874 the riots were likely sparked by Seely's victory over Palmer, the former having
made himself unpopular with the working class in a dispute with the iron foundry. 61
In 1880 both Seely and Palmer were returned amid allegations that the Liberals had

resorted to bribery.

If the K.idderminster case study highlights the frailty of a patron's influence and the
fury of the unenfranchised mob, then the Lincoln study reveals the complexities that
underlay the outbreak of election disorder and the continued relevance of corruption
in mid-Victorian electioneering. Both case studies demonstrate the parochial nature
of constituency politics and both reveal the dangers that politicians faced by ignoring
the sensitivities of non-voters.

Whereas in K.idderminster violence was directly

related to personality and local economic concerns, in Lincoln violence was the
outcome of partisan conflict, corruption and public resentment of authority. The
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Lincoln mob's predisposition towards violence was the result of political frustration
and militant parochialism. Radical non-electors were mobilised to violence through
political impotency in the face of the Whig-Tory compromise. Furthermore Lincoln's
geographic remoteness was compounded by a developing industrial character that
alienated it from the surrounding rural countryside.

This sense of isolation was

manifest in the violent resentment of outside interference in borough affairs. Not for
nothing were the County Police in 1862 derisorily termed "nrrals". Thus the Lincoln
case study affirms the view of mid-century English elections as being largely framed
within a local context and little influenced by national political issues, characterised
by local and personal antagonisms, occasionally disorderly and even violent, and
retaining a propensity for corruption and the exercise of influence.
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Bradford

A considerable number of people were very much hurt; pieces of iron
were thrown about that were very sharp in the points, and a good many
people were cut in the faces, and one man had his eye cut out.

Bradford by-electi~n riot, 1869. 62

Bradford was an archetypal industrial city of Victorian England.

During the

nineteenth-century rapid economic growth in this West Riding borough had
transformed a previously small provincial town into a sprawling urban metropolis.
By the middle of the century Bradford's adoption of mechanised fabric manufacture
had placed it at the head of the English wool industry, and at the centre of the global
textile trade. Between 1801 and 1861 Bradford's population increased from 13,264 to
103,778, and the borough electorate grew from 1,139 in 1832 to 21,518 in 1868. In
the 1850s Bradford was regarded as the national centre of religious dissent, and the
city could boast the third highest urban population of Nonconformists in the
country. 63 As in many other boom towns of industrial England politics in the borough
were largely dominated by men of entrepreneurial zeal and wealth; the champions of
the new liberal economic zeitgeist.
And yet Bradford was no stranger to electoral malpractice, and borough
electors faced similar types of 'extra-political' pressures brought to bear upon the
Lincoln and Kidderminster voters. Even after 1867 Bradford's electoral managers
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continued to supplement newer forms of political organization with more traditional
means of persuasion.

Corruption and undue influence were common in borough

elections, and no Bradfordian contest was complete without the liberal flow of free
beer from the city's numerous public-houses. In 1867 and 1869 violence in the
borough was linked to the re-emergence of local sectarian conflict and to the
disintegration of a mid-century political consensus.

In the 1850s·Bradford was dominated by a political equilibrium that united moderate

Liberals, Radicals and free-trade Tories under the banner of progressive bourgeois
liberalism. Edward West, the Mayor of Bradford in 1868, described the state of party
politics thus: "We are a Radical constituency, we are not Whigs and Tories; it is
merely a division among the Liberals. The Conservative element, of course, is there
to aid the one side or the other, whichever they choose". 64 This consensus was made
possible by the economic prosperity of the 1850s, and a softening of the ChurchChapel confrontation of the 1840s. Despite the strong presence of working-class
Radicalism in the borough a, "Tory-Whig-Liberal Moderate element discouraged the
election of Advanced Radicals". 65 This political consensus normally ensured that
Bradford's two parliamentary seats were shared by a 'near-Tory' and a moderate
Radical. A consequence of this arrangement was the lack of contested elections:
between 1851 and 1865 only 2 out of 6 parliamentary elections went to the polls, in
1852 and 1859. The 1852 general election exemplified the mid-century consensus,
with the borough electorate divided between a Whig-Liberal, Richard Milligan, and a
free-trade Tory, Henry Wickham. The sitting Radical member, T.P.Thompson, lost
his seat after Catholic voters deserted him over his support of the Ecclesiastical Titles
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bill. Milligan was elected at the head of the poll with Wickham 107 votes behind.
Despite standing as a Conservative, Wickham's free-trade credentials and defence of
the First Reform Bill gained him vital moderate Liberal support.

He defeated

Thompson by just six votes, and went on to hold the seat until his death in 1867.
Yet even amidst the apparent congeniality of Bradford borough politics there
was still room for more direct methods of electoral coercion. Edward West told the
Hartington Committee in 1869 that treating was notorious in the borough and that "it
has been the usual practice in all elections". 66 Both municipal and parliamentary
elections were open to corrupt practices. Samuel Storey, a stuff merchant and town
councillor, told the Hartington Committee that at Bradford municipal elections, "there
were the usual meetings at public houses, and beer more or less given out in the way
of refreshments". 67

Both Edward West and Samuel Storey's evidence to the

Committee provides an interesting insight into contemporary perceptions of electoral
corruption and electoral law.

Storey condemned what he saw as an increase in

bribery and treating after 1867, urging that the law be amended to ensure that
corruption at municipal elections carried the same penalties as at parliamentary
elections. He stated that bribes had been paid at the 1868 municipal election with a
view to influencing the parliamentary contest.

I believe that the municipal election was largely used as a means of
influencing the Parliamentary election which had to take place a
fortnight afterwards; there is a general feeling that they can do
anything at the municipal elections; they can bribe or treat and are not
responsible for anything of that sort. 68
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Mayor West, however, believed that the law which dealt with treating was "almost
too severe", and remarked that "I do not think that [treating] has been viewed as
corruption in days gone by". 69 His comments reflected contemporary public opinion
of those suspected of electoral malpractice.

Prosecutions and convictions for

corruption were relatively rare as electoral offences were often viewed as only mild
infractions of the law. West testified that legal action against corrupt practices was
uncommon in Bradford because "public opinion will not support a man in prosecuting
anybody for conduct of that description". 70
l11timidation was a well-established practice in Bradford by the late 1860s, and
few contests passed off without some allegations of undue influence being exercised
over the vulnerable part of the electorate.

Samuel Storey believed that a "very

intimidating influence" was brought to bear upon the borough's factory workers by,
"overlookers and foremen in the various establishments". 71 However the workingclass voters and the unenfranchised were not without their own weapon of influence;
the shop boycott. Edward West stated that small shopkeepers and tradesmen suffered
as badly as factory employees. He testified that they, "have more need of protection
than the lower class; our working men are very independent, and generally speaking,
they are quite independent of their masters". 72
Bradford was certainly no stranger to electoral violence or working-class
agitation during the nineteenth century. There were serious riots at the 1835 and 1841
general elections, and the borough was a regional centre of Chartist activity in the
1840s. However by 1850 the economic prosperity that paved the way for Bradford's
political consensus had contributed to the easing of class conflict.
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subsequently became less likely to engender the bitterness of the 1830s, and the
occurrence of only two contested elections between 1850 and 1867 further lessened
the likelihood of serious violence. The disorder that attended the elections of 1867
and 1869 thus marks the period at which the mid-century consensus began to fail.
The late 1860s witnessed the re-emergence of sectarian conflict between
Anglicans and Dissenters. The efforts of the Liberation Society further fuelled the
bitterness of the Church-Chapel confrontation, and the resulting polarisation of party
politics signalled the end of the liberal consensus. This period witnessed the gradual
cohesion ofBradford Conservatism, with the formation of the Conservative Working
Man's Association in 1866 and the Conse~ative Association in 1867.73 The Second
Reform Act further contributed to the weakening of the consensus. Post-1867 the
borough electorate was increased from 5,189 to 21,518.

This massive increase

represented the enfranchisement of a large number of working-class voters. The
Bradford Liberals reorganised themselves to meet the demands of this new electoral
environment. Various local Liberal organizations such as the Registration Society,
the Reform Union and the Reform League were subsequently replaced by the new
Liberal Electoral Association, formed in January 1868. The immediate effect of these
changes was the destabilisation of Liberalism in the borough. The moderates rejected
the radicalism of the new organization, and there were divisions over labour
representation and education reform. 74 Thus the bitter election contests of the late
1860s reflected the changes occurring in Bradford politics.

The Bradford by-election of 1867 was caused by the death of the Conservative
member, H.W.Wickham. The election preceded the introduction of the franchise
73
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provisions of the Second Reform Act and was thus the last in the borough to take
place under the conditions set in 1832. The electorate numbered 5,189 and was
distributed across the borough's thirteen wards. The contest, which revealed the new
division in Bradford politics, was fought between an Anglican brewer and a
Dissenting anti-drink campaigner. M.W.Thompson, a Whig-Moderate Liberal, strong
supporter of the Church of England and the city's chief brewer, stood against Edward
Miall, a dissenting anti-drink Radical, leading figure in the disestablishment
movement and founder of the Liberation Society.

Thompson was a local

manufacturer who had been Mayor of Bradford in 1862 and 1863. He was supported
by, "Tories, Anglicans, Methodists who disliked Miall, Moderate Liberals and old
Whigs and naturally other brewers, publicans and many others who disliked the idea
of anti-drink legislation". 75 Miall was a stranger to the borough having contested
Southwark in 1845, Halifax in 1847 and Banbury in 1859.76 In a borough with a long
tradition of treating it is little wonder that Miall was popularly described as
representing the "kill-joy" party.

Significant political differences between the

candidates were few, as they both supported free-trade, parliamentary reform and vote
by secret ballot. The main points of contention were therefore religion and drink
legislation. Thompson was in France during the campaign and was nominated in his
absence by Samuel Storey.
There is some evidence that a disturbance was feared at the nomination day.
The Leeds Mercury reported a request by Miall's committee to change the site of the
nomination due to a preponderance of stones in the area that might, "be turned to evil
account in the event of a tumult". 77 However their request came too late and the
ceremony went ahead in its original location. An estimated 70,000 people attended
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the nomination, and while such a figure was almost cetiainly an exaggeration there is
little doubt that an enormous crowd gathered near the hustings. Party placards soon
became targets for violence, and what began as sporadic fighting between the
'Miallites' and 'Thompsonites' rapidly degenerated into, "a perfect state of riot and
stone-throwing". 78 The show of hands was abandoned due to the disturbance and a
poll was declared for the following day. However any hope that peace would be
maintained was lost when the polling day began in much the same way that the
nomination day had ended: voters were pelted with mud as they approached the
polling booths and at one stage, "the mob separated into two hostile parties, and began
to chase each other"?9 Miall's central co~ittee-room was attacked by a large crowd
armed with stones and lumps of coal. The Nonconformist blamed the riot on roughs,
"devoted to the brewing interest", and described the scene inside Miall's committeeroom where, "large stones and broken glass were flying about the rooms, which were
crowded by Mr.Miall's supporters, and many were cut and bruised both in the face
and hands". 80 The borough police eventually managed to contain the mob and several
people were arrested for rioting. At the declaration of the poll a reserve of 60 police
armed with cutlasses were held in readiness. There was, however, no repeat of the
previous day's violence.
Thompson was elected by the modest majority of 403 votes, and his opponents
immediately claimed it as a victory for the drink interest.

The Nonconformist

commented bitterly on what it described as "the Beer-Barrel Triumph",

The friends ofMr.Miall fought well and bravely; but against the crowd
of influences with which they had to contend - against the unholy
alliance of faithless Liberals, Tories, Church parsons, publicans, bigots
78
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and fanatics, their efforts were in vain. 81

However, such a view of Miall's defeat carries the obvious bias of a newspaper
owned and edited by the defeated candidate. There is little doubt that public-houses
were opened during the election and that beer was distributed in the form of treating.
Furthermore Thompson's ownership of some 150 public-houses in the city gave
added weight to the accusations of treating levelled against him. Yet Jack Reynolds
argues that in attributing his loss entirely to the drink interest, Miall's supporters
ignored those, "who saw the vote for Thompson as a vote against the sanctimonious
kill-joy party". 82 Miall's radical politics and militant disestablishment ideals likely
helped align Bradford's Moderate Liberals and Tories against him.

The General Election of 1868 proved that the politics of coercion could still exercise
an influence over an enlarged electorate. In 1867 Bradford's electorate was increased
four-fold from 5,189 to 21,518, and while the electoral conditions were new, the
response of the electoral managers was not. Jack Reynolds writes that ''Nobody was
certain how the new electorate would vote; neither side was prepared to leave the test
entirely to the democratic decision of individuals, preferring to support the new
system with some of the more traditional practices of English electioneering". 83 The
local manufacturer Thompson retired in 1868 and the general election shaped as a
three-way battle between the sitting member, W.E.Forster (Liberal), Edward Miall
(Advanced Liberal) and Henry Ripley (Independent Liberal). Ultimately, however,
the contest would prove a two-way battle between Miall and Ripley, as Forster's high
profile virtually guaranteed his seat.
81

Ibid.
Reynolds, The Great Paternalist, p.219.
83
Ibid., p.330.

82

Both Miall and Forster could rely on the

Chapter V

223

assistance of the new Liberal Electoral Association, while Miall's support continued
to rest mainly with the Nonconformists.

H.W.Ripley, a local manufacturer who

owned a dyeing factory, and had been brought up as a dissenter, had by 1858 moved
to the Anglican Church, and by 1874 was regarded as virtually a member of the
Conservative party. He was never very popular in Bradford, and in 1864 he had
offended working-class opinion by inviting Lord Palmerston to open the city's new
Wool Exchange. His supporters included some Liberals, and Anglican and Methodist
Tories.
The campaign proved the high point of Bradford corruption in the nineteenth
century. The borough was virtually awash in free beer distributed from more than
300 public-houses across the city. Henry Ripley's greatest political asset was his
purse, and during the election he spent over £7,000 on drinks for 'committee-men' in
hundreds of public-houses. More surprising is that Miall and Forster too spent more
than £3,000 between them at 62 public-houses, despite the anti-drink sentiments of
the former. 84 Reflecting the fact that the business of electoral politics could not yet be
seriously pursued without recourse to such practices, and that political principle had
still to triumph over the realities of constituency electioneering. Violence during the
election was restricted to an isolated incident in the Irish quarter of the borough
where, "rioters were throwing stones through the windows of certain houses". 85 Jack
Reynolds describes the first election in Bradford after the passage of the Second
Reform Act,

The election campaign in fact had been in the best traditions of
Eatanswill with plenty of refreshment in the various inns and public
houses used by the candidates ... the conduct of a number of Forster's
committee men was criticised, but the misdemeanour of Ripley' s
84
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men ... had been not only excessive but blatant. 86

Amidst allegations of treating and intimidation by both sides W.E.Forster was elected
at the head of the poll.

However in a shock to the efforts of the new Liberal

organization Ripley defeated Miall by 579 votes. Reynolds argues that the Radical
loss proved that Bradford's Tories were not a spent force in local politics, and when
pushed could align themselves with Moderate Liberals and Whigs to reject the
Radicals. However the influence of corruption cannot be overlooked. It appeared
that Ripley's 'committee-men' had been somewhat heavy-handed in their approach to
canvassing, especially among the working-class Irish. A petition was lodged against
Ripley's election and he was unseated on the grounds that "in one ward of the said
borough, inhabited principally by Irishmen of the working class, large numbers were
influenced by corrupt practices". 87 Furthermore the reversed election result in 1869,
when both sides agreed not to use public-houses for committee-rooms, suggests that
treating was successful in swaying at least part of the electorate.

The by-election caused by Ripley's disqualification was held in March 1869. This
contest proved a mirror image of the by-election of 1867. Edward Miall faced the
former member Thompson, who returned to the borough as an independent Liberal.
Miall was absent during the campaign, and violence attended the nomination of
candidates. There was a considerable amount of bad feeling between the two parties
as a result of the 1868 election and petition. However the Nonconformist reported
that "an understanding was drawn up and signed by both sides, pledging them to the
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use of none but honest means". 88 Whether it was the effect of this agreement, or the
fear of another petition, there was an almost complete absence of corruption or
treating in 1869. Edward West commented that the contest was, "as pure an election
as could possibly be; there were very few public-houses engaged". 89 Whereas the
polling day was peaceful, as in 1867 the nomination again resulted in a serious riot.
The likelihood of violence at the show of hands was increased when, several days
beforehand, the decision was made to close the mills between 11 and 1 o'clock on the
nomination day. The resulting crowd was described by the Manchester Guardian as
being, "the largest that ever assembled on a similar occasion". 90 Thompson was
accompanied to the hustings by Henry Ripley, who received an enthusiastic welcome,

Mr.Ripley was greeted with imitations of cockcrowing and shouts of
"who bought the game cock?" and one facetious individual
displayed ... a well-executed representation of a game cock. It may be
remembered that one of Mr.Ripley's supporters was said to have
endeavoured to bribe a voter by purchasing a game fowl belonging to
him for a large sum. The display was hailed with boisterous laughter
and hooting. 91

As the speeches began a Mr.Mumford, one of Thompson's supporters, was seen
signalling to the crowd to move forward. A general rush towards the hustings then
took place and a scene of 'frightful confusion' ensued. Mumford continued to signal
to the crowd until the Mayor told him to stop, adding "You are the worst of them
all". 92 A general disturbance then erupted amongst the crowd, ''between some men
carrying boards; they broke the boards in pieces and armed themselves ... and
immediately commenced a riot". 93
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Mayor resumed the speeches. However, no sooner had Thompson come forward to
speak than a more serious riot erupted and the entire proceedings were abandoned.
The Manchester Guardian reported that "numbers· of men and women were
knocked down by the stones. One poor woman, who found herself in the centre of a
large ring, was made a target of by a number of ruffians, and received severe cuts on
the head and face". 94 The Mayor attempted to restore order but the hustings came
under fire from the mob and it was soon deserted. The police intervened but were
unable to contain the crowd which soon, "streamed in vast numbers into the town, and
the state of things was so alarming that the shopkeepers ... closed their shops". 95 The
violence appeared to have been begun with Thompson's supporters, who were
accused of bringing stones with them to the nomination. Later in the day the Mayor
issued a notice that police reinforcements from Leeds and Wakefield would be present
druing the polling. The polling day, however, proved the quietest in recent history.
The Nonconformist reported that "there was scarcely a drunken man to be seen in the
town during the day, and no public-house whatever was engaged on Mr.Miall's side,
and very few were engaged on the other side". 96 In what was hailed as a victory for
Radicalism, Miall was elected by 1,437 votes. Furthermore the Irish electors were
reported as polling almost entirely for the Radical candidate. The large margin of
victory in 1869, and the reversal of Miall's fortunes, certainly suggest that the
influence of corruption and intimidation in 1868 had been substantial.

The violence displayed at the Bradford elections of 1867 and 1869 fits the pattern
established in the previous case studies: all three boroughs reflect the willingness of
party elites to supplement political organisation with electoral coercion, and
94

Manchester Guardian, 2 March 1869, p.3.
Ibid.
96
Nonconformist, 17 March 1869, p.249.
95

Chapter V

227

demonstrate the seriousness of English election violence. In addition, the polarisation
of borough politics and the weakening of the mid-century consensus were due to local
rifts in political and religious opinion, and not to the intrusion of national party
politics.

The incidence of violence in Bradford does, however, appear more

spontaneous than in Kidderminster or Lincoln. The outbreak of disturbances during
the nomination was more related to the large gathering of people that attended than to
any form of organised intimidation.

And given that Bradford's public-houses

provided free beer to any and all who declared themselves 'committee-men', and that
borough nominations regularly attracted enormous crowds of shouting, placardwaving partisans, the chances of violence were always going to be high. Yet it is the
similarities between these three constituencies, and not the differences, that are most
striking. Despite the differences in size and character, Bradford fails to provide a
clear contrast to the politics of a semi-rural borough like Lincoln or a small
manufacturing town like Kidderminster. It is also interesting to note that disorder
involving the Irish played such a small part in Bradford in 1868, when serious antiMurphy riots occurred just 30 kilometres away in Ashton and Stalybridge. It is likely
that the numerical majority of Dissent, and the weakness of inter-party conflict helped
Bradford weather the storm of Irish Church disestablishment.
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V

Carmarthenshire

In Carmarthen, as in most polling places, the shops were closed,

business suspended, and the town put on its holiday attire. Guildhall
Square was filled by an excited concourse of persons ... Every window
was occupied by the fair sex, who not only watched the progress of
events ... but also were not backward in displaying their colours.

Carmarthenshire county election, 1868. 97

The excitement displayed in Carmarthen on the day of the 1868 county election
reflected not only the anticipation of a close contest, but the first contest to be held in
the constituency for 31 years. Not since 1837, when Colonel Trevor (Conservative)
and John Jones (Conservative) were elected ahead of Sir J.Williams (Liberal), had the
voters of this south-Wales county had an opportunity to exercise their franchise. For
a generation before 1868 leading Whig and Tory families had engineered a consensus
that usually ensured the uncontested return of two Conservatives. Indeed since 1857
David Pugh and David Jones (both Conservatives) had been returned unopposed. The
four-way contest in 1868, between two Conservatives, an Independent Liberal and a
Radical, thus represented a spectacular break with Carmarthenshire's traditional
political arrangement. The contest also reflected in many ways the changes that were
taking place in Welsh politics during the period: the election represented the first
serious challenge to the Carmarthenshire aristocracy by Liberal nonconformity; the
return of a Liberal and a Conservative revealed both the new electoral power of
dissent, and the continued strength of aristocratic influence; and Carmarthenshire was
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at the centre of allegations regarding evictions by Tory landlords, an occurrence
which had a profound impact on Welsh social and political consciousness in the years
after 1868.

Carmarthenshire was no stranger to election disorder during the nineteenth-century.
In An Anglican Aristocracy Matthew Cragoe writes that between 1832 and 1895,
"Carmarthenshire elections were frequently marked by outbreaks of violence",98 and
cites examples of disorder in 1837, 1868, 1880 and 1886.99 With the exception of
1874, this list includes all contested elections in the county between 1837 and 1886.
Thus Carmarthenshire reflects the general pattern of electoral violence - the years of
disturbance being exactly coterminous with the years in which an election contest
occurred.

Events during the General Election of 1868 confirm the county's

propensity for violent contests: a Liberal election meeting in Llanelly concluded with
an attack on the Conservative committee-rooms; and both the borough and county
polling days were disrupted by fighting between rival partisans.

Indeed

Carmarthenshire's previous election contest in 1837 had resulted in violence during
which a local magistrate was, "thrown through the window of a public house". 100
The 1868 election was always likely to engender some degree of excitement.
The county contest was precipitated by a local Conservative split, the campaign was
dominated by the emotive issue of Irish Church disestablishment and the Liberal
nonconformists, aided by the electoral increases of the Second Reform Act and the
efforts of the Liberation Society, were mobilised and organised on a scale sufficient to
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threaten the political status quo. Both sides were active in preparing for the contest
and reports of landlord coercion and chapel influence fought for prominence in the
local newspapers. The Carmarthen Journal modestly described the contest as likely
to be "a close one".

Whereas Wales has a rich history of popular disturbance, from food riots in the
eighteenth-century to the Rebecca Riots in the late 1830s, only rarely did such
disorder translate into election violence.

Indeed throughout the period Welsh

elections produced little in the way of serious disorder. Between 1857 and 1880
violent electioneering in the Principality was limited to two episodes in 1865 and
eight in 1868. The lack of disorder can be accounted for by the low incidence of
contested elections in Wales before 1868. At the general elections of 1857 and 1859
only four constituencies out of a total of 28 actually went to the polls. The high
number of uncontested elections reflected the strength of consensus politics and the
electoral influence of the landed elite. The concentration of electoral violence in
Wales during the 1860s was the product of a convergence of social, political and
religious tensions.

It was during this period that the latent forces of Welsh

nationalism, popular radicalism and religious dissent emerged to challenge the social
and political hegemony of the Welsh aristocracy.

The scale of violence in

Carmarthenshire 101 is therefore comparatively atypical of the Welsh electoral
experience during the Victorian period, given that the county experienced two
outbreaks of disorder while most constituencies in either England or Wales failed to
record multiple episodes of election violence.
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Between the First and Second Reform Acts Welsh political representation was
dominated by a ruling aristocracy. Land ownership, and thus social and political
influence, was concentrated in the hands of a small Anglican oligarchy increasingly
alienated from the bulk of the population by language, religion and politics. Welsh
members of parliament were drawn from the nobility and gentry; their seats
guaranteed by restrictive franchises and the exercise of landlord influence. However
from the beginning of the nineteenth-century protestant nonconformity emerged to
challenge the Anglican aristocracy's domination of politics and society.

Dissent

proved a popular movement in Wales because of its emphasis on the Welsh language
and culture.

By 1851 nonconformist chapels attracted roughly 80% of Welsh

religious attendance, 102 and dissent had come to, "create a fundamental line of
division within Welsh life". 103
In politics the Welsh nonconformists drew on their links with English dissent

and popular radicalism. Throughout the period dissenting campaigns against church
rates, tithes and burial laws were being increasingly linked with, "a more general
programme of radical protest."104 The dissenting challenge to aristocratic authority
thus evolved from a campaign for purely religious freedoms, to one of national and
political recognition. And while the dissenters took the Tories as their natural enemy,
they were equally opposed to the Whigs because, as Hanham writes, "on ecclesiastical
questions both parties [Tory and Whig] voted together". 105 The Second Reform Act
of 1867 further consolidated the rise of political nonconformity. The growth of the
electorate coincided with an effective registration programme coordinated by the
Liberation Society. From the 1850s the spread of Society branches across Wales
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provided the dissenters with, "an intelligible political creed and an efficient
machinery". 106 In addition the enlargement ofthe electorate placed the dissenters in a
nominal majority for the frrst time. The increase of voters in 1867-8, and advances in
registration and organization during the 1860s, provided the nonconformists with, "a
unique opportunity to disturb the political balance of centuries" .107

Carmarthenshire was a sprawling rural constituency on the south-west coast of Wales.
Agriculture was the dominant industry in the county, which stretched for 935 square
miles from the heaths and moor land of the north-east to the pastoral farms of the
western hinterland. The county town of Carmarthen remained the most important
regional centre during the period, although Llanelly on the south-east coast was
growing in prominence due to the exploitation of mineral resources. The united
boroughs of Cannarthen and Llanelly returned one member to parliament.
Carmarthenshire was predominantly Welsh-speaking and with a population of
115,710 in 1871 it was the third most populous county in Wales behind Glamorgan
and Monmouthshire. The Second Reform Act effectively doubled the size of the
county electorate to 8,026. County politics were dominated by large landowning
families, the greatest of these being the Cawdors and the Dynevors. Earl Cawdor,
head of the largest estate in west Wales and the leader of the Conservatives in
Carmarthenshire, exercised a controlling interest over one of the county seats. In
1868 his withdrawal of support for the sitting member, David Pugh, led to the rupture
of the county consensus and the capture of one seat by the Liberals.
The Carmarthenshire contest of 1868 developed as the result of Conservative
disarray and Liberal opportunism. In the months prior to the election considerable
106
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doubt was held for the chances of the two sitting Conservative members, David Pugh
and David Jones. Support for Pugh amongst traditional Tory voters had waned due to
his increasingly Liberal views, while Jones was thought to be too ill to stand again.
During his ftrst period as a county member between 1857 and 1868 David Pugh had
stood as a Liberal-Conservative.

He took an independent position on religious

questions and voted against Church rates. In 1868 he refused to pledge himself over
the Irish Church issue. His intransigence cost him Earl Cawdor' s support and the
Conservative 'party' ticket. Two new Conservative candidates were rumoured to be
coming forward in the event that the sitting members failed to stand: Henry Puxley, a
rich Irish Tory, and Lord Emlyn, son of Earl Cawdor. Puxley owned estates in
Ireland and had large copper mining interests. He held a series of election meetings in
1868 and is described by Cragoe as being the popular candidate.
Amid the Conservative disarray the Liberals decided to bring forward
E.J.Sartoris, a landowner with radical sympathies.

Sartoris owned land in

Carmarthenshire but lived in Hampshire. Though a stranger to the constituency he
was supported by an efficient registration network and, "the ultimate canvassing
network in the shape of the chapels". 108 The contest emerged thus: David Jones stood
down but transferred his interest to his brother John Jones; David Pugh stood for reelection "on 'independent' principles"/ 09 Lord Emlyn declined to contest the election;
Henry Puxley stood as a Conservative in the Cawdor interest; and E.J.Sartoris stood
as a Liberal.
During the campaign Puxley proved the most popular candidate. He gave
almost as many speeches as Sartoris and was loudly cheered at a succession of
agricultural dinners and Conservative party meetings. By comparison both Pugh and
108
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Jones campaigned less vigorously, with few speeches from either candidate. Sartoris,
conducted an efficient campaign during which he out-spoke and out-spent his rivals.
Conservative fears that the vote would be split were realised when Sartoris headed the
poll with 3,280 votes, ahead of I ones with 2,942. Puxley was beaten into third place
by just 114 votes. At the bottom of the poll with 1,340 votes was Pugh, whose
presence had likely cost the Conservatives a seat. Liberal attention to the registration
of voters after 1867 largely contributed to Sartoris'. victory in 1868.

In

Carmarthenshire the Liberal nonconformists were able to add some 1, 700 voters to
the register in the months prior to the election. Puxley recognised as much when he
blamed his defeat on, "the defective registration of 500 or 600 Conservative
voters". 110 The influence of the dissenting clergy in the Liberal interest cannot be
underestimated. On the polling day the Carmarthen Journal reported that "Dissenting
ministers all over the county had converted themselves into electioneering agents for
the Radical candidate" .111

Violence at the Carmarthenshire county election in 1868 was preceded, and in fact
precipitated, by violence at the borough contest. During that campaign Radical rioters
were blamed for disorder. The first report of violence was recorded after an election
meeting in Llanelly. The Liberal candidate for the borough, Colonel Stepney, had
been attending a political meeting with the county candidate, E.J.Sartoris, when "a
great tumult and rioting took place" .112 The Carmarthen Journal wrote that the
Conservative committee-rooms at the Thomas' Arms had been attacked by a crowd
allegedly incited by Stepney. It was claimed that he had contributed to the disorder
by directing the crowd towards the hotel. The scale of the disorder was no doubt
uo The Times, 28 November 1868, p.3.
Carmarthen Journal, 27 November 1868, p.3.
uz Ibid., 6 November 1868, p.5.
111

Chapter V

235

exaggerated as the damage only amounted to a few broken windows. This mild form
of election excess gave way to more serious disorder on the borough polling day. In
Carmarthen Radical partisans were again blamed for violenee.

Many of the Conservative voters were chased around the town and
roughly handled, and not even the recognised claims of the tenderer
sex to freedom from insult could secure their protection ... one poor
fisherman, who dared to vote for the British Constitution, was
assaulted by a band of female viragos, incited by a number of Radical
myrmidons, and beaten and scratched in the face. 113

Several instances of assault were reported and the Carmarthen Journal concluded
with the statement: "One good thing

h~

been accomplished by the Election this

week; it has taught the people of Carmarthen that Radicalism has not yet renounced
its love for physical force" .114
The actions of the mob left a good deal of ill-will in the county after the
borough contest, and there were rumours that a disturbance would occur during the
county election. The Carmarthen Journal reported that Conservative workmen, "felt
sorely aggrieved by the treatment they [had] received at the hands of the Radical mob
on the previous Tuesday" .115 As a result they had formed an organised body to
protect themselves during the county election. Cragoe writes that the possibility of
disorder was taken seriously by the Carmarthen authorities.

There was some

disagreement as to the best location for the polling booths as, "The Liberals favoured
the Shire Hall, but the Conservatives feared that the approaches were too narrow, and
that the mob which would inevitably gather would prevent 'timid voters' from casting
their votes". 116

The Carmarthen Weekly Reporter wrote that a large number of

strangers had entered the borough, and that a great deal of excitement was building in
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all the polling districts. These strangers may have been part of a body organised by
Henry Puxley, whose committee, "engaged a number of 'lambs', including the
leading professors of 'fistiana' in the neighbourhood". 11?

These men wore red

armbands and on the polling day organised themselves in front of the Town Hall.
Several fights broke out during the day, between Conservative and Radical
supporters, and at two o'clock fighting led to "signs of a general melee". 118 However
no serious outbreak of violence was reported.

There were rumours of a riot at

Llanelly, though this was later proved to be an exaggeration and that the extent of the
damage was that one man had been assaulted.

The General Election of 1868 has been described as a 'national awakening' in Wales,
a moment of triumph for Welsh nationalism and Liberal nonconformity. 119 Certainly
in some constituencies the political change was dramatic: in Cardiganshire the
V aughan family interest failed to prevent the election of an industrialist and
nonconformist, E.M.Richards; in Merthyr Tydfil Henry Richard, a leading figure in
the Liberation Society, was returned ahead of the Anglican magistrate and Home
Secretary H.A.Bruce; and in Carmarthenshire a 30-year old pattern of political
representation was broken with the election of the Liberal E.J.Sartoris at the head of
the poll. Across Wales the Liberals extended their 1865 majority with the capture of
23 seats, while the Conservatives lost ground with 10 seats. Yet while the election
signalled an important break with the past, the returns did not represent a solid victory
for Liberal nonconformity. Almost without exception the 23 Liberals elected were
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Whigs, and only 3 out of 33 Welsh members were active dissenters. 120 Rather than
being a moment of national and political triumph, the General Election of 1868 may
better be seen as straddling the period of change from one style of politics to another
The Carmarthenshire county contest of 1868 was a notable break with the
past. The election of a Liberal, and a stranger, to the county represented the growing
significance of issues over personalities, and the importance party organisation over
local influence. The election signalled the beginning of the end for interest-based
politics, and heralded the emergence of a more nationally oriented, party-based
politics. However, John Jones's election reflected the continued relevance of local
connections and landlord influence.

Much has been written of the political evictions

by Tory landlords that followed the Liberal victory in 1868. Yet Cragoe argues that
genuine examples of eviction were most likely less frequent than either side alleged.
In Cannarthenshire at least there is evidence that what the Liberals lacked in the way
of landlord-tenant influence, they made up for in chapel influence. Mob intimidation
seems unlikely to have played a significant role in either the borough or county
election.

Indeed the episodes of disorder that accompanied the Carmarthenshire

elections of 1868 were, by contemporary British standards, relatively muted: the
disturbance at the borough election amounted to the assault of a number of
Conservative voters, while the county contest was disrupted by a number of mild
collisions between Radical and Conservative partisans.
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The violent scenes depicted in the case studies represent only a small cross-section of
mid-Victorian electoral disorder. A considerable number of riots and disturbances,
many on a greater scale than those included here, are not discussed in detail. For
example in 1868 alone a woman was killed in Newport, Monmouthshire when
soldiers charged a riotous election crowd, a 63 year-old man was killed in front of the
hustings during a riot in North Durham, pitched battles involving hundreds attended
elections in Staffordshire and Shropshire, and in Preston, Lancashire a disturbance
after the contest resulted in one man being shot in the neck (he did, however,
survive!). In addition there were serious episodes of violence in election years not
mentioned, particularly in 1880. The episodes of violence described here, and the
catalogue of disorder outlined in Chapter N, reveal that throughout the period
English and Welsh elections could provoke serious, and sustained, outbursts of crowd
violence. The case studies therefore demonstrate that electoral violence was not a
spent force in English politics during the mid-to-late Victorian period, and the scale of
disorder described here goes well beyond that of broken windows and fractured
kneecaps.

Compared to the general patterns of violence established in Chapter N, the
constituencies examined here provide relatively atypical examples of election
violence. As Table 13 (p.167) shows most English and Welsh constituencies were
unlikely to produce more than one case of electoral disorder during the period. Yet
Lincoln elections were violent five times between 1857 and 1880, Carmarthenshire
elections ended in violence twice in 1868 and 1880, Bradford elections were violent
in 1867 and 1869, and Kidderminster produced electoral disorder in 1857 and again in
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1865. However this does not lessen their value as case studies. While they are
atypical in the pattern of recurrent violence, they are typical in revealing the dynamics
of electoral violence within the framework of constituency politics. And what is most
striking about the case studies are the similarities they exhibit.
The case studies reflect the continuing role of violence at elections in the postreform era, and demonstrate both its complexity and seriousness. In contrast to
Richter and Hoppen's suggestions that violence reflected a 'simple love of disorder'
or the 'letting off of steam', these brief outlines of Victorian electoral culture reveal
the multi-layered nature of election disorder. Rather than limiting the cause of crowd
violence to a straightforward cash transaction, drunkenness or boredom (or
combinations of such), we should recognise these events as phenomena that reflect
the intricacies of local politics. In Kidderminster the events of 1857 highlight the
complex interplay of personalities and issues that led to violence. The riot did not
develop out of the carnival atmosphere of the campaign, or as the outcome of a bored
populace seeking entertainment. It is highly likely that at least part of the crowd that
attacked Robert Lowe was organised for the purpose. However, it is also clear that
the townspeople had genuine grievances relating to their member's attitude towards
them. Lowe's failure to engage adequately with local concerns and local issues cost
him dearly. In a borough with a history of class conflict and crowd violence, and at a

time when wages were being squeezed and hundreds living on charity, Lowe's
seeming ambivalence towards his constituents set him on a collision course with an
angry populace.
In Lincoln election violence owed as much to popular resentment of civic

authority as it did to radical frustration. A fierce parochialism informed the Lincoln
riots: in 1862 the introduction of a county force to police a by-election led to an attack
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on the Mayor's residence; and when in 1865 the military were summoned to assist the
borough force, serious rioting again occurred. However, party conflict was at the core
of violence in Lincoln: it was a Conservative candidate's hotel room that was
repeatedly targeted by rioters.

Contemporary reports identified employees of the

town's iron foundries as being prominent in the disturbances. As radical non-electors
their participation in the riots may have been the result of frustration at the political
dominance of the Tory candidate and member, Bramley Moore.
The Carmarthenshire election of 1868 proved somewhat different from those
in Kidderminster, Lincoln and Bradford; the election of E.J.Sartoris in the face of
local aristocratic opposition represented a triumph of organisation over influence, and
of issues over personalities. And yet the similarities between the electoral cultures of
all four constituencies are still striking.

Electioneering in Carmarthenshire was

punctuated by much the same scenes of disorder as in England, and the outbreak of
violence, as elsewhere, reflected the strength of local partisan rivalries. What limited
election violence there was in Carmarthenshire during the mid-Victorian period grew
out of party conflict and organised intimidation; Conservative voters and supporters
were 'chased around the town' by radical partisans during the borough election, then
retaliated during the county contest by organising a 'mob' of their own.

The constituency analyses presented here demonstrate that the diffusion of political
principle after 1832 was not a rapid process. In contrast to Phillips and Wetherell's
conclusion that "[after 1832] political principle defined in national terms by the
parties in Westminster took the place of the local, factional and idiosyncratic concerns
that had dominated England's unreformed political system", electioneering in Lincoln
and Kidderminster during the mid-Victorian period reflected the continued
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importance of local issues, local identities and local conflicts, without demonstrating
much evidence of the adoption of a nationally-oriented politics of principle. Even the
Cannarthenshire election of 1868, elements of which foreshadowed the emergence of
a national, party based politics, still reflected the importance of local connections and
landlord influence. Indeed national issues intruded not as the dominant force in these
constituencies, but as one factor among many.

And in the outbreak of electoral

violence the influence of national political issues normally came a poor second behind
a multitude of local economic, religious and political rivalries.
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The purpose of this thesis has been to analyse mid-nineteenth century election
violence in England and Wales in order to provide a better understanding of the
character ofVictorian electioneering, and to assess the pace of political modernisation
as defmed by John Phillips and Charles Wethere11. 1 The analysis provided in Chapter

N also allows conclusions to be drawn about a phenomenon that appears to defy easy
categorisation.2 The statistical evidence of violence, the mapping of its occurrence at
general elections, and the individual case studies present a picture of mid-century
politics apparently little different from older, more traditional electoral forms. Ritual,
symbolism and physical force clearly remained important elements of electioneering
in England at least, and in larger urban boroughs in particular. As a visible reminder
of the continuity of English electoral culture, the presence of violence in the mid-tolate nineteenth century suggests a slow and disjointed process of political
modernization. In Wales the lack of violence during the period is surprising, but not
inexplicable.

Prior to 1868 the electoral dominance of the Anglican gentry

contributed to a lack of contests, and thus a lack of disorder. Thereafter, however, the
frequency of contests increased and continued to rise, yet contemporary sources
provide only scattered evidence of election violence.
This study has contributed in several important ways to our understanding of
mid-Victorian English and Welsh election violence.

In Chapter I some of the

ambiguities that characterise historical perceptions of electoral disorder were outlined,
including issues of scale, origin and relevance. Donald Richter describes election

1
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violence as "brutal and vicious", and focuses on events that he classed as "mob
action[s] of a terrorist nature", whereas K.T.Hoppen argues that electoral violence
was "merely a general disorder" that rarely became serious.

According to John

Stevenson elections remained a potent source of disorder into the late Victorian
period, yet Hoppen argues the decline of such violence from 1832. Both Richter and
Hoppen contend that electoral disorder was most likely a product of corruption as
well as public enthusiasm ("simple love of disorder" and "letting off steam"), whereas
Jon Lawrence presents this type of violence as a purposeful use of physical force that
was employed as part of the symbolism of political legitimacy. The 'student of
electoral tumults' is thus left with a range of questions about the nature of this
phenomenon. Did electoral violence represent a serious outburst of public disorder,
or was it mostly 'harmless chaff'? What did electoral disorder represent within the
context of electoral politics: was it 'artificially' generated and therefore devoid of
political relevance; was it a spontaneous outburst of 'sheer ebullience' with no
motivation beyond boisterous entertainment; or was it a controlled and symbolic
demonstration of political legitimacy?

How late into the nineteenth-century did

English and Welsh elections continue to experience these kinds of disruptions, and
which constituencies were most at risk? And did the pattern of disorder change
during the century? What then has now been revealed about the realities of Victorian
election violence?

This study has identified several key features of English and Welsh election disorder
between 1857 and 1880: a significant number of contested elections in England
experienced some form of disorder, whereas in Wales this was comparatively rare; the
scale of violence was most often 'serious' and required some degree of magisterial
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response to bring it to an end; the frequency of violence increased during the middle
decades of the period as electoral contests increased; the decline of disorder dates
from the 1870s; violence in England was widely distributed and rarely occurred in the
same constituency more than once; larger boroughs dominate the sample of disorder
because of the frequency with which they were contested, and despite being
outnumbered by small boroughs before 1867.

Mid-Victorian election violence occurred at a significant number of contested
elections between 1857 and 1880. Table 8 (p.121) reveals that between 1865 and
1880 (the period with the greatest frequency of violence) a minimum of 10% of the
total number of English and Welsh contests experienced some degree of violence. 3
Indeed the frequency of disorder was usually higher, with 15.1% of contests
experiencing violence in 1865, 26.4% in 1868, 11.6% in 1874 and 10.4% in 1880.
These figures also demonstrate the increase in violence that occurred during the
1860s, and the gradual decline in the 1870s and 1880s. An important characteristic of
election disorder was that it rarely occurred in the same location twice. Table 13
(p.167) shows that between 1857 and 1880 only three constituencies experienced
more than three disrupted elections.

The sample of violence is therefore not

dominated by a handful of especially violent constituencies.

This has important

implications for a study of the causes of election disorder, which will be examined
later.
The scale of violence at English and Welsh elections during the period ranged
from relatively minor incidents at one end, to full scale riots and mayhem at the other.

3

If only the English figures are examined the trend appears the same. 9.2% of English contests
occasioned violence in 1857, 8.3% in 1859, 14.3% in 1865, 24.5% in 1868, 12.7% in 1874 and 11.3%
in 1880. For a comparison of the percentages for both England and Wales see Table 8.
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However most cases of violence were serious outbursts of public disorder involving
physical damage to persons and/or property. Table 9 (p.l25) reveals the scale of
violence during the period; a total of 63 'riots', 77 'disturbances' and 51 'incidents'
occurred during campaigning across six general elections between 1857 and 1880.
Both 'riots' and 'disturbances' are classified as serious outbursts of public violence
and commonly involved destruction of property and physical assault, as well as
prompting some form of magisterial response. Thus almost three-quarters (73.2%) of
all cases of election violence during the period can be described as serious. 'Riots'
alone accounted for one-third of the sample of disorder. The many examples of
bleeding bodies, cut faces, broken heads and smashed windows belies a description of
these events as mere 'enjoyable circuses'. The ten fatalities recorded during these
years further highlights how serious English, and on occasion Welsh elections could
become.
Importantly, in contrast to Richter and Hanham's assertion that electoral
disorder was a feature of small towns and rural areas, much of the violence of the
period was concentrated in boroughs rather than counties, and in large urban centres
as opposed to small boroughs. Between 1857 and 1880 there were a total of 109
separate cases of borough violence compared to 47 cases of county violence. The
dominance of the boroughs was partly due to the fact that they outnumbered the
counties by slightly more than two to one, and because throughout the period 72.6%
of boroughs were contested compared to 44.6% of counties. 4 County constituencies
were in fact proportionately more likely to endure violence than the boroughs, with
17.7% of contested counties experiencing disorder as opposed to 12.4% of borough

4

For an explanation of how these percentages were derived see footnote 23 on page 128.
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contests. However the greater number of boroughs meant that much of the violence
during the period occurred there.
Somewhat surprisingly the study reveals that election violence was not a
feature of the small boroughs, where it is generally believed traditions of venal and
corrupt politics were more likely to have persisted. Rather the sample reveals that
disorder was concentrated in larger boroughs - during the period 94 'large' (more
than 1,000 before 1867 and more than 2,000 thereafter) and 25 'small' (fewer than
1,000 prior to 1867 and less than 2,000 after 1867) boroughs experienced some
degree of violence. The reality was that the smaller boroughs were not contested as
often as their larger counterparts, and so were less likely to be disrupted. In the larger
urban constituencies greater and more consistent efforts were needed by the political
parties to mobilise the electorate, efforts generating a heightened degree of partisan
conflict and enthusiasm which were frequent causes of violence. Campaign events in
larger constituencies were also able to attract far bigger crowds than smaller
constituencies. This is not to argue that small boroughs were politically dormant,
however they appear to have lacked the frequency of contests that provided an
important stimulus to electoral violence.
Map 7 in Chapter IV reveals the distribution of electoral disorder across
England and Wales between 1857 and 1880. Violence in Wales was concentrated in
the southern counties of Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire, Glamorganshire and
Monmouthshire, with isolated cases in Denbighshire and Carnarvonshire.

This

pattern reflected the frequency of electoral contests. The low incidence of electoral
contests in counties like Montgomeryshire, Brecknockshire and Radnorshire accounts
for the lack of violence in those areas. In England, where violence was located
predominantly in the North and West Midland, North Western and York divisions, the
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concentration of disorder reflected the distribution of small and large boroughs.
Areas with a high proportion of large boroughs experienced a greater number of
electoral contests, and therefore recorded more cases of violence. Table 14 (p.169)
reveals the lack of disorder in the Southern, South Eastern and Eastern divisions of
England, where there was a greater preponderance of small boroughs than in the
north.

Map 7 shows the frequency of English electoral violence to have been

concentrated in industrial districts, and correspondingly low in agricultural or rural
areas such as the South Eastern or Southern divisions. This pattern exemplifies the
distribution of English violence in large urban boroughs with a high population of
industrial labourers, such as the potteries district and the manufacturing centres of
Lancashire and Yorkshire.
A demographic analysis of electoral violence (see Table 15, p.170) failed to
provide clear evidence of a link between Irish populations and violence. The Northwestern division, with the largest concentration of Irish immigrants of any division in
England or Wales, did experience a considerable amount of violence.

Yet the

Northern, South Midland and London divisions had similarly large Irish populations
and each failed to produce even half as much disorder as the north west. Table 15
does not discount the role of the Irish in electoral violence. Yet it suggests that on the
available evidence explanations of the pattern of violence cannot take into account the
presence of Irish immigrants.
The importance of effective policing in the suppression or prevention of
election disorder is a debatable issue. Police forces, where clumsily used or heavyhanded in the execution of their duty, were more likely to increase violence than end
it. Violence in Lincoln during the 1862 by-election was prompted after the county
police were judged by rioters to have been too rough in dealing with a disorderly
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election crowd. The small size of borough and county forces meant that the police
were always going to be outnumbered by disorderly campaign crowds. Table 15 fails
to show any defmitive pattern of violence based on ratios of police to population.
London, with the best figures for the country did suffer the least amount of violence
during the period. Yet neither the South Midland nor Eastern divisions, with low
ratios of police to population, experienced considerable amounts of violence.
The pattern of disorder did not alter substantially during the mid-Victorian
period. Neither the First nor the Second Reform Act contributed to more peaceful
electioneering in England and Wales, despite Roland Quinalt's argument to the
contrary, indeed the increases to the electorate in 1832 and particularly in 1867, the
introduction of a system of registration in the former, and the inclusion of many new
working class voters in the latter were factors that helped stimulate the frequency of
electoral violence. These changes motivated the political parties to capture the new,
enlarged electorates, thereby contributing to the intensification of party conflict and
the likelihood of violence.

The timing of disorder remained relatively static

throughout the period with most elections being disturbed on the polling day. In that
respect John Stevenson's argument that the Secret Ballot Act (1872) reduced the
opportunity for violence by removing the open hustings is wide of the mark. Indeed
as late as 1880 more than one-third (38.4%) of all disorder continued to occur during
the poll. 5 The Ballot Act did, however, abolish the nomination ceremony which was a
frequent cause of violence during the period.

5
For details see Table 12, p.l30. The amount of violence occurring on the polling day may have been
higher as the statistics used in Table 12 include 26 cases of disorder in which the timing was unknown.
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This study presents a picture of mid-Victorian election violence as often serious,
geographically widespread (in England), relatively unchanged in scale and timing
throughout the period and explicable largely in terms of the frequency of election
contests. And yet what did these events represent within the context of Victorian
electoral politics? The motives of 'mobs' or individual rioters are rarely easy to
discern, and generalisations about the causes of election disorder are likely to obscure
as much as they reveal. After all what is true of violence in Liverpool, Lancashire is
not necessarily true of violence in Sandwich, Kent. What then has been written about
the origins of electoral disorder and what has this study contributed to that discussion?

As noted previously, there are several interpretations of election violence. It has
either been characterised as a product of corruption and bribery, as a purposeful and
ritualised aspect of electioneering, as the spontaneous outburst of a bored populace, or
as a combination of all three. Richter argues that most episodes of election violence
defy easy explanation and he suggests that beyond the influence of religious,
economic and ethnic rivalries, "election riots seem to have occurred with the purest
spontaneity, with the least degree of justifiable provocation or outrage". 6 Therefore
Richter turns to a "simple love of disorder'' to explain the bulk of violence that, he
stresses, owed less to specific sociological strains and more to "spontaneous outbursts
of sheer ebullience". He largely discounts the importance of political conflict in the
majority of election disturbances and writes that, "the difference between political
candidates, many times minute or imperceptible, could hardly have constituted the

6

Richter, "The Role ofMob Riot", p.26.
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basis for such brutal and vicious scenes of violence during the campaign and on the
polling day ... In short, the current of sustained, even habitual [my emphasis] violence
and rioting burst the bounds of all ordinary discontent"? ·Richter therefore suggests
that elections provided only the opportunity and not the motive for violence.
Hoppen echoes Richter's assessment of election violence as a product of
public boredom and the "letting off [of] steam". According to him Victorian electoral
'mobs' did not challenge the political status quo and sought only "participation in
enjoyable circuses". Yet Hoppen also contends that electoral manipulation was at the
bottom uf most cases of violence and he describes English elections as being,
"characterised by an atmosphere of urban mayhem and carnival underpinned by cash
on the nail". 8 Hoppen's interpretation of Victorian electoral disorder largely deprives
the participants of self-determination and presents them as either thugs-for-hire or as
bored spectators.
Rather than a random, spontaneous or artificially generated outburst,
Lawrence argues that electoral disorder represented a "widespread acceptance of, and
frequent connivance in, 'the politics of disruption'". 9 He presents these episodes as
part of a controlled display of physical force in which the disruption of campaign
events, or the 'capture' of civic space, formed a ritualised aspect of constituency
electioneering. As such violence was employed by politicians and partisans alike as a
highly visible and symbolic expression of political legitimacy.

Lawrence's

interpretation, while perhaps downplaying the severity of such events, suggests a

purposeful use of violence in which an electoral contest provided the motive and not
the opportunity for disorder.

7

Richter, "Public Order", p.240.
Hoppen, "Grammars", p.610.
9
Lawrence, Speaking for the Pe~ple, p.l83.
8
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The case studies in Chapter V provide an insight into the relative complexity
of electoral violence. The K.idderminster riot of 1857 owed much to partisan conflict,
economic depression, the unpopularity of the sitting member and the introduction of
an organised body of strangers to the town. Violence in Lincoln during the 1860s
grew out of partisan conflict and the political frustrations of the town's radical nonelectors. Militant parochialism, opposition to authority and the influence of treating
also contributed to Lincoln's disturbed elections. Bradford disorder was the product
of corruption (large-scale treating) and local rifts in political and religious opinion.
The popularity of election events in Bradford, and the large crowds that gathered for
speeches and meetings, also added to the potential for violence. In Carmarthenshire
violence grew out of partisan conflict and the introduction of organised 'roughs' in
the Conservative interest. This evidence suggests that the origins of electoral disorder
were rarely straightforward or simple. Beyond mere outbursts of 'sheer ebullience',
election riots could express genuine political grievances, and even where local
political tensions or religious conflicts provide a ready answer for violence, corrupt
practices could be found to have exercised an influence over disorder.
Given the apparent complexity that underlay moments of election disorder,
interpretations that stress the spontaneity or randomness of violence require some
assessment.

Richter downplays the importance of political motivations in the

outbreak of election violence and goes so far as to suggest that,

This is not to say that the rioters were necessarily aware of the
underlying motives for their rowdiness ... the more conscientious would
hardly be willing to admit that they raised a row at meetings merely for
the sake of a good time. Whether consciously or unconsciously the
working class rowdy sought to rationalise or justify his conduct as
fierce devotion to such commendable causes as religion, political
:freedoms or social justice. 10

10

Richter, "Public Order", p.250.
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Yet contemporary reports of violence in which indiscriminate looting and destruction
of property took place are balanced by accounts in which partisan motives were
clearly obvious. Attacks on committee-rooms, candidates besieged in their lodgings,
the houses of prominent party supporters being targeted, successful and unsuccessful
candidates pursued by 'mobs', and the partisan heckling, abuse and fighting that
occurred in front of the hustings; all suggest that Victorians were passionate about
their politics and were willing to engage even physically with the electoral campaign.

Furthermore, mid-Victorian election violence does not appear to have been habitual.
Only a handful of English and Welsh constituencies repeatedly experienced disturbed
elections, a situation that would undoubtedly have been reversed had a recourse to
violence been a habitual aspect of electioneering. Yet does the wide distribution of
disorder shown in Table 13 (p.l67) provide evidence of the randomness of electoral
violence? The case studies in Chapter V suggest another possibility as disorder in
Kidderminster, Lincoln, Bradford and Carmarthenshire appears less the product of
habitual patterns of violence, and more the outcome of specific local tensions. A
complex interplay of social, economic, religious and political conflicts informed midVictorian constituency politics, and the outbreak of violence in any constituency
depended upon the convergence of a number of factors: the length of the campaign,
the bitterness of the local political divide, the candidature of a stranger, the economic
condition of the constituency, traditions of treating, corrupt practices and the potential
local importance of national political issues. As such the frequency of violence within
an individual constituency depended upon fluctuations in the intensity of those
essentially local tensions. It seems clear, therefore, that elections provided the motive
rather than the opportunity for violence.

Victorian campaigning undoubtedly
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provided a measure of popular entertainment, but to characterize election violence as
the product of 'sheer ebullience' is wide of the mark. Whether generated by partisan
enthusiasm, corruption or even as part ofthe symbolism of party legitimacy, electoral
disorder represented the violent extension of a political contest.

m

According to John Phillips and Charles Wetherell, "England's frenzy over the Reform
Bill in 1831, coupled with the effect of the bill itself upon its enactment in 1832,
unleashed a wave of political modernization" .11 However the picture of Victorian
electioneering that emerges from this study is one in which political change was
delayed by the strength of pre-reform electoral traditions. In describing the nature of
English electioneering during the mid-nineteenth century Hoppen writes, "Locally,
involvement in electoral politics tended to mean action and ritual (often violent action
and ritual) rather than decision-making" .12 Certainly in that respect little had changed
for more than a century, and it is startling how far descriptions of mid-Victorian
elections mirror those of Hanoverian England despite the passage of reform acts in
1832 and 1867. Indeed much of the chaos and venality satirised in William Hogarth's
prints of the Oxfordshire contest of 1754 can be found duplicated in particular
nineteenth-century election reports. 13

Given this apparent level of continuity in

English electoral culture, what conclusions can be drawn about the pace of political
modernisation; that development which John Phillips and Charles Wetherell have
argued began to rapidly change the face of English electoral politics after 1832?

11

Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act", p.412.
Hoppen, The Mid- Victorian Generation, p.257.
13
See for example Chairing the Members (1754) in which corruption, intimidation, treating, rioting
and chairing are all displayed.
12
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Phillips and Wetherell argue that the First Reform Act quickly replaced the
Hanoverian political system with "an essentially modem electoral system based on
rigid partisanship and clearly articulated political principle". 14

They argue that

"persistent flaws" should not obscure the new political realities that were ushered in
with reform in 1832. Yet how far should those 'flaws' be ignored when they stand at
odds with a picture of post-reform politics as inclusive, principled and partisan? This
study has highlighted the largely parochial nature of a significant portion of the midVictorian electoral system. Phillips and Wetherell stress that in the wake of the Great
Reform Act, "political principle defined in national terms by the parties in
Westminster took the place of the local, factional and idiosyncratic concerns that had
dominated England's unreformed political system". 15 And yet a quarter of a century
later electoral politics in a number of English constituencies continued to revolve
around the influence of local personalities, local political, economic and social
tensions, corruption, electoral tradition and a recourse to the coercive or symbolic
implications of physical force and violence.
The pace of English political modernization after 183 2 has been challenged by
Jaggard in a study of electoral politics in seven Cornish small boroughs between the
First and Second Reform Acts. 16 He argues that,

Cornwall's small boroughs as well as family and proprietary boroughs
elsewhere illustrate how voters' preferences were the outcome of a
mixture of factors including questions of principle, electoral history,
the power of patrons, and local circumstances. Furthermore, after
1832 the speed of political modernisation was a function ofthe relative
strength of these varied factors, which was slower in many smaller
boroughs. 17

14

Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act of 1832", p.412.

15

Ibid., p.415.

16

Jaggard, "Small Boroughs", pp.622- 642. 'Small' boroughs refers to those with fewer than 1,000
voters prior to 1867.
17
Ibid., p.642.
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Yet the evidence of election violence presented here suggests that a slow pace of
modernisation was not restricted to the smaller boroughs. Indeed the majority of
Victorian election disorder occurred in the larger boroughs, where party organisation
might be expected to have been more advanced, and where the type of principled,
partisan politics that Phillips and Wetherell describe could have had a chance to
flourish. Indeed their conclusions about the pace of political modernisation are based
on evidence drawn almost exclusively from larger boroughs. 18 Thus in a number of
mid-Victorian English constituencies, of the very type in which Phillips and Wetherell
found a "new view of principle and principled behaviour"19 after 1832, electoral
politics continued to resonate to older electoral tunes in which notions of party,
principle and organisation were subsumed in favour of a reliance on ritual, symbolism
and action.

This thesis has identified the portion of the English electoral system that experienced
violence during the mid-Victorian period. In Wales violence was largely muted as
opportunities for electoral contests were stifled by the political hegemony of the
landed aristocracy. In England the continued presence of violence beyond the frrst
threshold of reform in 1832, and into the post-1867 era, reflected the strength of premodem electoral traditions and priorities.

Caroline Jackson describes the mid-

Victorian period as characterised by a dichotomy between two competing forms of
politics; one that looked backwards to the past, and one that looked forwards to the
future. Within such a framework violence remained as a visible expression of an

18

Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act of 1832", p.421. They used data drawn from 12
large boroughs and 1 small borough. The size of the electorate (in 1857) for each borough is provided
in brackets: Beverley (1,136), Bristol (12,612), Colchester (1,282), Hull (5,494), Lewes (724),
Liverpool (18,314), Maidstone (1,611), Newcastle (1,365), Northampton (2,375), Norwich (6,175),
Shrewsbury (1,617), Southampton (3,508) and Yarmouth (1,308).
19
Ibid., p.425.
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older style of politics. The nineteenth-century proved "a crucial transitional period
between the comparatively narrow (yet lively) electoral world of the eighteenthcentury and the broad democracy of the twentieth" ?0 And as we have seen, in the
mid-Victorian period the diffusion of political principle, voter partisanship and party
organisation was at times slowed by, amongst other factors, the repeated occurrence
of electoral violence.

20

Ibid., p.553.
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Appendix

The appendix includes all cases of election violence referred to in the thesis as 'the
sample'. Each episode has been categorized according to the following criteria: (i)
the county in which the constituency was located; (ii) the location of the violence,
normally a borough name but in some cases this records a county town; (iii) the year
in which the violence occurred; (iv) the type of constituency involved, either borough
or county; (v) the scale of the violence, either 'riot', 'disturbance' or 'incident'; and
(vi) the timing of the episode, if known. The size of the electorate involved is also
recorded, whether borough or county, and the source in which the episode of violence
was located is also provided. For easy identification all duplicate episodes of violence
have been highlighted and are in italics. In the constituency description category
cases of county violence are in bold type. The numbers provided in the far left
column are for reference purposes only.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Coun
BERKSHIRE
ESSEX
GLOUCESTERSHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE
SUSSEX
WARWICKSHIRE
WORCESTERSHIRE
YORKSHIRE
YORKSHIRE
YORKSHIRE

Coun
13 DORSET
14 LANCASHIRE
,'1~:!fANQifsftl8§,·
16 LANCASHIRE
17 LANCASHIRE
18 MIDDLESEX
19 OXFORDSHIRE
20 WILTSHIRE
21 YORKSHIRE
22 YORKSHIRE
23 YORKSHIRE,W.R
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Place
Wallingford
Harwich
Tewkesbury
Rochdale
Bolton
Nottingham
Brighton
Coventry
Kidderminster
Beverley
York
Sheffield

Year
1857
1857
1857
1857
1857
1857
1857
1857
1857
1857
1857
1857

Election
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough

Disorder
Disturbance
Disturbance
Incident
Disturbance
Incident
Incident
Incident
Incident
Riot
Disturbance
Disturbance
Incident

Timin
Declaration
Declaration
Polling Day
Meeting
Nomination
Declaration
Nomination
Meeting
Polling Day
Nomination
Nomination
Nomination

Place

Year
1859

Election
Borough

Disorder
Incident

Timina
Polling Day
Meeting

Bury
Oldham
Finsbury
Banbury
Calne
Beverley
Hull
Leeds

1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859

Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Coun

Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Riot
Incident
Disturbance
Incident

BOR
371
313
371
1255
1933
5650
3936
4982
502
1136
4236
6874

cou

BOR
COU
264
4222
NYiietJninFr ~;"T12?~ . !~:~ ' ·· ····•·····
Declaratio~·
Polling Day
2151
21951
Meeting
Polling Day
672
Declaration
174
1210
Nomination
Declaration
5526
40476
Meetin

\289 ,,,

Source
The Times
The Times
B&WJ.1857 April4.
NLH, 1857 April 4 & Hoppen
Manchester Guardian
The Times
The Times
CWT, Supplement March 18
MG, Coventry Weekly Times
S/C.1857 Petition Mf.62.28-9
Nonconformist
The Times
Source
The Times
Manchester Guardian
····Miiicfie~ter<.;uariit~Ji:· .j ·
Manchester Gtl~'rdian · ·. •· ··
Manchester Guardian
Manchester Guardian
Victorian Ban bury- B.Trinder
Bridlington Free Press
Manchester Guardian
Manchester Guardian
Manchester Guardian
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County
24 BERKSHIRE
25 YORKSHIRE, E

Place
Reading
Beverley

Year
1860
1860

Election
Borough BY
Borough BY

Disorder
Incident
Incident

Timin9
Polling Day
Declaration

BOR
1451
1210

cou

Source
Manchester Guardian
The Times

County
26 LEICESTERSHIRE

Place
Leicester

Year
1861

Election
Borough BY

Disorder
Riot

Timin9
Unknown

BOR
4207

cou

Source
The Times

County
27 LINCOLNSHIRE
28 LINCOLNSHIRE

Place
Grimsby
Lincoln

Year
1862
1862

Election
Borough BY
Borough BY

Disorder
Riot
Riot

Timing
Polling Day
Polling Day

BOR
4348
1435

cou

Source
Manchester Guardian
Home Office Papers

County
BERKSHIRE
BERKSHIRE
CAMBRIDGESHIRE
CUMBERLAND
·s3:'c£JfVi8i{fj~ftt5L~:· ·_., ···
34 DEVON
35 GLOUCESTERSHIRE

Place
Maidenhead
Windsor
Cambridge
Carlisle
ciiliisiir~r·:· .. :.. :
Tavistock
Cheltenham

Year
1865
1865
1865
1865
1~~5'' ·•
1865
1865

29
30
31
32

•-,

Election
County
Borough
Borough
Borough

Disorder
Disturbance
Disturbance
Incident
Disturbance
· .· ai/rotlgh : ·•~ q[~t{{rpan<fe__
Borough
Disturbance
Borough
Disturbance

Timing - BOR
COU
Polling Day
764 7
Declaration
651
Nomination
1769
Nomination
1304
· F:9ijj~f;'fi~Yii"'H;;·~~Q~Sm!t
Declaration
426
Canvass
2793

·.: •-• · · ·

~~~I({4<:Jl:f{Jg}~'il£F?.§HJtJ~;···gil~lfltn~~Jifjj: ··:·.••·]J36~-~--~-J¥fife~!L1i]::. :)pistuf6ance·r·r·: lifeiJJFifiJ0··
37
38
39
40
41

LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LEICESTERSHIRE,N
Ll NCOLNSHIRE
Ll NCOLNSHI RE

Rochdale
Oldham
Leicestershire,N
Lincoln
Grantham

1865
1865
1865
1865
1865

Borough
Borough
County
Borough
Borough

Riot
Incident
Disturbance
Riot
Disturbance

Unknown
Unknown
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day

•· _: -~:~~9,"3''~"~~, ·
1358
2285
6348
1713
755

Source
Nonconformist
Times
Nonconformist
Times, CENA

·cgtR~_:::;· .?2.: ..• c ...
C&DH
Cheltenham Examiner

· ci!felfen6aiif&'iimineHc:·r
Richter, 1965 Thesis
Hoppen, 1994 Article
HLT
Home Office Papers
Noncon, C&DH
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Place

Year

Election

Disorder

flming

BOR

COU

Source

42 NOTTINGHAMSf-iiRE .... Nottingham •....... ·...... 1865 ..· .·•. B~rough·.·.·· ·.··•· Ri?t, .••.•.
43 ·•ffovJtrf[Gfi:A!i!iJ§iiiftl& .• .li11/filfi9:7iiidlJ · ..•• ,: 4865 ;:-·T?C>iJ/ui:Jfli····.·.··. oisfu[ba~ce. :~

44P'EfVIsR.oKEsRTR.'E.

·Pembr.cil<e·~···

· Ts65

.Me~tin~···.: . 5934 · •· ·
. · •.. ··•···· ..... Non~o.~for~ist
•r
M1!Jl!na~O!J .· ,:;~~$4}i;T .· ·.· ...... ·.; : : · • . Nonr/cFe;i1ofii-i[§f)'1J;:J;·:;~;
sorou9h.. incident. Nomination ···1433 ···· · ·· ··········· ··The welshm·a·n
·

45 PEMBROKESHIRE
Haverfordwest
1865
Borough
Disturbance
Polling Day
669
The Welshman
46 SUSSEX
Lewes
1865
Borough
Incident
Nomination
676
Times
41 7 ltt~f5W£Gf(§l;fl@y!}£ / lMfl~rS.t9H!Pj;~.i . ·. ·.···18~§! ..d·9.R~~~T' ··~.IfnciCient : · · • ···· 'P(jftt~9f!iiiit r::r• ··:r . ,.374(!
(¥tJt~~t;; t~?4~~1$t~f&d~iirf&cfiL
48 WARWICKSHIRE,N
Nuneaton
1865
County
Incident
Polling Day.
3740 .. Quinalt, 1974 inStevenson&Q
49 Jf!liijW£q~§lfif!jg~~iT ,r;~M~riJlOOf!?.~~)i I:~.'Ji~:·l~~§~;:l~~:£f>Hnt.Yi:;E~~2f11S.1i.Jf§~~fif .·::.·::·flnf/j§liiili~Tif·t ~~~;llii1Il~§.§Q;;r;J.:91Jlrt?ft;;·r.~~¥i!!J.$J.~ft~Hilh~fAii.~:
50 WARWICKSHIRE,S
Warwick
1865
County
Incident
Unknown
2550
Quinalt, 1974 in Stevenson&Q
51 WILTSHIRE
Chippenham
1865
Borough
Riot
Polling Day
392
Times, Non, C&DH
52 WILTSHIRE
Cricklade
1865
Borough
Riot
Polling Day- 2029
Times
53 WORCESTERSHIRE Kidderminster
1865
Borough
Disturbance
Polling Day
612
Times
54 WORCESTERSHIRE Dudley
1865
Borough
Riot
Unknown
1358
C&DH
55 YORKSHIRE, WR.S
Rotherham
1865
County
Riot
Polling Day
19908
Nonconformist
56 YORKSHIRE, WR.S
Huddersfield
1865
Borough
Riot
Unknown
2138
C&DH
57 YORKSHIRE, E
Hull
1865
Borough
Disturbance
Declaration
5566
HLT

U•

County

58 ESSEX
59 YORKSHIRE, WR.N

Place
Colchester
Bradford

Year

1867
1867

Election
Borough BY
Borough BY

Disorder
Incident
Riot

Timing

BOR

Unknown
Nomination

1405
21158

cou

Source
Proceedings of the H.C.
Select Committee 1868-9

r
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Avvendix

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

County
CAMBRIDGESHIRE
CAMBRIDGESHIRE

,:qjjftii!NJ~lj{gl)i; :~ 7~

Place
Cambridge
Whittlesey

;;:

"~f!~ii~Itfi miE~~~

Year
1868
1868

•:~ }868 '}

Election
Borough
County

:}?§fcftj~~;

CARMARTHEN
CARMARTHEN
CARNARVONSHIRE
CHESHIRE

Carmarthen
Carmarthen
Carnarvon
Birkenhead

1868
1868
1868
1868

Borough
County
Borough
Borough

CHESHIRE,MID
CUMBERLAND
CUMBERLAND,E
DENBIGHSHIRE
DERBY,E
DERBY,S
DEVON,S
DURHAM,N
GLAMORGANSHIRE
GLAMORGANSHIRE
GLOUCESTERSHIRE
GLOUCESTERSHIRE
ISLE OF WIGHT
KENT
KENT ,W
LANCASHIRE

Sandbach
Carlisle
Cumberland,E
Ruthin (Denbigh E
Clay Cross
Ripley
Hatherleigh
Durham City
Cardiff
Aberdare (Merthy1
Cheltenham
Coleford
Newport
Gravesend
Bromley
Blackburn

1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868

County
Borough
County
Borough
County
County
County
County
Borough
Borough
Borough
County
County
Borough
County
Borough

:PlllS~ldlff§I;;::;:;c ···;:;~.:r;g:J~/E~~rrb:~~~~r:z.; ·',E.I~~§:~· .:· ". :§919liii~

':

Disorder
Incident
Riot

Timing
Polling Day
Polling Day

BOR
4000

;r Jit6Ji:N~J1f>;·.

Y¥if~i[~!it'

Disturbance
Disturbance
Incident
Incident

Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Nomination

Riot
Disturbance
Riot
Incident
Disturbance
Riot
Riot
Riot
Riot
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance

Polling Day
Unknown
Declaration·
Unknown
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Unknown
Polling Day
Declaration
Polling Day
Unknown
Polling Day
Polling Day
Nomination

COU

Source
Gloucester Journal
The Times

9502

;' • ~ ~g~~~~j ,~T ,J ! s;>;
3286

8026
3376
5892

· · · · · :·.• '::lb£~cien,f:;.,~;·'~J}iJlilltn.gJP~x~i~~:~§§~?:':"

i,Q~r(p~ij}J~q;J}~flirij~l·
Carmarthen Journal
Carmarthen Journal
C&DH
Manchester Guardian

J~~IEi E~.'~! X'.::ftf{lhfi@~t~!I?'ft~r~l~h

7158

4537
6672
7623
4550
7873
8047
10576
5388
14577
3536
11463
3807
2722
8828
9183

i

Manchester Guardian
CENA
Manchester Guardian, G.J
C&DH
Derbyshire Courier
DC, Richter
The Times, GJ
Manchester Guardian
BDP, The Cambrian
Bristol Daily Post
Gloucester Journal
Gloucester Journal
Hansard(3)1870.Vol.202 p.1355
Select Committee 1868-9
Home Office Papers
MG, CJ

Avvendix

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

County
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE,S
LANCASHIRE,S.W
LEICESTERSHIRE,N
LEICESTERSHIRE,S
LINCOLNSHIRE
LINCOLNSHIRE
LINCOLNSHIRE,S
MIDDLESEX
MONMOUTHSHIRE
MONMOUTHSHIRE
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Place
Bury
Wigan
Warrington
Preston
Bolton
Salford
Ashton-u-Lyne
Stalybridge
Manchester
Blackburn
Wigan
Shepshed
Hinckley
Lincoln
Boston
Lincolnshire,S
Finsbury
Newport
Blanaevon

Year
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868

Election
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
County
County
County
County
Borough
Borough
County
Borough
Borough
County

Disorder
Disturbance
Incident
Disturbance
Disturbance
Riot
Incident
Riot
Disturbance
Disturbance
Riot
Disturbance
Riot
Riot
Riot
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Riot
Riot

Timing
Nomination
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Nomination
Nomination
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Declaration
Nomination
Declaration
Meeting
Polling Day
Polling Day

BOR
5587
3939
4470
10763
12650
15862
4822
5338
48256

cou

19340
19218
6348
8306
4243
2527
10493
33601
3731
7971

Source
Manchester Guardian
Manchester Guardian
MG, Warrington Guardian
MG
MG
MG
MG, Hanham
Select Committee 1868-9
Gloucester Journal
Manchester Guardian
Nonconformist
Derbyshire Courier
MG, Times, GJ
J.F.Hill (Victorian Lincoln)p.34
Boston Gazette
Boston Gazette
Alcester Chronicle
MG, Home Office Papers
Manchester Guardian

1o3,,rffp'NAI{()I.Jrl-j~ljlfjg''I,~~ntypR~[E;,:I;1.~~~[ ~'~~u~~i,: . Riot: ·.. ~61/ih~(~g:,. '':'
f~~f,t/'
104,ft(19NMPUTHS1j{f(W .• . • • •. .• ~l)~r?ychae . '··········~.1868'' '.;gotlpty,i::: F· •.• Riot; : ,. i...••• P;q/QIJf/rEJEJY~::· r::,rr , ····,,,?~£1t
105 MQNMOUTHSH/RE: ·····tf~c/~Q~( , ••..•.•. . ,~!t ~.fc§~§i. ,:~~2t~I!~L:: .. •·• ·Riot .. · · .,:·.· fg[l!f?dt~Y,i .... • .· . ~· ·~·,.((J7,tt••
106 NORTHAMPTONSHIRE Peterborough
107 NOTTINGHAMSHIRE Nottingham
108 NOTTINGHAMSHIRE,N Mansfield

1868
1868
1868

Borough
Borough
Coui!!Y.

Disturbance
Incident
Riot

Declaration
Meeting
Nomination

2461
14168

5205

,;)r~'~"J!t,t[L''•
Boston Gazette
The Times
MG, Times, DC
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Countv
109 SHROPSHIRE
110 SOMERSET

113
114
115
116

STAFFORDSHIRE
STAFFORDSHIRE
STAFFORDSHIRE
STAFFORDSHIRE,W

Place
Church Stretton
Bristol

Year
1868
1868

Election
County
Borough

Disorder
Riot
Riot

Stafford
Wednesbury
Lichfield
Wolverhampton

1868
1868
1868
1868

Borough
Borough
Borough
County

Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance

Timina
Polling Day
Polling Day

Polling
Polling
Polling
Polling

Day
Day
Day
Day

BOR

COU
5847

Source
MG, Staffordshire Advertiser
MG, Times, GJ

21153

SA, Stafford Petition
Staffordshire Advertiser
Staffordshire Advertiser
MG, The Times

3152
14277
1320
9942

Jii~f!ll!~~:!ir•t,~,i ~i{!~~-~ ~JT~;~~:~~47i,,tl~:,ir~if~J$il 1''::r;,

120 SUFFOLK
Ipswich
1868
Borough
Disturbance
Polling Day
121 SUSSEX
Horsham
1868
Borough
Incident
Nomination
122 \'\fARWICKSHIRE,s..
Le~mingto~
.. , 1868,, County.
Distu~bance .· Decl~~.ation
1i§.t[~tf§i4t4~A~RIJ t86i3. · ~fly~~<···-· ln(;k;ien.f; 1.
123 ,W~FiJMRB~f:l(@t§
124 WORCESTERSHIRE,E Hales Owen
1868
County
Riot
Polling Day
125 ~W.C!l3XJ!r~tiii3~1f!{f§§.B~~~I146.:',:·
i::·l§§~i .. ;.. ;£~iif!tYXt ·• bfstiii:ban(;ef' ::e§!f(og.i~t
126 YORKSHIRE,W.R.S
Wakefield
1868
Borough
Riot
Nomination
Halifax
1868
Borough
Incident
Polling Day
127 YORKSHIRE,W.R
128 YORKSHIRE, E
York
1868
Borough
Riot
Declaration
Bradford
1868
Borough
Incident
Declaration
129 YORKSHIRE,W.R
Barnsley
1868
County
Riot
Polling Day
130 YORKSHIRE,W.R

:.

•.:::

Place
Bradford

6205 :

l[nF.rO.itlli'

.· J

Coun
131 YORKSHIRE,W.R

5352
799

Year
1869

Election
Borouah BY

Disorder
Riot

Timin
Nomination

<

$42fJ.~C ·
10313

. x ,.:tr.::;.;<to343' · · · ·
36 27
9328
9088
21158
19908
BOR
21158

cou

lE & ESM
Richter, 1965
Boston (3a.~ette

N~~tlii;t;hrp,qio[e:c'<
Manchester Guardian

'[~~t~f,ifP.lj~ofii£!~;:L"·~:T·

Manchester Guardian
MG, Staffordshire Advertiser
Bradford Advertiser
Manchester Guardian
Source
1868-9 Select Committee o.143
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Coun
132 YORKSHIRE, N

Place
Rip on

Year
1871

Election
Borough BY

Disorder
Riot

Timina
Polling Day

BaR

Countv
133 CORNWALL
134 DERBYSHIRE, EAST
135 DERBYSHIRE
136DURHAM,NORTH

Place
Penryn & Falmou·
Chesterfield
Derby
Hetton

Year
1874
1874
1874
1874

Election
Borough
County
Borough
County

Disorder
Disturbance
Incident
Incident
Riot

Timina
Declaration
Polling Day
Declaration
PollingDay

BaR

137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

eau

Source
Nonconformist

eau

Source
MG, 9 Feb 1874, p.8
MG, 11 Feb 1874, p.6
MG, 6 Feb 1874, p.7
MG,11Feb1874,p.7

1025

1860
4836
11316
12153

Tl:>fl8lfM1Ef1lJif{f{fdiE :·._.:§~~&?!Jti:~:~~~·;··•··•·· :.I!~~~~r:::~~~[~g~fi.i~~~E.i·.• f#J1~"2~~~I:'0' e9Jlfi~FJ?.¥i .•.~ ····~:~~·:r·;~~··· {~!5.?·:~::·~I·3:~&lJ,A:1tiifil/ii:'f§'t~{i?I:t:i:L•::;I[·.•~
GLOUCESTERSHIRE Cinderford
LANCASHIRE
Liverpool
LANCASHIRE
Stalybridge
LANCASHIRE
Warrington
LINCOLNSHIRE
Lincoln
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE Peterborough
NORFOLK
Norwich
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE Nottingham
OXFORDSHIRE
Oxford
STAFFORDSHIRE
Wolverhampton

1874
1874
1874
1874
1874
1874
1874
1874
1874
1874

County
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough

Riot
Incident
Riot
Incident
Riot
Disturbance
Incident
Disturbance
Incident
Disturbance

Polling Day
Declaration
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Polling Day
Canvass
Declaration
Meeting
Meeting

11463

Nonconformist
MG, 7 Feb 1874, p.5
MG, 5 Feb 1874, p.8
MG, 3 Feb 1874, p.8
Nonconformist
Nonconformist
MG, 4 Feb 1874, p.8
MG, 6 Feb 1874, p.6
MG, 3 Feb 1874, p.8
The Times

54952
5129
5022
4689
3056
15166
16154
5680
23257

1
:::1]~~;~
'i"Ml~;,~:~llrl.~,~~:;~
!
.
~~~@0
~;~ji~r:
il!!J;:·::·~~1~~~~~J~;
.
r~J~%'Jl['l
§J["JJ£-E9RQ§!Tfl@ .· . . ·...
•:
Riot. • •·• , J?oflmgJf1<1Y.'•;;'23257
:M(3,;fJRf!JbJ874, p,.§,,.r. > ·

150
'lfil~flh<~lttWcofo(erhiftp). f8U;~:
Bg£9,Ugf! ...·
151 sTAFFD'RbsrHRE ·
1874···· Borough
152 STAFFORDSHIRE
Stoke-on-Trent
1874
Borough
153 'srA#i=6RO§FiiREC .• Stoke'"On-Trent ~ ·~;,'18741 X.'Bcit01i~iff~

wec!nesbury · ··

7

·
Disturbance · Pollin 9 bay···263'5f
Disturbance
Polling Day
19129

'iffFckient

:1\lli:Jeiffr/il~··f·

11 ;;

·· · · · ·

:~

. ,• ; •..•.•

1

····staff. Chief constable Report
Staff. Chief Constable Report

:1:912.9/.· ············ .....

't~·wvt'Gli5.:Fi:J'b"if8't4,i>;({''~'{

,,:
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County
Place
154 SUFFOLK
Ipswich
Bewdley
155 WORCESTERSHIRE
Dudley
156 WORCESTERSHIRE
.157 WORCESTERSHIRE, E Lye
158 [:Yf!lJF!i?~~Jli~§fiit{£);E 'Filr!@C9(f~'fl··
159 YORKSHIRE, W.R
Castleford
160 YORKSHIRE, W.R.S
Barnsley
161 YORKSHIRE,W.R.S
Sheffield
Hull
Pontefract

County
165 WILTSHIRE

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

County
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE
CHESHIRE
CHESHI RE,M
CHESHIRE,W
CUMBERLAND,W
DEVON,E
DEVON,N
DORSET
DORSET

Election
Borough
Borough
Borough
County

Disorder
Disturbance
Disturbance
Riot
Riot

cJi:t:W4· ::.·Ig~~i'!ii .?~~l L:i:?fai ,..~a:

162['{.6i3f5§1#JIB.$~: W}tfl§~_-.. .§~~(ff~tgJ:' ·:~·:12
163 YORKSHIRE
164 YORKSHIRE

Year
1874
1874
1874
1874

;

1874
1874
1874

County
County
Borough

Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance

Timing
Polling Day
Declaration
Polling Day
Polling Day

BOR
6619
1082
5578

11105

:~o[IfHg;Q.~'i~ ·;:: ;,;;· ..~:~
Polling Day
Polling Day
Meeting

~;~~?.~ ~i· ~Ei§!P~"iiJxA.C .· f~~2tlfenf5:ri e~alag:fid?cx

COU

Source
The Times
MG, 2 Feb 1874, p.8
Journal of House of Commons
MG, 13 Feb 1874, p.5

;1rtto5• :~ :. · •- MP:; /t$fif!J~1~'fitk-~d 'EJi)
19908
29922

36701

MG, 14 Feb 1874, p.7
MG, 11 Feb 1874, p.6
Nonconformist

I :~~tl!.1l~;c? . L;LA. .: ; : •. ifv1/li;1/Jf;~§:[z,§:tft2P: :z .·. ; '

1874
1874

Borough
Borough

Disturbance
Incident

Polling Day
22026
Declaration - 2038

MG, 9 Feb 1874, p.7
MG, 4 Feb 1874, p.5

Place
Wilton

Year
1877

Election
Borough BY

Disorder
Disturbance

Timing
Meeting

BOR
1401

cou

Source
Nonconformist

Place
Great Marlow
Chester
Northwick
Neston
Barrow-i n-F urn es~
Newton Abbot
Ex mouth
Dorchester
Shaftesbury

Year
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880

Election
Borough
Borough
County
County
County
County
County
Borough
Borough

Disorder
Riot
Disturbance
Riot
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Incident
Riot
Disturbance

Timing
Declaration
Polling Day
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Polling Day
Polling Day

BOR
941
7611

cou

Source
Manchester Gua,rdian
Manchester Guardian
William Saunders, 1880
William Saunders, 1880
William Saunders, 1880
William Saunders, 1880
William Saunders, 1880
Manchester Guardian
William Saunders, 1880

8963
11097
7496
10416
9496
817
1388

Avvendix

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Coun
DURHAM
DURHAM,S
HAMPSHIRE
ISLE OF WIGHT
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE
LANCASHIRE,S.E
LINCOLNSHIRE
NORTHUMBERLAND
SOMERSET
STAFFORDSHIRE
WARWICKSHIRE,S
WILTSHIRE
WORCESTERSHIRE,E
YORKSHIRE,W.R.S
YORKSHIRE
YORKSHIRE,W.R.S
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Place
South Shields
South Durham
Winchester
Shanklin
Warrington
Ashton-u-Lyne
Farnworth
Lincoln
Newcastle-u-Tyne
Bath
Lichfield
Leamington
Swindon
Oldbury
Pontefract
Hull
Rotherham

Year
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880

Election
Borough
County
Borough
County
Borough
Borough
County
Borough
Borough
Borough
Borough
County
County
County
Borough
Borough
Coun

Disorder
Riot
Incident
Disturbance
Disturbance
Disturbance
Incident
Riot
Disturbance
Incident
Riot
Incident
Riot
Disturbance
Incident
Riot
Incident
Riot

Timin
Unknown
Unknown
Polling Day
Meeting
Polling Day
Unknown
Polling Day
Declaration
Unknown
Declaration
Polling Day
Polling Day
Unknown
Meeting
Polling Day
Unknown
Polling Day

BOR
9893

cou
10498

2011
5320
5919
5901
20631
4243
23800
5534
1374
6429
7249
12455
2429
26193
26329

Source
Manchester Guardian
Manchester Guardian
Manchester Guardian
Manchester Guardian
MG, Warrington Guardian
Nonconformist
Manchester Guardian
J.F .Hill (Victorian Lincoln)p.193
Nonconformist
William Saunders, 1880
Lichfield Borough Petition
William Saunders, 1880
Salisbury & Winchester Journal
Manchester Guardian
Manchester Guardian
Nonconformist
William Saunders, 1880
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